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Life can only be understood backwards. But [...] it must be lived forwards. 
(Kierkegaard, 1847, cited in Stevens, 1996: 185)
_______________________________________________________________
The work that forms this doctoral portfolio was not designed around a theme. 
On first viewing, a literature review on the use of gratitude within psychological 
therapy does not obviously link with a case study exploring the therapeutic 
relationship between client and counselling psychologist, nor indeed with a 
research study into changing identities following cancer. However, as I reached 
my final year of training I became aware that this work was intricately 
connected, through a multi-faceted exploration of meaning. As a woman 
changing career in mid-life, counselling psychology did not simply represent a 
qualification, but also a way of better understanding both my fellow human 
beings and my self. In his exploration of the philosophical underpinnings of 
existentialism, May (1983: 76) cites Nietzschean ideas which suggest that 
human beings should make “their experiences a matter of conscience for 
knowledge.”  The values and choices underlying the work in this portfolio form 
such a personal act of meaning: to paraphrase the American philosopher, 
Thomas Nagel, it is “the view from somewhere” (Nagel, 1986: 1).
In teasing apart this personal act, I hypothesise that there are three different 
ways in which I have sought to explore meaning. The first is through the 
decision to focus on material which is, in itself, concentrated on the 
understanding of meaning. Part of the interest in conducting a literature review 
on gratitude was the opportunity to consider how we appreciate – or endow 
with value or meaning – the different elements in our lives. As I discuss later, 
gratitude is a positive emotion which, by raising awareness of our good fortune 
or of others’ concern for ourselves, can increase a person’s sense of well-being. 
While we may be more used to considering gratitude within the sphere of 
everyday life rather than in the consulting room, research is now showing that 
interventions centred on the development of gratitude can increase wellbeing 
among the general population. Gratitude also appears to play a part in the 
adjustment of people who have experienced trauma, through cognitive 
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appraisals which attribute benefits to the self from traumatic event. Clearly, 
however, there are tricky ethical considerations about the way in which such 
discussions might arise; as Janoff-Bulman (1992) states, this understanding of 
trauma needs to arise from the client, rather than be imposed from the 
counselling psychologist. However, writing this literature review did indeed help 
me to appreciate benefits of gratitude, both for its therapeutic potential and for 
the greater understanding I gained about the people and things for which I 
was personally grateful.
The material of the professional work and the research study are very 
obviously connected with the making of meaning. In the case study, my client 
Abigail is seeking to make sense of the imminent death of her mother, within 
circumstances which significantly complicate the nature of this grief. The 
research project explores how, following an experience of breast cancer, 
younger women create meaning in their lives through continuity and change in 
their identities. As Frankl (1992) asserts, living through such circumstances is 
not a question of simple existence, but rather requires at some level a decision 
as to what existence will be. These studies take up questions of how meaning 
is constructed at the level of particular relationships or roles, but is also 
created through broader systems of personal belief and as well as the cultural 
discourses which shape our general approach and interaction with life.
Thus in considering the fundamental substance of this portfolio, I realised that 
I have been drawn to write about issues of meaning, through a desire to 
understand more about the nature of our existence as human beings and the 
way this existence is realised in our practical, everyday lives. However, there is 
also a second facet of meaning which is reflected throughout this portfolio, and 
this concerns efforts to understand professional meanings in my new identity 
as a trainee counselling psychologist. As Rose (1990) has argued, 
psychologists are not working within a fixed environment, but rather have an 
active role in the creation of this environment:
 
 Psychology is not merely a space in which outside forces have been played out, a tool 
 to be used by pre-given classes or interest groups. To the extent that its various theories 
 have been more or less successful in enrolling allies [...] in producing calculable 
12
 transformations in the social world, in linking themselves into stable networks, they have 
 established new possibilities for action and control. In establishing and consolidating 
 such networks, in forcing others to move along particular channels of thinking and 
 acting, psychologists have participated in the fabrication of contemporary reality. (Rose, 
 1990: 112).
During my first year of counselling psychology training, I worked within the 
National Health Service, and this clinical work involved treatment for a wide 
range of distress which could be coded as “psychopathology”. The choice to 
write a literature review on gratitude arose from my desire to consider how, 
instead of treating distress, psychological knowledge could be used to prevent 
such conditions occurring in the first place.  In her “broaden and build” theory, 
Frederickson (1998) suggests that positive emotions undo the adverse 
physiological effects of negative emotions, and extend cognitive functioning 
through more creative, flexible or efficient patterns of thinking. This 
exploration of the potential of gratitude allowed me to conceive of a wider 
function for counselling psychology, which moved beyond the management of 
distress to a concern for alternative ways of promoting wellbeing. The resulting 
critical literature review was published in Counselling Psychology Review 
(Nelson, 2009), and has been updated here with relevant recent studies.
This interrogation of my identity as a counselling psychologist is also evident in 
my professional practice case study. While proficiency as a counselling 
psychologist clearly requires knowledge of appropriate therapeutic techniques, 
I had become increasingly interested during my final year of training in what is 
often called ‘use of self’: the degree to which the person of the counselling 
psychologist is, and should be, made manifest in the therapy room. Such 
issues of ‘being versus doing’ (Frankland & Walsh, 2009) involve consideration 
of the relative contributions of specific ‘methodological’ techniques and a 
psychologist’s empathic, accepting presence to a client’s progress in therapy. 
In writing this particular case study, I was attempting to make clear my 
growing sense of the two-person nature of psychological therapy, and my 
evolving conceptualisation of the psychologist’s role. This involved a shift from 
my earlier, more cautious work as a trainee, where I was more concerned with 
mastering the technical tools of the trade and less aware of working on the 
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messier and more complex relational issues which are so critical to therapeutic 
outcomes. 
In choosing to explore the lived experience of women with breast cancer, I was 
again conscious of a choice motivated by my vision for counselling psychology. 
The substantial majority of studies concerning therapeutic interventions and 
cancer focus upon cognitive adaptation to this new state, and intra-personal 
factors relating to an individual’s adjustment. However, while recognising the 
value of such research, my concern is that psychology restricts itself to the 
domain of the individual, and fails to understand how the meaning of cancer is 
actually transacted within the context of a person’s daily life: our social world. 
Situating myself within critical realist framework, I hold that there is a material 
reality to our world – bodies, tumours, hair loss – but believe that our 
understanding is profoundly shaped by the ways in which we talk and act 
about these objects. Therefore the choice of methodology and research 
question in this study were, in some very small measure, a way of presenting 
an alternative understanding of the cancer experience within counselling 
psychology.
So in addition to an explicit focus on the types of meaning constructed, each 
piece of work within this portfolio represents my exploration of professional 
meanings available to a counselling psychologist. However, there is also a final 
facet of meaning which is present in my work, and which connects on an 
intimate level with the earlier levels of meaning. Following Bruner (1990), I 
perceive that my choice of perspectives in the pieces presented here 
represents my personal values and preferences. Such values, Bruner suggests, 
propose a basis for the satisfactory conduct of life, or at least a basis for 
negotiation: these values provide the foundation for self identity, as well as a 
means of locating oneself within a culture. This personal meaning is deeply 
present in each element of the portfolio. In choosing to write about gratitude, I 
was aware of wanting to resist the ‘medicalisation’ of counselling psychology. 
During my undergraduate studies, I was particularly inspired by the works of 
Csikszentmihalyi (1992) on the nature of “flow”: a state when a person feels 
they are totally engrossed in and stimulated by an experience or activity. Thus 
I was attracted to exploring gratitude, and the new field of positive psychology, 
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because of the contrast it presented to my clinical work. As its founder, Martin 
Seligman (2003) describes, the intent behind positive psychology is to explore 
how to build wellbeing from a notional scale of 0 to +7, rather than the deficit 
reduction of clinical work which seeks to move the needle from -7 to 0. Clearly, 
the majority of work for counselling psychologists is in healthcare settings 
which require work within evidence-based models of care on the alleviation of 
distress. However, the increasing incidence of psychological distress within 
Western societies suggests that, as counselling psychologists and as human 
beings, we need to think more creatively about the ways of living which inform 
our lives. Positive psychology has been criticised as a kind of L-dopa for the 
masses; Barbara Ehrenreich (2009) is only one among many authors who has 
sought to challenge positive psychology for its ‘unrealistic’ focus on wellbeing, 
and for the emphasis it places on individual action rather than social change to 
achieve such ends. However, while accepting these criticisms, I have found 
positive psychology has offered me a way of appraising the ways of living 
which I offer to others through therapy, as well as the forms of working and 
living which I adopt in my own life. 
In my case study, I was aware that an important personal meaning lies in the 
choice of therapeutic approach. I have a strong regard for the principles and 
utility of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), but have concerns that – as a 
counselling psychology trainee in the early twenty first century – the dominant 
focus on CBT is becoming something of a new “methodolatory” (Allport, 1937: 
127). Understanding and shaping these cognitive and behavioural patterns has 
clearly enabled psychologists to find more constructive ways of living, and this 
is likely to be further enhanced in future through our greater appreciation of 
the neuroscientific composition of the brain. However, in a society which sees 
an increasing emphasis on technical aspects of self involving control over 
nature and the mind, I share the concern expressed by May (1983) that we are 
repressing our ontological sense of being. What excites me about person 
centred (and existential) therapeutic approaches is the embracing of these 
fundamental dilemmas of our human lives: our struggle with issues of non-
being, which can be seen as both external, as in the reality of death, and also 
internal, as in the personal characteristics which limit us from fulfilling our own 
potentialities. Thus the choice to write my final case study within the person 
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centred model is partly an acknowledgement of the gratitude I feel for the 
inspiration and insight I have been able to draw from humanistic thinking 
during my counselling psychology training.
The research study contains perhaps the most personal meaning in this 
portfolio. At the beginning of my second year of post-graduate training, I was 
diagnosed with early stage breast cancer. As I describe later within a reflexive 
consideration during the research, I was deeply shocked by the diagnosis. 
Within in a week, it seemed that my whole world had been turned upside 
down. However, at the same time I have also been aware – both then and now 
– of my good fortune. This good fortune consisted not only of having family, 
friends and counselling psychology colleagues who supported me through this 
time, but also of having access to the resources of a profession which allowed 
me to make sense of my own experience. After a first year of training with 
personal therapy and reflexive journals, denying cancer didn’t seem the way 
forward! The research study which I have developed here has therefore had 
very significant meaning for me, and while this is covered in more detail during 
the reflexive aspects of the research study, I would like to draw out two 
aspects of that meaning here. The first is that the research question arose in 
part from my own experience of cancer, where I found myself translating the 
meaning of cancer through the identities available to me in my everyday life. 
However, during investigation of existing research on cancer and identity, there 
was much less consideration of this area than I had expected, but rather a 
focus on the refinement of coping strategies and adjustment. As I shall discuss 
later, I believe a greater connection with the grounded, lived experience of 
cancer can enhance our capacity as counselling psychologists to support people 
in such situations.
The second meaning is both personal and public, or perhaps - as the early 
feminists advocated - the personal is the political. In her humane and 
thoughtful book about trauma, Janoff-Bulman (1992) discussed how those 
whose survival is threatened seek to rebuild their fundamental assumptions 
about the world. When the meaningfulness of the world appears to be 
overturned by an event, one typical response is to find new meaning by re-
evaluating the disruptive event in terms of its benefits for self and others. In 
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going beyond my personal journal writings and conversations, I am aware that 
this research has provided me with an opportunity to explore the wider context 
of my own experience with cancer, and refine my understanding of personal 
‘lessons learnt’.  However, I also know that another way of making sense of my 
experience was to use it in some way for the benefit of others. In his book “At 
the will of the body”, Frank (1991) writes persuasively of the way in which 
medical and social systems deprive ill persons of conversations about their 
illness: their hopes and fears; their sense of suffering; the possibility of death. 
His image of health and illness as foreground and background strikes me as a 
critically important understanding; as counselling psychologists, we can do 
better work when we not only deal with the cognitive processing of our clients, 
but also deal in the detailed realities of managing an existence lived with 
cancer. Indeed, listening to these experiences of illness can help inform and 
develop particular Western definitions of ‘health’ as a controlled and disciplined 
body.
So while the elements of this portfolio may seem superficially un-connected, I 
can now look back and perceive how there are very material connections in the 
content of the work, and in the areas of personal and professional meaning. 
Frankl (1992: 104) has written movingly about his sense of the human “will to 
meaning”: a primary motivational force in human beings to find meaning and 
sense in existence. He suggests that we can derive meaning in three ways: 
through creating work; through encountering someone; and through the 
attitude we take to unavoidable suffering. In re-reading Frankl’s book, it struck 
me that in some modest way the literature review on gratitude, the case study 
about two-person therapy, and research into the experience of cancer can be 
related to each of these three different ways of finding meaning. The diversity 
of my work has made the years of training very challenging; both 
experientially and intellectually, I feel as if there has been considerable ground 
to cover. However, I now perceive that this challenge lies not merely in their 
status as assignments completed for the fulfilment of a portfolio. I now value 
these works as “acts of meaning” (Bruner, 1990: xii), whose purpose has been 
the greater understanding of my self and of my new profession of counselling 
psychology. 
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Section B: Critical literature review
Appreciating gratitude: 
Can gratitude be used as a 
psychological intervention to improve 
individual wellbeing?
20
 Gratitude, as it were, is the moral memory of mankind. 
        (Simmel, 1950: 45)
_______________________________________________________________
1 Introduction
The value of gratitude has been frequently addressed in popular literature 
(Ryan, 1999; Miller, 1995). As Carman & Streng (1989) describe, gratitude is 
extolled as a fundamental virtue in all the world’s major religions.  People in 
most cultures appear to experience gratitude, and have developed their own 
linguistic and social patterns for its expression (Appadurai, 1989; Sommers & 
Kosmitzki, 1988). However, until recently, gratitude has received little attention 
within the psychological literature, and has been omitted from many major 
works on emotion (de Rivera, 1977; Lazarus, 1991).
But recently the nature and importance of gratitude has been reconsidered. In 
part, this traces to the growth of positive psychology. With a focus on 
developing improved wellbeing and optimal functioning, positive psychology 
has sought to develop “the scientific study of positive experiences and positive 
individual traits” (Duckworth, Steen, & Seligman, 2005: 630). As part of this 
scientific approach, Peterson and Seligman (2004) developed an inventory of 
twenty four character strengths, and the character strength of gratitude was 
one of the few which later associated most strongly with ratings of subjective 
wellbeing (Park, Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Alongside the development of 
positive psychology, an increasing range of new empirical research, together 
with a re-evaluation of older studies, has indicated that gratitude can improve 
well-being in two ways: directly, as a causal agent of wellbeing; and indirectly, 
as a means of buffering against negative states and emotions. 
Greater understanding of the power of gratitude as a psychological intervention 
has wide-ranging significance for counselling psychology. Even at such an early 
stage, gratitude research can both inform individual strategies with clients and 
contribute to the development of more sustained programmes of intervention. 
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Gratitude research can amplify thinking within current theoretical models, 
including both cognitive behavioural and person-centred approaches. Finally, 
gratitude research can provide counselling psychology with ideas for 
interventions with a range of client groups, from those experiencing 
depression, bereavement or substance abuse, to individuals who are not 
experiencing clinical issues but are seeking simply to enhance their state of 
wellbeing. 
In assessing the therapeutic use of gratitude to increase wellbeing, this review 
will cover three main areas. Firstly, it will provide an introduction to 
conceptualisations of gratitude and the place of gratitude within cognitive-
emotional and biosocial theories. Secondly, it will examine a variety of research 
studies to evaluate evidence for gratitude’s impact on individual well-being, 
both directly as a causal agent and indirectly as a buffer against negative 
states. Working within an evidence-based approach, this analysis will focus on 
empirical studies, although making use of psychoanalytical reports which may 
suggest future empirical research opportunities. Finally, this review will identify 
four main conclusions from existing gratitude research, considering 
implications both for theories of gratitude and for the practice of counselling 
psychology, as well as future research directions.
2 Conceptualisations of gratitude
Gratitude can be defined as “the quality or condition of being thankful; the 
appreciation of an inclination to return kindness” (OED, 1989). While gratitude 
has defied easy classification, most psychological research sites gratitude 
among the emotions. Gratitude has been acknowledged as a moderately 
pleasant and activating emotion (Mayer, Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufman & Blainey, 
1991), with a distinctive cognitive form. It has therefore received attention 
from theorists studying cognitions as causes of people’s emotional responses to 
events. Weiner, Russell and Lerman (1979) demonstrated that causal 
attribution and event valence predict the direction and magnitude of emotion, 
and from laboratory experiments suggested that the emotion of gratitude 
depends on appraisal of a positive outcome and on attribution of that outcome 
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to the efforts of others. Gratitude has also been conceived as one of the 
empathic emotions, dependent on the capacity to empathise with others 
(Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). Within this conception, each emotion is seen as 
having a unique dramatic plot, with that of gratitude being appreciation of an 
altruistic gift. 
However, this conception of gratitude has recently been expanded. More 
detailed analysis of studies involving gratitude has suggested that, in addition 
to appreciation of the helpful actions of others, gratitude may also arise from 
sources such as thankfulness for one’s abilities, or for an environment which 
facilitated productive work. Thus, as Wood, Froh and Geraghty (in press) 
argue, the trait of gratitude is better seen as a wider life orientation towards 
noticing and appreciating the positive in the world.  This general life orientation 
is supported by diverse and specific areas or facets of gratitude, including: 
appreciation of other people; a focus on, and thankfulness for, what the person 
has; feelings of awe when encountering beauty; focusing on the positive in the 
present moment; appreciation that life is short; and positive social 
comparisons. In a quantitative factor analysis of gratitude scales, Wood, 
Maltby, Stewart and Joseph (2008) found that these lower order facets form 
part of a higher order gratitude factor. Following Rosenberg (1998), Wood, Froh 
and Geraghty propose that people can be considered to have a strong 
orientation towards gratitude if they experience these lower order facets 
frequently, intensely and through a wide range of eliciting stimuli. 
These conceptions begin to address an important question: what good is 
gratitude? Aside from the purely hedonic value of gratitude as a pleasant 
emotion, gratitude performs two important functions. Firstly, gratitude works 
at a societal level to stimulate pro-social behaviour. Simmel (1908/96) 
described gratitude as “the moral memory of mankind” (1908/96: 3), and 
Trivers (1971) and Bonnie and DeWaal (2004) have examined the potential 
adaptive and evolutionary benefits to a society rooted in gratitude. However, 
these moral functions of gratitude have been comprehensively documented 
elsewhere (e.g. McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons & Larson, 2001), and will not 
be considered here except where they add to understanding of well-being. 
Secondly, gratitude works at an individual level, to build lasting and beneficial 
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personal resources. In her “broaden and build” theory, Frederickson (1998, 
2001) has suggested that positive emotions undo the adverse physiological 
effects of negative emotions, and extend cognitive functioning through more 
creative, flexible or efficient patterns of thinking. Thus over time, the 
broadening triggered by positive emotions builds a range of positive resources, 
which may help individuals transform themselves into more healthy, socially 
integrated and resilient people.
The potential of gratitude to build personal resources provides the link between 
gratitude and individual well-being. Subjective wellbeing is defined as “a 
person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life” (Diener, Lucas & 
Oishi, 2002: 63). In their research into a sustainable architecture of happiness, 
Lyubormirsky, Sheldon and Schkade (2005) have shown that interventions 
focussing on individual’s activities and practices can achieve lasting 
improvements in wellbeing. This review will consider to what extent gratitude 
interventions can improve wellbeing. Using the hierarchical levels of emotion 
proposed by Rosenberg (1998), most interventions described will focus on the 
development of a grateful mood: a sustained period of emotion which can vary 
across or within days. However, the review will also consider why future 
interventions by counselling psychologists might also be directed to furthering 
development of the trait of gratitude, which Rosenberg (1998: 249) viewed as 
a “more stable predisposition [...] towards certain types of emotional 
responding”. 
3 Gratitude: A causal agent which improves individual wellbeing
3.1  General gratitude interventions
Several recent studies have employed rigorous and robust scientific methods to 
demonstrate the impact of gratitude on individual wellbeing, and to evaluate 
general gratitude interventions. Among the first was a comprehensive 
examination of the effect of grateful mood on psychological and physiological 
wellbeing by Emmons and McCullough (2003). This study was also an early 
pioneer of the ‘gratitude list’, which – as Wood, Froh and Geraghty (in press) 
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observe – has become the most researched gratitude intervention. In an initial 
study lasting ten weeks, participants (n=192) were asked to submit weekly 
reports documenting five things for which they were grateful, with further 
experimental conditions reporting on five hassles and five events. In 
subsequent Studies 2 (n=162) and 3 (n=65), several variables were 
investigated. A condition asking participants to focus on downward social 
comparison was substituted in Study 2 for a focus on hassles. Interventions 
were tested on both undergraduates (Studies 1 and 2) and adults with chronic 
illness (Study 3). Finally, the duration and frequency of interventions was 
manipulated, with the second and third studies requiring daily reports for two 
and three weeks respectively. 
Across the studies, a wide range of benefits to wellbeing was reported. In 
Study 1, participants in the gratitude condition rated current and prospective 
life more favourably than the other two conditions; these participants also 
recorded fewer symptoms of physical illness and described spending 
significantly more time exercising. But despite these improvements in outlook 
and physical wellbeing, an important issue with this study was the failure of 
the gratitude condition to show increases in positive affect (PA). This situation 
changed in Studies 2 and 3, where the increased frequency of daily 
interventions appeared to affect PA. Study 2 produced significantly higher 
levels of positive affect (PA) than did the hassles condition, though differences 
in PA between the gratitude and events conditions were non-significant. In 
Study 3, in a straightforward comparison with a non-gratitude control, the 
gratitude intervention showed a significant increase in PA and decrease in 
negative affect (NA). Importantly, mediational analyses indicated that gratitude 
fully accounted for the effect of the gratitude intervention on PA, rather than 
PA mediating gratitude. Study 2 revealed no differences in reported physical 
health, potentially due to the significantly shorter time frame of the study. 
However, the gratitude condition here recorded more instances of pro-social 
behaviour, with these participants being more likely than those in the other two 
conditions to have offered emotional support to others. Study 3 also provided 
reassurance as to the validity of the self report measures of PA used in the 
earlier studies (see Schwartz & Strack, 1999), as significant effects of the 
gratitude intervention on wellbeing were also recorded by the participants’ 
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partners. In summary, this extensive study provides important evidence as to 
the direct agency of gratitude in improving individual well-being. The 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) indicated these benefits were most obvious 
when compared to the hassles condition, but they were also recorded in direct 
comparison with a control condition. The benefits were achieved with only 
minimal intervention, requiring a few minutes of time each day or week. 
Replication of results across different participant groups also lends confidence 
to the generalisability of these gratitude interventions, while the qualification of 
differing intervention (daily vs weekly) frequencies and durations provides 
useful pointers for developing intervention schedules. 
A second longitudinal study supports and extends the findings of Emmons and 
McCullough (2003), adding weight to the argument that gratitude interventions 
can directly increase individual wellbeing. Watkins et al (2003) carried out an 
experimental study to examine whether a different gratitude intervention - 
grateful reflection - could enhance PA, and how levels of PA might differ under 
a range of gratitude interventions. A RCT was used, with student participants 
(n=157) allocated to one of three gratitude conditions: thinking (reflecting on 
a living person for whom they were grateful); essay (writing about a living 
person for whom they were grateful); and letter (writing a letter addressed to 
a living person for whom they were grateful). All three gratitude conditions 
showed significant increases in PA compared with the control condition. 
However, the grateful thinking condition showed the strongest increase in PA, 
recording a mean change score in PA more than double that of the grateful 
letter condition. Other research may help to explain this finding. Lyubomirsky, 
Sousa and Dickerhoof (2006) found that writing and talking about positive 
events was associated with less PA than thinking about them, and 
hypothesised that this was due to processes of analysis and structuring 
inherent in writing, which may reduce the sense of pleasure and wonder 
inherent in positive emotional states.  Watkins et al also found that scores on a 
measure of dispositional gratitude predicted affect changes in the gratitude 
experimental conditions. Individuals manifesting high trait gratitude showed 
stronger increases in PA than those with lower trait gratitude, though all 
recorded improved scores. Overall, research by Watkins et al provides further 
support from within a robust empirical setting for the effect of gratitude 
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interventions on wellbeing. Though the study is weakened by the restricted 
(student) participant base, and the lack of mediational analysis on the 
interaction of gratitude with PA, it does extend understanding of the range and 
potential of different gratitude interventions. Finally, though Watkins et al 
(2003) investigate more temporary changes in well-being than Emmons and 
McCullough (2003), their work supplies useful information as to the power of 
gratitude interventions among individuals with both low and high trait 
gratitude.
As well as underscoring the potential of gratitude to increase well-being, 
research by Seligman, Steen, Park and Peterson (2005) expands thinking on 
the efficacy and different interventions by examining the impact of grateful 
behaviours. This study involved a RCT of five happiness exercises among 
participants (n=411) recruited, briefed and evaluated via the internet. Two 
gratitude interventions were used. The first was a gratitude visit, which 
involved writing and delivering a letter to someone for whom participants were 
grateful. The second intervention involved “counting blessings” (another 
version of the previously mentioned gratitude list), by recording three good 
things every day. One strength of this study is the length of time over which 
interventions were evaluated, which led to insight on the impact of 
interventions. The gratitude visit produced the largest increase in happiness 
and decrease in depression during the first month of the study, but by month 
three, participants’ affective states had returned to the baseline. The gratitude 
list intervention showed increased happiness and decreased depressive 
symptoms at six months. There are several considerations relating to the 
methodology and results of this study. Firstly, the participant group 
volunteered for participation through a positive psychology website, and thus 
their motivation to achieve increases in well-being may be higher than other 
groups within the wider population. This may be related to a second point. 
Seligman et al (2005) observed a significant effect within the gratitude list 
condition of participants’ adherence to the gratitude intervention over time. In 
other words, participants’ continued use of the intervention after the end of the 
test period contributed to the longer lasting effect of the intervention. This 
non-advised continuance provides support for the meaning and value of the 
interventions, suggesting that participants have ‘voted with their feet’ by 
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continuing the gratitude exercise, but this reaction might not extend to a more 
representative sample. Finally, the delivery of this intervention via the internet 
suggests that, for motivated individuals, this can be an effective and efficient 
method of providing psychological gratitude interventions.
Following this generally positive record of gratitude interventions, there is 
some evidence which provides a contrasting picture. Sheldon and Lyubomirsky 
(2006) ran a four-week experimental study to assess how the practice of two 
mental exercises might influence PA, and how this influence was mediated by 
motivation. Student participants were asked either to cultivate gratitude by 
counting things in their lives for which they were grateful, or to describe their 
best possible selves (BPS), visualising their ideal life in the future. Each group 
was then encouraged, but not required, to continue this exercise during the 
following two weeks. Results showed that only the BPS intervention produced a 
significant increase in immediate PA. The gratitude intervention fell midway 
between a control condition and the BPS exercise in terms of boosting PA, 
although it did not differ from either the BPS or the control condition. In 
addition, the BPS exercise produced the highest level of self concordant 
motivation, suggesting it evoked a stronger fit with participant’s true values 
and interests. However, there are several aspects of this study which cause 
concern. At the baseline screen of participants, those within the gratitude 
condition recorded significantly higher negative affect than those in either of 
the other two conditions. The study’s authors do not make clear whether 
current or previous experience of depression may have affected 
disproportionately those within the gratitude condition, and this could have 
been expected to affect adversely ongoing gratitude scores (e.g. Watkins et al, 
2003). Moreover, the gratitude intervention involved outlining reasons for 
gratitude “in as much detail as you can”, which as previously mentioned, may 
have resulted in the dissipation of positive emotion as reported by Lyubomirsky 
et al (2006). Contrasting this study with research conducted by Emmons and 
McCullough (2003) does suggest the importance of stipulating regular practice 
of a therapeutic intervention. It may be that certain interventions, such as 
those involving gratitude, involve more of a change in mental patterns than 
those requiring visualisation of BPS. 
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Concluding the review of general gratitude interventions, recent research also 
provides important insight as to how positive emotions such as gratitude can 
enhance well-being. Arguing that emotions have as much to do with the body 
as the brain, McCraty and Childre (2004) asserted that sincere positive 
emotions such as appreciation are associated with a higher degree of 
coherence in the heart’s rhythmic activity, which they term “physiological 
coherence” (2004: 236). Further, McCraty, Atkinson, Tiller, Rein and Watkins 
(1995) reported that the extended human cardiovascular system works at its 
optimal resonant frequency when an individual is actively feeling appreciation 
or another positive emotion. In additional studies (McCraty, 2002; McCraty & 
Atkinson, 2003), a link was created between these physiological states and an 
increase in cognitive skills. Evaluated against a control group experiencing 
relaxation, an experimental condition experiencing the physiological correlates 
of gratitude showed significantly better performance in discrimination tasks 
requiring focussed attention, and in their ability to react quickly and accurately. 
There is one significant concern with this research to date, which is that it has 
largely focussed on appreciation, which is an aspect of gratitude but does not 
encompass the full range of feelings associated with gratitude, as defined 
earlier. However, these studies yield important findings as to the physiological 
processes which may underpin gratitude, and the ways in which positive 
physical and cognitive benefits can accrue from grateful moods. This work also 
suggests that interventions might explore not only grateful thinking, but also 
creation and mindfulness of grateful feelings, in order to achieve maximum 
increases in well-being.   
3.2 Gratitude and psychotherapeutic interventions
Gratitude interventions have also been used as part of wider psychotherapy 
programmes targeting individuals with clinical issues. Seligman, Rashid and 
Parks (2006) developed a programme of positive psychotherapy (PPT), where 
two of the twelve sessions focussed on gratitude-related interventions. This 
PPT was delivered in group sessions to individuals diagnosed with mild-
moderate depression (n=40). A modified programme, divided into roughly 
equal sessions of traditional CBT treatment for depression and PPT, was 
delivered via individual therapy to individuals diagnosed with unipolar 
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depression (n=46).  For the purposes of this review, a key weakness of this 
study is the inability to evaluate the contribution of specific gratitude 
interventions on results. However, the results of the overall programme are 
significant, and suggest the potential for counselling psychologists in trialling 
programmes of therapy which mix traditional CBT approaches with aspects of 
positive psychology such as gratitude. For those participants with mild-
moderate depression, six weeks of group PPT resulted in significant 
improvements in depressive symptoms and life satisfaction at one year. 
Individual CBT/PPT therapy for unipolar depression recorded more 
symptomatic improvement and more remission from depressive disorders than 
treatment as usual, and than treatment as usual plus anti-depressant 
medication. There are several potential limitations to this research. The studies 
were conducted exclusively among students, and sample sizes, although not 
unusual for psychotherapy research, were smaller than many empirical 
psychology experiments. Finally, failure to rotate therapists meant there may 
have been a therapist effect. 
Two recent studies have also explored how gratitude lists may be as effective 
as techniques commonly used in clinical therapy. The first study by Geraghty, 
Wood and Hyland (in press) was conducted among a sample of people (n=479) 
with severely impaired body image. Participants were allocated to one of three 
conditions: a waiting list; a gratitude condition, which involved keeping daily 
lists of things for which the client was grateful; and a daily automatic thought 
record (ATR), where negative thinking about body image was both documented 
and challenged. Among those completing the study, both the gratitude and ATR 
groups recorded a significant decrease in body dissatisfaction compared with 
the waiting list, suggesting that the gratitude list is as least as effective as a 
current standard clinical technique. However, it is notable that the gratitude 
group was more than twice as likely to complete the intervention, compared 
with participants completing the ATR.  
Similar results were found in a second study by Geraghty, Wood and Hyland 
(2010), among people who exhibited excessive worrying (n=247). Under 
implementation of the same conditions, the gratitude condition again recorded 
reduced levels of worry equal to the ATR group, with both conditions being 
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significantly lower than the waiting list control. People in the gratitude 
condition were again found to be more likely to complete the intervention than 
those in the ATR group. The authors suggest that anecdotal evidence implies 
that participants found the gratitude diaries more enjoyable, and propose that 
this option may be particularly useful where compliance is likely to be an issue. 
Taken together, these two new studies provide encouraging evidence about the 
potential of gratitude interventions to improve wellbeing for those with clinical 
issues. Further work is required to confirm and extend the findings from these 
studies, both among different clinical populations and with different 
interventions. 
4 Gratitude: A buffer against negative states and a stimulus for 
 growth
Evidence presented so far has indicated that gratitude interventions can 
directly increase wellbeing. However, gratitude also appears to play an 
important role in buffering against negative states and in promoting growth 
through trauma. To understand better this role, it is helpful to begin with a 
brief review of the personality correlates of individuals who exhibit high trait 
gratitude. While such cross-sectional studies do not provide evidence for the 
active role of gratitude, they supply useful information on links between 
gratitude and increased resilience to negative states or situations. 
McCullough, Emmons and Tsang (2002) provided the first extensive analysis of 
the grateful disposition. In research which generalised across both students 
and a large sample of adults (N=1266), they reported that self ratings of high 
dispositional gratitude correlated significantly with many measures of positive 
emotionality and well-being, including vitality, hope, optimism, happiness, lack 
of depressive symptoms and lack of anxiety.  High dispositional gratitude was 
associated among adults with being spiritually minded and being more 
forgiving when hurt by others. Importantly, this research also controlled for the 
effects of Big Five personality variables such as Extraversion as well as for the 
influence of general positive affect, and found that gratitude accounted for 
variance in nearly all the measures of well-being. Watkins et al (2003) carried 
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out a similar correlational study among students. Again, a strong relationship 
was found between high dispositional gratitude and high levels of PA and life 
satisfaction. Depression, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory, was 
found to have a strong and reliable inverse correlation with dispositional 
gratitude. A grateful disposition was also show to have a strong negative 
correlation with narcissism, and an inverse correlation with anger. 
Understanding links between dispositional gratitude and other emotions helps 
explain the role of gratitude interventions in reducing negative states. For 
example, Baron (1984) conducted an experimental study which involved 
assessing the potential of gratitude to reduce destructive conflict. Following 
theories that people are incapable of engaging in two incompatible responses 
at once, results showed that individuals exposed to a gratitude intervention 
after conflict displayed more positive ratings of their opponent, as well as 
reporting a significantly higher preference for constructive modes of dealing 
with the conflict (e.g. collaboration vs avoidance). One issue with this study is 
that feelings of gratitude are inferred following receipt of a gift, but not directly 
assessed. However, if grateful moods contain similar emotional contingencies 
to dispositional gratitude, the study can be argued to receive practical support 
from the study by Watkins et al (2003) cited earlier, where anger is inversely 
correlated with gratitude. Moreover, Nussbaum (1994) provides theoretical 
support for the power of gratitude to “undo” the negative emotion of anger. 
She describes how gratitude and anger have similar, but opposite, structures: I 
am grateful to [S] for [X], rather than I am angry with [S] for [X]. It is 
possible to hypothesise that a similar oppositional relationship may exist 
between gratitude and other negative states, such as materialism. Kasser 
(2002) cited several studies where materialistic values have been associated 
with a variety of problems in personal wellbeing, including depression, anxiety 
and narcissism. Research into dispositional gratitude (McCullough et al, 2003; 
Watkins et al, 2003) shows that it is uniformly negatively correlated with 
measures of materialism and envy.  Adler and Fagley (2005, cited in Polak & 
McCullough, 2006) suggest that gratitude may counteract materialist strivings 
and their negative effects by tapping into an ability to appreciate what we have 
in life, which they find strongly related to subjective wellbeing. Unfortunately, 
there is currently no empirical work to support these claims. 
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So it can be argued that gratitude plays a role in buffering against negative 
emotions such as anger and the adverse effects of materialism. Research also 
suggests that this role extends to protecting individuals against the 
development of psychiatric illness. Kendler et al (2003) examined the 
relationship of dimensions of religiosity to lifetime psychiatric and substance 
abuse disorders. Gratitude was represented by a measure named 
Thankfulness, which encompassed feelings of gratitude as opposed to 
ingratitude, as well as a sense of thankfulness rather than anger towards life 
and God. Thankfulness was one of only two dimensions which was associated 
with reduced risk for both internalising disorders (major depression, phobias, 
panic disorder, bulimia) and externalising disorders (nicotine and alcohol 
dependency, drug abuse, adult anti-social behaviour). Again, this research is 
cross-sectional and not longitudinal, and so it cannot examine causal 
relationships. However, negative correlations cited earlier between dispositional 
gratitude and depression (e.g. Watkins et al, 2003) help support the idea of 
gratitude as a protective trait. Furthermore, there is evidence from small-scale 
therapeutic work in Japan that gratitude interventions can improve well-being 
for those experiencing anorexia and alcoholism (Morishita, 2000; Suwaki, 
1985). Sakuta, Shiratsuchi, Kimura and Abe (1997) described how this Naikan 
therapy cultivated an appreciation of the contributions of others to the 
individual undergoing therapy, and how such interventions resulted in a sense 
of gratitude and in improvement of symptoms. 
Moving on from an examination of negative states, research indicates that 
gratitude can be used as coping strategy to increase well-being during times of 
stress or adversity. In her phenomenological study of survivors of Hurricane 
Andrew, Coffman (1996) found that thankfulness for the safety of homes or 
families was the first of seven themes to emerge in individuals’ accounts 
following the disaster. Similarly, research by Ventura and Boss (1983) indicated 
gratitude was the basis for one of three coping patterns adopted by parents 
after the birth of a child (“telling myself I have many things to be thankful 
for”). Kashdan, Uswatte and Julian (2006) found dispositional gratitude to 
show an inverse correlation with post-traumatic stress disorder in veterans; 
additionally, for both PTSD and non-PTSD groups, ongoing daily experience of 
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gratitude was associated with better daily functioning, irrespective of level of 
symptoms.  In their research into benefit finding in adversity, Tennen and 
Affleck (2005) provide clues as to how gratitude may enable individuals to 
cope. Bowers et al (1998, cited in Tennen and Affleck, 2005) reported that 
among bereaved HIV sero-positive men, greater appreciation of loved ones and 
a perception that life was precious was associated with multiple effects. It 
correlated with both increased self-understanding and enhanced interpersonal 
functioning, and benefit-finding also anticipated slower HIV progression and 
was associated with a lower rate of AIDS-related mortality in the next four to 
nine years. These results have greater validity due to mediational analysis, 
which showed that disease progression was not mediated by health variables 
but fully accounted for by appreciation of benefits. These studies provide 
important understanding as to how participants use gratitude, consciously or 
sub-consciously, to improve well-being in times of adversity. However, to date 
there appear to have been no studies examining psychologists’ use of gratitude 
as an intervention in such situations.   
A similar absence of longitudinal, mediational research exists when reviewing 
evidence for the potential of gratitude to facilitate personal growth through 
crisis. Frankl (1962) proposed that people seek to create new life meanings as 
a way of defeating feelings of loss and despair. Drawing on a variety of 
qualitative and quantitative research, Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis (2005) 
describe how loss can lead to developmental change by confronting people 
with new situations and issues, and that types of growth in such situations 
show remarkable consistency across a wide range of traumas. One of the three 
main types of growth cited by Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis (2005) is growth in 
relationships, resulting from increased appreciation of significant others and a 
reduced focus on everyday problems. It is worth noting that the role and 
power of gratitude may have been underplayed in trauma literature to date. 
Previous research has found dispositional optimism to be the strongest and 
most consistent predictor of benefit-finding (Affleck and Tennen, 1996; Davis, 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Larson, 1998), but this research pre-dated the 
development of a reliable measure of dispositional gratitude. Moreover, recent 
work has provided indirect but compelling evidence of the role gratitude plays 
in transforming the lives of highly generative individuals. McAdams, Diamond, 
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de St Aubin and Mansfield (1997) described how highly generative adults tend 
to construct life stories around what they call a “commitment story”. This 
commitment story can be seen as a “narrative of thanksgiving” for the 
redemptive move in their story, which allowed them to recover from earlier 
adversity. Moreover, McAdams and Bauer (2004) describe how even the 
concept of generativity can be seen as an offshoot of gratitude, inspired by a 
desire to give something back. Thus there appear to be several studies which 
indicate that gratitude plays an important role in enabling growth through 
crisis, but no research which has explicitly examined causative links, or 
evaluated specific interventions.
Indeed, opinion has differed over the power and role of psychological 
interventions for people experiencing difficult times. Tennen and Affleck (1999) 
described how even well-intentioned efforts to encourage benefit-finding have 
been perceived as insensitive and inept, and viewed as an unwelcome attempt 
to minimise the burdens and challenges that needed to be overcome. However, 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis (2005) suggested that, within a person-centred 
model which presupposes non-judgmental listening and recognition of the 
uniqueness of an individual’s experience, supportive interventions might 
highlight growth in character and skills. From their research, they 
recommended what might be termed “indirect” gratitude interventions, such as 
asking a bereaved person about changes in perspective as a result of loss, or 
starting a discussion as to the ways in which trauma may have contributed to 
new ways of functioning. These interventions, which may fit with more 
experiential person-centred approaches such as that outlined by Rennie 
(1998), have also received further support from research from Wood, Linley, 
Maltby, Baliousis and Joseph (2008). Wood et al. showed that gratitude had 
important links with the Rogerian concept of congruence; specifically, gratitude 
was strongly and positively correlated with authentic living, which involved 
behaving in ways consistent with personal beliefs and values, while gratitude 
was negatively correlated with self-alienation, which was described as having 
inaccurate symbolisation of experience, inconsistent beliefs and a weak sense 
of identity. Thus it appears that, within the emerging literature on gratitude, 
there may be important connections with person-centred practice, in addition 
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5 Discussion
5.1 Conclusions
Having considered relevant literature, it is time to form an answer to the 
research question: can gratitude be used as a psychological intervention to 
improve individual wellbeing? Despite its short research history, it is already 
clear that gratitude can play an important role in enhancing individual well-
being. Drawing together both theoretical insights and practical learnings, this 
section aims to establish four substantial conclusions from research previously 
discussed. By embracing these conclusions, and helping lead further research, 
counselling psychology can develop work within therapeutic models such as 
CBT and person-centred counselling, and extend its practice across a range of 
client groups and clinical disorders.
The first conclusion is that interventions which develop individuals’ grateful 
mood can directly increase individual wellbeing. This causal link has been 
reliably demonstrated in several robust longitudinal studies, which have 
included mediational analyses (Emmons & McCullough, 2003) and non-self 
report measures (Watkins et al, 2003). The validity of these findings is further 
enhanced by the generalisability seen to date across differing participant 
groups, from students to motivated adults and adults with chronic illness as 
well as clinical issues such as body image or anxiety. Thus such research 
supports theoretical ideas about a sustainable architecture of happiness cited 
at the start of this review. Following Lyubomirsky et al (2005), it appears that 
despite individuals’ dispositional levels of happiness and circumstantial 
situation, interventions which focus on changing a person’s activities and 
practices can achieve lasting improvements in wellbeing. The findings also add 
weight to the “broaden and build” theory of positive emotions (Frederickson, 
1998; 2001). Similar to other positive emotions, gratitude appears to have its 
own pattern of positive benefits, which include reduced depressive symptoms 
(Seligman et al, 2005), strengthened relations with others (Emmons & 
McCullough, 2003), and enhanced physiological and cognitive functioning 
(McCraty & Atkinson, 2003). Therefore, as with other positive emotions, 
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gratitude can be seen both to improve immediate capabilities and also to 
develop practical and psychological resources for potential future use.
This has significant implications for counselling psychology. For example, while 
the vast majority of work within cognitive behavioural therapy focuses on 
analysis and removal of negative states, perhaps an equally valid route might 
involve the strengthening of positive states. Indeed, Duckworth et al (2005) 
have suggested that positive experiences or traits are not necessarily slave 
processes to some negative state or trait. Thus a “build what’s strong” 
approach may usefully supplement (or eventually replace?) the traditional “fix 
what’s wrong” strategies. Positive results from individual interventions and 
from programmes such as PPT (Geraghty et al, 2010; Seligman et al, 2006) is 
encouraging. Such initiatives now need to be refined and qualified on a larger 
scale.
A second conclusion from this literature review is that, while there is greater 
understanding as to how interventions can create grateful moods, little 
knowledge exists as to how interventions can help create grateful dispositions. 
Most empirical research on gratitude interventions to date has focussed on 
examining the longitudinal effect of mood on wellbeing. In those few instances 
where gratitude interventions have been examined over a longer time scale 
(e.g. Seligman et al, 2005), there has been no assessment as to how or 
whether continuous evocation of grateful moods evolves into the more 
substantial emotional disposition described by Rosenberg (1998). From a 
developmental perspective, isolated studies have examined children’s 
comprehension and expression of gratitude (e.g. Gleason & Weintraub, 1978), 
but no sustained research has been conducted on the emergence of gratitude 
in children. This is a critical omission, as analysis from a number of studies 
(McCullough et al, 2003; Watkins et al, 2003) shows robust correlations 
between a grateful disposition and many desirable states such as happiness, 
life satisfaction, as well as inverse negative correlations with depressive and 
anxious symptoms, narcissism and anger. What is lacking is theoretical 
knowledge as to how the grateful disposition develops, and evaluation of 
counselling psychology and social interventions which could encourage it. 
Existing research suggests that, while distinct from all Big Five Personality 
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Variables, gratitude shows most overlap with Agreeableness (e.g. Saucier & 
Greenberg, 1998). Since meta-analysis of traits estimates Agreeableness to 
have a heritability of 0.28 (Loehlin, 1992, cited in Cloninger, 1996), it seems 
possible that interventions directed at early environments, carers, family life 
and upbringing regimes can have a significant impact on the development of a 
grateful disposition. 
A third conclusion, concerning the potential of gratitude interventions to buffer 
against negative emotions, can at this stage only be regarded as tentative. 
Existing longitudinal research into the effect of gratitude on anger is 
encouraging (Baron, 1984), as is initial evidence as to the negative correlation 
between gratitude and materialism (McCullough et al, 2003; Watkins et al, 
2003). However, greater theoretical understanding is needed about the 
cognitive and affective mechanisms by which a positive emotion can buffer 
against a negative affect. Furthermore, there is a need for substantial, 
longitudinal studies in this area, to measure clearly the unique agency of 
gratitude hinted at in earlier studies. 
Moving on to the final conclusion, evidence is compelling for gratitude’s indirect 
role in promoting coping and growth through adversity. A range of studies 
using different quantitative and qualitative methodologies (e.g. Bower et al, 
1998; Davis et al, 1998; Kashdan et al, 1996; Ventura & Boss, 1983;) suggest 
that gratitude and appreciation of benefits can enable individuals to cope with 
diverse situations including bereavement, natural disasters and health 
problems. Gratitude may also be a significant factor promoting personal growth 
and relational well-being (McAdams et al, 1997; Tsang, 2006). However, while 
there are some causal and many associational links between gratitude and 
well-being in these areas, there is little direct evidence of particular 
psychological interventions which have promoted such wellbeing. Indeed, 
within the person-centred models of counselling frequently used in 
bereavement and crisis counselling, the idea of direct gratitude “interventions” 
is theoretically incompatible. The role and form of gratitude interventions in 
this area is a matter which counselling psychology could usefully explore.
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5.2 Directions for future research
Despite positive early findings on the causal link between gratitude 
interventions and individual wellbeing, considerable further research is 
required. On a conceptual level, the recent analysis from Wood et al (in press) 
provides a better understanding about both the structure and content of the 
trait of gratitude. This helps clarify how early studies with apparently different 
aims – the investigation of thankfulness to others, a focus on the present – can 
be related to a broader overall phenomenon. However, this new 
conceptualisation also appears to ask for some re-working of the existing 
literature, so that psychologists can assess whether there are particular facets 
of gratitude which are more powerful than others. Moreover, in future studies, 
psychologists need to be mindful of the specific facets of gratitude which are 
being assessed in their research.
For counselling psychologists, one key area requiring investigation is the 
optimal delivery of interventions which create grateful moods. Current research 
suggests that even brief, five minute exercises carried out consistently result in 
improvements in wellbeing, but might activities with longer duration, greater 
daily frequency or a biweekly “big bang” intervention (c.f. Seligman et al, 
2005) lead to improved results? Consistency of practice appears to have been 
a factor behind the failure of one gratitude intervention (Sheldon and 
Lyubomirsky, 2006). Building on knowledge about importance of self-
concordant motivation to achievement of goals (e.g. Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 
2001), future qualitative research might consider how to boost motivation in 
such interventions, or how to address major obstacles preventing the regular 
use of gratitude tools. Further work is required to identify the relative power of 
different gratitude interventions.  While a small number of interventions has 
already been proven successful, ranging from lists of three good things 
(Emmons & McCullough, 2003) to thinking or writing to someone to whom one 
is grateful (Watkins et al, 2003), ongoing research might seek to develop still 
more powerful alternatives, or to understand how currently available options 
can best be tailored to the needs of different client groups. Finally, in this 
evaluation of gratitude interventions, future research needs to be more 
attentive to the structuring of control groups. As Wood et al argue (in press), 
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understanding of active factors within interventions can be better understood 
through control groups where variables are closely and gradually varied, rather 
than with very differing practices. 
What research routes might counselling psychology explore, to understand 
better the developmental factors and counselling interventions which can affect 
the grateful disposition? One possible path may be to explore clinical insights 
from psychoanalysis, where Klein (1957/1997) has suggested that the loving 
nature of a child’s early relationships with his or her mother develops the 
alternate capacities for gratitude or envy. Another idea might be to examine 
the influence of particular environmental factors such as religion on the 
grateful disposition. Intrinsic spiritual beliefs have been shown to have strong 
associations with dispositional gratitude (McCullough et al, 2002), and future 
research might examine what previous environmental factors (aspects of 
religious practice, family or community spiritual beliefs) might be linked to 
these beliefs. Finally, once the developmental trajectory of the grateful 
disposition is better understood, it may be productive for counselling 
psychologists to consider incorporating such learnings into long term, 
preventative community programmes. If future research strengthens early 
findings that grateful mood and a grateful disposition can protect individuals 
from mental health issues, the dimensional distribution of mental health issues 
within a country would argue for a population approach (Huppert, 2004), 
potentially delivered as part of proven parenting or school programmes such as 
the Triple P (Sanders, 1999) or the Penn Resiliency Programme (Freres, 
Gillham, Reivich & Shatte, 2002).
Counselling psychology can play a significant role in qualifying how gratitude 
interventions may help buffer against negative states, or promote coping and 
growth through adversity. To ensure environmental validity, these studies 
would ideally be conducted within real-life settings, and with a range of client 
groups such as adults within the workplace or individuals referred with issues 
such as anger management. A first step may be detailed theoretical and 
practical studies into the ways in which gratitude builds wellbeing through 
adversity, for example through increasing appreciation of simple pleasures, 
changing values attributed to different elements of human lives or through 
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awareness of new and valuable skills acquired in adversity. Research could also 
expand on ideas from Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis (2005). Counselling 
psychologists could examine “indirect” gratitude interventions such as 
focussing on changes in perspective or new ways of functioning, and consider 
how these might fit conceptually with less directive forms of counselling. 
Finally, given recent development of reliable measures for assessing 
dispositional gratitude, it will be important to understand to what extent 
dispositional gratitude is correlated with coping and growth in adversity, and 
whether those with high and low trait gratitude need different counselling 
interventions to enable them to cope with trauma. 
Finally, a programme of qualitative research could significantly extend 
understanding of the impact of gratitude interventions. To establish the value 
of gratitude to psychological study within an empirically dominated research 
establishment, most recent studies have sought to achieve quantitative 
demonstrations of causal links between gratitude and wellbeing. However, now 
that the value of gratitude is becoming more widely recognised, a multi-
disciplinary programme of qualitative and quantitative study may lead to faster 
progress in understanding. One avenue of enquiry might be to explore how the 
experience of different interventions such as grateful thinking or a grateful 
letter is associated with different meanings for individuals. Other research 
could consider how cross cultural factors affect the experience of gratitude, and 
therefore the development of interventions. Finally, qualitative studies could 
explore people’s experiences of social messages and expectations concerning 
self-sufficiency or wealth creation, and how these might conflict with the 
development of gratitude. Possible ways of addressing these barriers could also 
be explored. 
6 Summary
Despite the short history of gratitude research, there is already exciting 
evidence that gratitude can be used as a psychological intervention to improve 
individual wellbeing. Such findings are providing increased impetus to the 
ongoing study of gratitude, and to the field of positive psychology generally. 
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This paper has sought to show that the potential of gratitude interventions has 
wide-ranging relevance to counselling psychologists working across diverse 
client groups and within different theoretical models. In the words of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (1967):
 In ordinary life, we hardly realise that we receive a great deal more than we give, and 
 that it is only with gratitude that life becomes rich. (1967: 370).
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Section C: Professional case study
Person-centred or two person-centred 
therapy? 
Exploring the meaning of the 
therapeutic relationship in person-
centred therapy.
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 ...but I too have met the tribal will to impose
 taboos and codes, and have behaved rudely,
 invoking my dead wife in dinner-table conversation.
 A beat of silence, of shared fear and sick shock, falls,
 a symptom of the malaise that James himself calls
 “the awful doom of general dishumanisation.”
       (Reid, 2009: 47)
___________________________________________________
1 Introduction
At the end of my training in counselling psychology, my work with Abigail1 
emerged for many reasons as the obvious candidate for this study. On a 
clinical level, Abigail was seeking to make sense of the imminent death of her 
mother, within circumstances which hugely complicated her grief. Our work 
together indicates the benefits which a person-centred approach can offer in a 
bereavement context, and makes links on this clinical level with the search for 
meaning in other aspects of my doctoral portfolio. On a theoretical level, my 
growing psychotherapeutic experience has led me to acknowledge the 
significance and potential of the use of self. This case confirmed for me that 
person-centred therapy does not mean the provision of certain conditions, but 
rather the offer of a two-person relationship – an encounter – where the 
psychologist aims to embody attitudes which facilitate growth. Finally, in 
addition to its significance on clinical and theoretical levels, my work with 
Abigail asked me to assess my competence in offering such an encounter. 
Throughout this study, and with the assistance of personal reflection and 
supervision, I hope to illustrate my capacity to create this depth of therapeutic 
relationship, while highlighting areas of growth for the future.   
1 Names and certain personal details have been changed to ensure confidentiality of client 
information.
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2 Theoretical orientation
2.1 Person-centred theory
According to person-centred theory, psychological distress arises when an 
individual’s self-beliefs conflict with their experiencing. Rogers (1959) argued 
that these beliefs - conditions of worth – were introjected from relationships 
with others. Discrepancy or incongruence between beliefs and experience, and 
thus the psychological distress, could be resolved through a therapeutic 
relationship which followed six conditions: psychological contact between two 
persons; a client who is in a state of incongruence; a therapist who is 
congruent or genuine in the relationship, and can experience and communicate 
both empathy and acceptance to the client. Rogers argued this relationship 
was sufficient for change to occur, as the therapeutic conditions facilitated a 
person’s innate tendency for growth and thus greater congruence between 
beliefs and experience.
Recently, person-centred practitioners have debated the form and significance 
of this relationship. Some, such as Sanders (2007), work from a position which 
sees change as occurring within the individual, amidst a climate created by the 
therapist. Others such as Schmid (2007:37) argue that change occurs through 
a co-created process, where “the actualising tendency as a force of individual 
is embedded in the interconnectedness or social nature of the person”. 
Considering relational depth, a heightened form of this two-person relating, 
Mearns and Cooper (2005: xii) propose that this “state of profound contact and 
engagement between two people ... [occurs when] each person is fully real 
with the Other, and able to understand and value the Other’s experiences at a 
high level”.
My practice as a trainee counselling psychologist has been influenced by 
relational approaches, and also by the experiential tradition described by 
Rennie (1998). This respects the fundamental person-centred principles of 
client autonomy and working from within the client’s world; however, it also 
emphasises how growth occurs through the self-awareness and agency 
enabled by reflexivity. If a client is in a state of non-reflexive emotional 
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distress, “the therapist may expedite the progress of therapy by being directive 
about the client’s processing of experience” (Rennie, 1998: 9), although such 
interventions must be carefully raised to ensure they are acceptable to the 
client. 
2.2 Bereavement theory
Earlier models for bereavement work envisaged clients moving through a 
series of stages (Kubler-Ross, 2009) or tasks (Worden, 1983). Latterly, Stroebe 
and Schut (1999) proposed a dual process model, suggesting that productive 
grief work involves an oscillation between two aspects: a loss orientation, 
where the client is addressing issues relating to the death of another; and a 
restoration-orientation, where the client explores the wider life changes 
required as a result of the death. Through this dual process, individuals 
develop new meanings which enable them to adapt to their changed world.
3 Context and referral  
3.1 Biographical details
Abigail was a Caucasian woman in her early thirties. Her physical appearance 
was neat and casually smart. From the first meeting, Abigail generally sat still 
in her chair and maintained regular eye contact, in a way that suggested a 
purpose and commitment to her presence.
3.2 Referral and presenting problem
In my work at a cancer centre, Abigail was referred to me following her 
request for a one-to-one meeting with the psychology team. Abigail stated that 
she was experiencing significant distress, in the form of intense numbness, 
broken sleep and low mood. Abigail’s mother had recently been diagnosed with 
terminal cancer. Abigail described the relationship with her mother as 
especially close, “like a best friend”, in part due to her childhood 
circumstances. Until the time Abigail was eleven, Abigail and her mother had 
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experienced regular physical abuse from Abigail’s father. After her parents’ 
divorce and her father’s disappearance from their lives, Abigail mentioned 
supporting her mother emotionally and practically, such as with the care of her 
much younger brother. She had experienced depression while at university, 
and mentioned that counselling had not helped.
Abigail also described major concerns with her marriage and her work.  To care 
for her mother, she had returned from America where she and her husband 
had been working. This distance was now adding to earlier doubts about the 
value of both her career and her marriage. 
3.3 Initial assessment 
Opinion is strongly divided within person-centred approaches as to the 
appropriateness and utility of assessment. Sanders (2006), following Rogers 
(1951), argued that formal assessment and diagnosis do not fit with person-
centred values. Such a medicalised process requires a judgement of the client’s 
state which goes against respect for the client’s authority, and has limited 
value as understanding of issues evolves throughout therapy. However, Wilkins 
and Gill (2003) challenge this view, suggesting assessment within a medical 
setting can respect client autonomy, provided it is collaboratively and 
sensitively handled. This perspective informed my work during an initial 
assessment session with Abigail, where I sought to respect her authority 
through mutual consideration of appropriate support.
Research into bereavement outcomes by Parkes (2006) and Stroebe, Schut 
and Stroebe (2007) indicates psychological support should not be routinely 
offered to bereaved people, but targeted at those experiencing complicated 
grief. Such grief arises from situational issues (e.g. type of lost relationship, 
ongoing conflicts), intrapersonal factors (e.g. pre-bereavement depression and 
previous losses) and interpersonal factors (e.g. social support), and is 
significantly less likely to be resolved spontaneously. Stroebe et al reported 
that – unlike bereavement work among the general population - psychological 
interventions in this area have been shown significantly to improve client’s 
wellbeing. Multiple studies (Currier, Holland & Neimeyer, in press; Schut, 
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Stroebe, van den Bout & Terheggen, 2001) indicate person-centred therapy is 
effective in helping resolve such issues of grief. 
In our initial assessment meeting, discussion of Abigail’s situation led us to 
recognise the complicated grief she was experiencing. We explored the 
possibility of depression, but decided this was not currently an appropriate 
descriptor, due to the absence of full DSM symptoms (DSM-IV, 2000) together 
with Abigail’s own sense of her experience. Abigail stated a strong preference 
for explorative therapy which allowed her to understand and express the 
emotions she was experiencing. I therefore felt our decision to start person-
centred therapy was fully congruent with Abigail’s and my knowledge of her 
preferences, and with clinical evidence.
3.4 Contract and plan for psychological counselling
Bordin (1979) proposed that establishment of clear tasks and goals, and the 
nature of the bond between psychologist and client, are critical to success in 
any therapeutic relationship. Rogers (in Baldwin, 2000) described how the 
person-centred therapeutic goal is process; here, our initial contract was to 
identify and explore the sources of the numbness and difficult emotions which 
Abigail experienced. In terms of task, Abigail and I agreed to meet weekly, 
with a formal review of progress every six sessions;  we would discuss 
whatever emotional material Abigail felt important in that week. Considering 
our bond, I sought feedback concerning those aspects of her previous therapy 
which had been unhelpful. Abigail mentioned feeling no connection with her 
earlier therapist, whom she felt had used “psych-speak” and bald questions 
about how she was feeling. While she said that she instinctively felt positive 
about our relationship, we agreed I could regularly check on these issues.
4 Initial phase of therapy
In reviewing this case, I have chosen to combine case history and process 
reflections. In line with Rogers’s observation above, the two are inextricably 
combined, and this approach allows me to show the inter-connections. I have 
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however divided the case/process history into three parts: issues in early 
sessions; significant developments in session six; progression and conclusion 
of therapy. This decision is borne out of the substance of therapy, where 
session six formed a pivotal moment in our work.  
4.1 Key content & process issues in early sessions
From our second session, a number of patterns became evident in Abigail’s 
construing of her experience. Talking of the numbness she felt about her 
mother’s condition, Abigail described herself as being in “survival mode”, which 
meant “being hard”: blocking out negative feelings which might be 
overwhelming or terrifying, and trusting in only a handful of people. In 
response to my invitation to elaborate, Abigail indicated how “being hard” had 
been an essential survival strategy or condition of worth when she was growing 
up. Spontaneously, she described how, at the age of ten, her mother had been 
locked out by her father, who was ignoring the banging at the door. Hoping her 
father was too drunk to notice, she had subdued her fear and crept down to 
open the door. However, her father heard her and began beating her in the 
doorway, whereupon her mother smashed the door’s glass panel to turn the 
handle and help Abigail. When I shared my sense of great sadness for the ten 
year old Abigail, and the horror she had to cope with, Abigail replied that she 
felt she had to block out her feelings to avoid provoking her father or further 
distressing her mother.
This interchange intimated something of the potential for relational depth. 
Working from a two-person conception of therapy suggested by Mearns and 
Cooper (2005), I had sought to offer an invitation for Abigail to meet me in 
exploring her feelings at a deeper level. Yet Mearns and Cooper also propose 
that such a meeting requires willingness from the client in sharing the most 
vulnerable and frightening aspects of themselves, as Abigail did here. Abigail’s 
disclosure touched me profoundly, and while my response aimed to indicate my 
empathy and prizing of both the ‘child’ and ‘adult’ Abigail, I feel my comments 
were also a congruent statement of my feelings as a real person, rather than 
what Rogers (2007) termed a professional façade. Abigail received my 
comments quietly, appearing to have tears in her eyes. Noting this, and 
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mindful of our initial conversations about the alliance, I sat with her in the 
silence, before reflecting that I would trust her to tell me if, at any time, she 
did not want to talk. Abigail affirmed that she would.
During sessions three to five, we explored the condition of “being hard” more 
extensively, while creating understanding of another condition: being helpful. 
Abigail described how she felt appreciated and loved when she was able to 
support others. She reflected how, as a child, she was aware of being valued 
by her mother for taking care of her brother, and how this had extended as an 
adult to ongoing support for her brother, as well as a mediating role in the 
difficult relationship between her mother and brother. In explaining this, Abigail 
began to explore how this condition of “being helpful” had made it harder for 
her to assert her own need for support, and had in some ways reinforced the 
first condition of “being hard” and denying her emotions. Although an 
expression of love, we considered how managing the palliative care of her 
mother was also the ultimate expression of help. 
As we discussed these experiences, it seemed as if there were characteristics 
of the process of movement described by Rogers (1961). Abigail appeared to 
be able to show an increased openness to all aspects of her experience, and 
she stated that, in our sessions, she was able to share emotions which she had 
“walled off” from others. For example, Abigail described the desperate 
loneliness she felt, as she chose to manage the release of medical information 
to her mother. Another time, Abigail expressed the guilt she felt about her 
mother’s condition, questioning whether, if she had been living in the UK, she 
could have effected an earlier diagnosis of her mother’s cancer. Describing 
these emotions, Abigail sometimes had short periods of crying, as if she was 
beginning to experience these emotions physically.
However, despite this movement, progress appeared only partial. While we 
were discussing negative emotion, it felt as if our sessions often involved 
rational discussion rather than living the experience. Rogers (1961) suggests 
that feeling an emotion in the present, rather than reporting it as a past event, 
marks the increased fluidity in self-concept necessary for the full integration of 
experiencing. There appeared to be two reasons for this only partial progress. 
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Firstly, as Cornelius-White (2007) has argued, therapy is most effective when 
the therapist can accurately symbolise their own experience. As I describe 
below, I used supervision to help me understand how my presence in one 
particular session may not have maximised growth.  But secondly, following 
reflections from Mearns and Cooper (2005) concerning relational depth, I 
hypothesised that Abigail was not yet ready to trust herself to feel these 
emotions. This seemed to be reflected in a comment Abigail made in session 
four when, after beginning to discuss the exhaustion she was feeling, Abigail 
spontaneously reflected that she couldn’t face looking ahead. At the end of this 
meeting, and recognising the importance for the therapeutic relationship of 
considering tasks and bond, I asked whether approaching such emotions 
together was useful or manageable. Abigail said that she felt it was, and that 
these were issues she needed to address. We agreed she would warn me off if 
she were not willing or able to explore them.
5 Detailed exploration of session six
Whilst as Lietaer (1992) noted, client and therapist are frequently misaligned 
on the identification of helpful sessions, both Abigail and I agreed in a later 
review that this session was pivotal to change. I believe that the reason for 
this change - the dialogical encounter – underpins my theoretical argument for 
a two-person, rather than one-person therapy. While the session has many 
imperfections, the conditions driving the intensity of the encounter seem to 
tally with those proposed by Mearns and Cooper (2005) as characteristic of 
relational depth: a state of profound contact; both participants being fully real; 
and a mutual valuing of the other’s experiencing. In this way, they propose, it 
is the encounter, and not simply the conditions, which is key to healing. 
Abigail began by describing what she called “an awful week”.  Fearing their 
mother was going to die, Abigail and her brother challenged the medical team 
on their decisions about her mother’s care. We discussed the anger Abigail felt 
about this treatment, and moved to talking about Abigail’s sadness and 
exhaustion. At this point, sensing something more at what Gendlin (1984: 76) 
termed “the edge of awareness”, I shared my impression of her feeling very 
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alone this week. Abigail responded by describing her fear of her mother’s 
death, but also her difficult hope that her mother might die soon, both because 
her mother would be out of pain, and also because Abigail doubted how much 
more she herself could take. 
Early in the session, Abigail’s speech appeared bright and rapid with 
frustration, which I largely matched. As the subject matter changed, our voices 
became quieter and slower. As Abigail expressed the difficulty of coping, she 
began to cry. I sat with Abigail in silence as she cried, trying to support her 
through my gaze and my stillness. Abigail broke the silence by articulating her 
hope that her mother’s condition would improve, but also an inner sense that 
this was unlikely. I felt I needed to provide an accurate empathic response 
(Mearns & Thorne, 1999) to affirm I was hearing and accepting what she was 
saying. I was aware Abigail had avoided using any “death” words, and my 
response was sensitive to that choice. Mearns and Cooper (2005) describe 
how, in facilitating relational depth, there is often a need to slow down to find 
time and words to address deeper feelings. I was conscious of this in the pace 
and tone of my response. Abigail seemed to be able to recognise and build on 
this empathy, as she elaborated on her sense of imminent death.
In his review of Rogers’ empathic exploration, Greenberg (1996) highlights the 
value of patience. In various exchanges, we explored the difficulty of 
understanding her mother’s exact medical position. In an empathic conjecture 
(“While one part of you is holding on to the hope, there’s, there’s this real 
feeling that [sighs] ... how much hope can there be, I suppose, now?”), I 
sought patiently to encapsulate the dilemma Abigail had been expressing, 
while encouraging deeper investigation of her experience: what Mearns and 
Cooper (2005: 121) term “knocking on the door”. While I questioned in 
supervision whether I might usefully have focussed on the edge of awareness 
(e.g. fear and sadness that her mother would not survive), the conclusion was 
that greater attunement was demonstrated by my actual response, which 
aimed delicately to balance the conflicting emotions of hope and despair. From 
her subsequent statements, Abigail seemed to sense her ambivalent feelings 
were understood and validated, and this encouraged her to explore these 
negative feelings further.
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Describing her mother’s gradual loss of strength, Abigail voiced her sense that 
– for both her mother and herself – the fight for different treatments had 
resulted in a sense of despair: that “every corner has been a brick wall”. I was 
aware how Abigail’s image suggested the hopelessness of her mother’s 
situation. However, while recognising the therapeutic utility of metaphors, 
Rennie (1998) cautions that their exploration can detract from empathic 
following. Thus in my response (“It’s difficult to keep believing when you can’t 
find a way out”), I sought not to address the metaphor directly, but by 
extending Abigail’s imagery in a gentle voice, to sense the struggle to maintain 
hope. Mearns and Cooper (2005) suggest relational depth involves being in a 
shared world, and Abigail’s reply appeared to confirm my sensing of her 
experience, as she affirmed the imagery I had used by whispering “Yeah, there 
is no way out, I know that.”
As Abigail continued to acknowledge this situation, her voice tailed away and 
she began to cry once more. She quietly reflected that she had expected to 
have more time, and the chance to do more with her mother. Given our 
therapeutic goal of exploring difficult emotions, I decided to be congruent with 
my feelings, both as an expression of my empathy and also because they 
appeared related to our goal. In describing my deep sadness in hearing about 
these missed opportunities and lost hopes, my intent was to recognise what I 
felt to be the deeper edge of Abigail’s experience, and also to embody the kind 
of presence which Bugental (1976) describes: both accessibility (willingness to 
be impacted) and expressivity (willingness to share oneself). 
During the session, I was uncertain of the impact of my comments, as in her 
reply, Abigail reverted to exploring the impossibility of recovery, rather than 
engaging in the emotion (sadness) of the situation. Mearns and Schmid (2006) 
describe how an invitation to meet can be ignored, and in my next comments, 
I was concerned to rebuild our engagement through an accurate empathic 
response. However, I may have underestimated the value of my congruence. 
In our review after the next session, Abigail spontaneously recalled my 
disclosure, and reflected her sense that I cared about what she was feeling, 
not just as a therapist but as a real person. This perhaps suggests something 
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of the longer-term impact of encounter, and the mutual experience of being 
“touched by the essence of the opposite” (Schmid, 2002, cited in Mearns & 
Cooper, 2005:.42).
 
In re-engaging with Abigail’s situation, I sought to affirm my understanding of 
both the practical difficulties of caring, but with emphasis on the emotional 
strain of seeing someone you love so ill. My intent was to validate the pressure 
Abigail described in her most recent comments, while also directing the 
process towards the emotional impact of her experience. Examining Rogers’ 
empathic exploration, Greenberg (1996) remarks how Rogers focused 
selectively on the more painful, unexpressed emotions, while also prizing the 
client’s feelings. Abigail seemed to sense my understanding of her situation, 
and she expanded on the terrible sadness she felt at witnessing her mother’s 
decline. As she began to cry once more, she questioned – with what felt like a 
sense of despair in her voice – what the long term effect of this experience 
would be for her. 
Feeling myself again touched by Abigail’s distress, it felt as if my response 
came from my core (“That you almost wonder what all this is doing to you, 
how it’s possible to bear all this, bear all this desperate sadness ... and fear”). 
My intent was to be alongside Abigail, by showing my empathy and acceptance 
for her fear and sadness. Furthermore, these empathic reflections were bound 
up in what Greenberg (1996) calls embedded process direction: a focus on 
what was most strongly felt, which I believed to be Abigail’s concern that she 
might not be able to cope. Brink and Farber (1996) describe how silence can 
be hard-working. I felt that our words, and the gaps between our words, 
carried a shared understanding of the sadness and despair. During this time, 
Abigail gazed intently at me, and I leant forward in my chair; it seemed, as 
Mearns (2003) suggests, that the silence was a time to slow down and hear 
ourselves.
 
After a long pause during which Abigail began to cry quietly, she half-sobbed 
“Just sometimes I want it to just stop....and it won’t”. In exchanges 
interspersed with silences, we gradually unfolded the intense strain Abigail 
perceived in needing always to be strong, and her sense that her mother was 
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no longer the mother she had known in the past. Seeking to focus my 
empathic reflection on what seemed most live and poignant (Freire, 2007), I 
affirmed that the Abigail had already lost something of the person she loved. 
In a tacit exchange, Abigail nodded, and her eye contact seemed to convey her 
sense of being understood, and a deeper level of connection in our 
relationship. Mearns (2003: 64) has observed that relational depth provides a 
feeling of safety, where more of the “unspoken relationship” can be brought 
into the open. This appeared to be the case in Abigail’s response, as she cried 
intensely: “Because the person I really want to hug me, comfort me, tell me 
it’s all right, is her, and she can’t, and never will again.” It seemed to me that 
Abigail was finally able to symbolise the impossible nature of her loss: that the 
person who was dying was the person she would previously have turned to for 
support.
In the silence following Abigail’s comment, it felt as if we were sharing the 
desperate sadness of Abigail’s situation. Cornelius-White (2007) suggests that  
the core person-centred conditions of warmth, empathy and congruence can 
be as well communicated through non-verbal as verbal behaviours. Choosing 
to break the silence, I affirmed my own sense both of the awful impossibility of 
her situation, and also my awareness that nothing I might say could diminish 
this loss. My response was “simply trying to be my feeling in relationship with 
[her]” (Rogers, 1961: 203), so as to further reflect these core conditions in my 
words. In empathising with the “awfulnessness” (Abigail’s expression from the 
the start of this segment), and sharing my sense of the tragic existential reality 
and the ultimate limitation of the therapist and the therapeutic relationship, it 
seemed as if the core conditions combined in what Mearns and Cooper (2005: 
17) termed “genuine empathic acceptance”.  
The empathy, acceptance and congruence I intended appeared to enable 
Abigail to elaborate in the final minutes of the session on the pain of her loss. 
She gave some poignant examples of what her mother’s death would mean for 
her, both practically and emotionally. As we discussed these difficulties, I 
reflected that “the love that comes from her won’t be there in that kind of way 
any more”. While seeking to empathise with her sadness, my intent in the use 
of the phrase “in that kind of way” was – very lightly - to signal something of 
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the changing perception of loss throughout bereavement (Worden, 1983). 
Greenberg (1996) suggests such a sense of context allows for the possibility of 
growth. 
6 Progression of therapy after session six
Following session six, Abigail appeared more open and present to the difficult 
aspects of her experience. In discussing the actualising process, Bohart (2007) 
suggests such openness results in greater value being placed on congruence 
with oneself and with others. This openness and real-time experiencing of 
emotion was increasingly apparent in remaining meetings, but particularly in 
session seven, which both Abigail and I reviewed as another important 
encounter.
Session seven began with Abigail describing her desperate sadness at the 
death conversations she had had with her mother. Considering the subject and 
Abigail’s heavy tone of voice, I voiced my sense of the significance of these 
conversations, but also checked whether Abigail was able to continue talking 
about her feelings. My congruence stemmed from awareness of my complex 
responsibilities as a therapist, which meant not only furthering our jointly 
agreed goals, but also ethically avoiding inflicting harm. Abigail decided to 
expand on her feelings of sadness and loss, and then chose to contrast these 
feelings with a new relationship which she described as “making her feel alive”. 
Mindful of work by Angus and Rennie (1989), describing how metaphors often 
contain an underlying meaning context which can illuminate understanding, I 
offered a tentative process direction to explore the meaning of Abigail’s phrase. 
Abigail’s response led to what I considered to be a hugely significant 
discussion, which indicated not only Abigail’s increased openness to difficult 
aspects of her experience, but also our understanding of a third, overarching 
condition of worth. Abigail described how her mother’s death would in many 
respects mean she could lead a new life; that she felt her mother had wanted 
– needed – her to lead “a perfect life” of professional job, marriage and money, 
which proved to both of them that life had not been de-railed by the struggles 
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of Abigail’s childhood. However, Abigail wondered whether she might not be a 
“victim” in a different way, in that she had lived the respectable life her mother 
had wanted, rather than being true to her own feelings about those things she 
instinctively preferred. Rennie (1998) suggests that process identification can 
draw attention to the meaning of a client’s experience, and so I commented on 
my sense of Abigail’s troubled facial expression, and the difficulty of exploring 
these feelings at this time. Abigail responded by sharing that she felt disloyal; 
however, we then considered how the sadness (love) and release (anger) could 
both be true. Haugh (2001) observed that, through congruence, it is not that 
something new is perceived, but rather that something new is created. This 
seems an accurate comment about the integrated understanding reached in 
session seven.
In her study of clients’ experiences relational depth, Knox (2008) notes that 
moments of deep encounter often have enduring effects. These effects include 
a sense of validation or healing which is a catalyst for change in the self; such 
change involves a more open relationship with oneself and with the therapist, 
where a wider range of feelings can be expressed. In the sessions comprising 
the second half of therapy (eight to fifteen), I perceived that Abigail was 
attending to a much wider range of thoughts, feelings and bodily experiencing, 
and aiming to integrate these aspects of herself: in the words of Rogers (1961: 
181), she was exploring “being the self that one ... is”. Moreover, Abigail’s 
exploration appeared to reflect the dual process of bereavement which Stroebe 
and Schut (1999) describe, oscillating between the grief of her mother’s death 
and consideration of how to address her own future life. These sessions 
involved exploration of different kind of relationships with her brother and her 
husband. Besides her love for her brother, Abigail acknowledged a sense of 
resentment that he had been supported when she had had to struggle, and she 
began to consider how she might interact differently with him. On her 
husband’s return to the UK, Abigail chose to voice the fundamental concerns 
about the relationship which she had experienced for a while, but buried. She 
described finding their discussions sad, but also reported feeling an inner calm 
at their decision to separate, believing that significant differences in values and 
experience meant that she could only be more fulfilled – and more herself – in 
another relationship. Another important discussion involved her future work 
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plans, and later in this latter phase, Abigail began applying for jobs and 
courses which would enable her to pursue an altered career path, which she 
believed was more congruent with her values and long-term goals.
Discussing endings, Rennie (1998) considers the idea of the therapeutic 
relationship outlined by Bordin (1979), and the particular challenges in goal, 
task and bond in the last sessions. In our final review, Abigail and I assessed 
progress against our goal of understanding the reasons for her numbness, and 
what we needed to accomplish to end our relationship. Dingman (1996) notes 
that the process of change is rarely smooth or linear. Abigail continued to feel 
the intense exhaustion and sadness of looking after her mother; however, she 
also described an increasing number of moments when she was able to share 
this sadness with her mother, and she viewed this as important for both of 
them. Another ongoing challenge was the integration of what Abigail called 
“the good and the bad” feelings, and this difficulty was noticeable in Abigail’s 
unease before her marriage discussions with her husband.  
However, as Mearns and Cooper (2005) describe, this transformation of her 
intra-personal relationship with herself – Abigail’s awareness and acceptance of 
her feelings of sadness, anger, resentment – seemed to be connected over the 
weeks to the changes I have described in her personal relationships and work 
plans. This is perhaps captured by a discussion in session twelve.  As Abigail 
described her search for a new job, I observed a lightness in her manner and a 
smile on her face, and decided it might be useful to offer a process 
identification. Abigail commented that she felt an increasing sense of personal 
belief and freedom from expectations; when I hazarded a depth reflection that 
facing her mother’s death had given her confidence, Abigail replied that for 
once she had not looked on the bright side or made positive comparisons, but 
had faced the worst and found she was still standing. The experience of this, 
integrated with her practical and general skills, made her feel hopeful about 
creating a new life. 
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7 Evaluation of the therapy
7.1 Difficulties in the work and use of supervision
Supervision was used to enhance the scope of my work in a number of ways. 
As indicated previously, detailed examination of session recordings allowed me 
to review the value of particular interventions, and consider the impact of 
possible alternatives. However, I also used supervision to help me explore two 
wider concerns in my work with Abigail. The first concerned the quality of 
psychological contact. Wyatt (2007) argues that embracing a relational or two-
person view of psychological therapy means the therapist has to be vigilant to 
the quality of psychological contact. In session three, I felt at times as if 
Abigail and I were having a productive discussion, but that the therapeutic 
edge had been blunted. Reviewing the work in supervision helped me 
understand how, as Toukmanian (2002) describes, I had been overly aware of 
my own subjectivity, due to concern about needing to manage the process. 
This had detracted from my attunement to Abigail’s moment to moment 
processing, and the ability to sense behind what Abigail was saying. 
Discussions in supervision helped me re-focus on the conditions needed for 
empathic exploration.
A second concern related to Abigail’s psychological state. Mindful of Abigail’s 
previous experience of depression, and of the overlapping experiential 
symptoms of grief and depression (Parkes, 2006), I was aware of my ethical 
responsibilities as a trainee psychologist to ensure that Abigail was being 
offered appropriate support for her needs. Rennie (1998) mentions how meta-
communication can be helpful in person-centred therapy, by being congruent 
about the purpose of communication and thus reinforcing the therapeutic 
alliance. At the two points of greatest distress, Abigail and I had productive 
conversations in which this concern was made transparent, and discussed 
between us. Through conversations with Abigail, and in confirmatory reviews 
with my supervisor, we agreed to continue with the grief work.
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7.2 Evaluation of the work
Lietaer (1992) highlighted the difficulty of evaluating person-centred work. 
Discrepancies often exist between the interpretations of therapist and client, 
and, as in my work here, there can be an absence of paper measures. In an 
effort most accurately to assess the outcome, I have sought to use Abigail’s 
own statements and behavioural changes as a measure of progress.
Considering such factors, I feel our work together was very productive. 
Abigail’s regular attendance supported her statement that she felt that our 
work helped her address her original goal in seeking in therapy.
In our penultimate review, Abigail described how her new understanding of the 
conditions driving her experience (being hard, being helpful, the perfect life) 
was helping her assess her choices within current and future relationships. This 
seemed to be reflected in behavioural and life changes, such as the move to 
separate from her husband, exploration of new career path, and discussions 
over the ongoing relationship with her brother. Moreover, Abigail stated that 
she no longer experienced the numbness which had brought her to therapy. 
We noted her increasing capacity to sense and voice the full range of feelings, 
both negative and positive; as Mearns and Cooper (2005) suggest, this intra-
personal relating appeared to have enabled the greater congruence of feeling 
which Abigail perceived with her close family members. 
Finally, Abigail’s continued ability to care for her mother, while also beginning 
to assess future life directions, suggest that she was engaging usefully in the 
dual process which Stroebe and Schut (1999) describe. Within the loss 
orientation, Abigail’s ability to sense and integrate the conflicting feelings about 
her mother appear to have enabled her to begin to accept the meaning of the 
loss; within the recovery orientation, understanding the conditions that shaped 
her own experiencing allowed Abigail to begin to contemplate a different 
future.
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7.3 Learning about psychotherapeutic theory and practice
My work with Abigail has crystallised two important learnings about the 
meaning of relationship within person-centred therapy. The first issue is 
theoretical. Rather than a modernist, subject-object conception of classical 
person-centred therapy, I align myself with Schmid (2007) and Mearns and 
Cooper (2005), viewing the therapeutic relationship as fundamentally a two-
person encounter. The writings of Jordan (1991: 82) make clear the 
implications of this for both therapist and client: “one is both affecting the 
other and being affected by the other: extending oneself out, and being 
receptive to impact.” Moreover, as Schmid argues, perhaps our commitment to 
such presence as a therapist can be seen as an ethical responsibility to 
respond, within therapeutic boundaries. Certainly, this responsibility appears 
more significant if, as Greenberg (1996) proposes, change in person-centred 
therapy comes not just through the internal relaxation of conditions of worth, 
but from the experience of a caring relationship. My work with Abigail 
suggested that growth in a client is inextricably connected to the 
characteristics of relating described above.
Given the significance of this learning, my second issue concerns how the 
strength of this relationship can be better assessed in practice. Many person-
centred practitioners (Lambert, Shapiro & Bergin, 1986; Lietaer, 1992) 
describe how clients and therapists often hold differing views about the 
relationship, both within the session and across the course of the relationship. 
Recently, Patterson and Joseph (2007) began evaluating formal tools to assess 
these areas of person-centred work. In my ongoing practice, I am committed 
to exploring how I might make use of such developments, to help me learn 
more about the kinds of relationships in which I am engaged, and their 
therapeutic value for my clients. 
7.4  Learning about myself as a therapist
My personal learning derives from my theoretical learning. Accepting the 
concept of a two-person therapeutic relationship means there is an ongoing 
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requirement for me to uncover the “lace curtains” or “safety screens” behind 
which I am hiding. To be able to be fully present, and to be able to offer the 
accessibility and expressivity which Bugental (1976) defines as the hallmark of 
presence, I will need continually to explore my awareness of my own emotions, 
feelings and vulnerabilities. For example, in my work with Abigail, exploring my 
anxiety to manage process competently helped me clarify what was interfering 
with my ability to be present; examining the detail of session recordings in 
supervision helped me understand how, at times, a slight awkwardness with 
congruent interventions led to over-wordy responses. As a developing 
practitioner, I will keep seeking specialist supervision which can help me 
understand how I can make use of process ideas from experiential person-
centred therapy, while staying fully within the relationship: something which 
Rennie (1998) acknowledges as a challenging task. However, my work with 
Abigail has also made me aware of the growth in my capacity to offer this two-
person therapy. I feel this is in part due to a greater understanding about the 
technical and theoretical aspects of therapy, and in part due to deeper self-
understanding. Rogers (1961: 22) suggested that “the more I am willing to 
understand and accept the realities in myself and in the other person, the 
more change seems to be stirred up.” As I approach the last months of my 
counselling psychology apprenticeship, I see the training not as an ending, but 
rather as a vantage point from which to view the personal work required on 
the road ahead.
8 Ethics
Full and informed written consent was sought for the recording and writing up 
of this work, before regular digital recording of sessions commenced. It was 
recognised that consent could be withdrawn at any time. Anonymity regarding 
names and identifying details was assured and implemented throughout this 
report.  
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Section D: Research
Cancer as biographical disruption: 
Continuity and change in younger 
women’s identities following the 
experience of breast cancer
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Abstract
This study sets out to explore change and continuity in the identities of 
younger women, following a diagnosis of breast cancer. Experience of breast 
cancer is associated with both general and clinical distress, and evidence 
suggests that younger women may be particularly at risk (Jim & Anderson, 
1997; Soothill, Morris, Harman, Francis & McIllmurray, 2001). Such distress 
has recently been connected to the way identities are renegotiated after 
cancer, with acknowledgment of the individual’s lived experience and the social 
context in which identities are crafted. However, previous research has 
focussed on the process of identity change and on consideration of particular 
identities, with little research among younger women with breast cancer. 
Adopting a critical realist epistemology, this research aims to explore the range 
of identities younger women perceive themselves to experience after breast 
cancer. This study will describe the content of these identities, attending to 
perceived changes following the cancer diagnosis, together with positive or 
problematic aspects of these identities and the salience of particular identities. 
Eight women (< 50 years; cancer staging 0-II) participated in semi-structured 
interviews, which were examined using interpretative phenomenological 
analysis. Three major, interconnected themes emerged. “Challenges to 
embodiment: The body does its own thing” described new embodied identities 
related to the alien nature of cancer, being reduced to a body, and a different 
appearance. “Negotiated roles: What am I looking for now?” described changes 
experienced in social role identities such as partner, mother, friend and work 
colleague. “Emotional-existential dilemmas: Re-learning what life’s all about” 
records how participants positioned their identities differently in terms of their 
mortality, autonomy and life goals. These findings are discussed, with 
particular consideration of the way younger women’s experience of changed 
identities can be illuminated by theories of biographical disruption (Bury, 1982; 
1991) and discourses of bodily self-control (Lupton, 2003).
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1 Introduction
 Disease cannot be separated from other parts of a person’s identity 
 and life. Disease changed my life as husband, father, professor and 
 everything else. [...] It was no small thing to rediscover myself as I 
 changed. (Frank, 1991: 57)
________________________________________________________
1.1 Rationale for this study
Breast cancer is the most common cancer in the UK. In 2007 – the latest year 
for which figures are available – almost 46,000 women and 277 men were 
diagnosed with the disease (Cancer Research, 2010). This represents a fifty 
per cent increase in the incidence of breast cancer over the last twenty five 
years. Within this overall population, the proportion of younger women 
diagnosed with breast cancer has also risen. Recent statistics suggest that 
women aged 50 or under form approximately 20% of the total number of 
people diagnosed with the disease (Cancer Research, 2010). While there is 
greater knowledge about genetic and lifestyle factors (HRT, diet, exercise, 
contraception) which may affect onset of the disease, there is still considerable 
uncertainty as to the contribution of such factors within both the individual 
diagnosis and the rates of incidence across geographies. However, due in part 
to earlier screening and diagnosis, breast cancer survival rates are increasing. 
Approximately three quarters of people with breast cancer survive at least ten 
years after diagnosis, with higher survival rates among those whose cancer is 
at a less advanced stage (Cancer Research, 2010). Thus, each year, an 
increasingly large number of women (and men) are living a life which has been 
affected by the experience of breast cancer. 
Being diagnosed with a life-threatening disease obviously causes shock and 
emotional distress. From a clinical perspective, the definition of emotional 
distress has focused on the inability to cope:
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 ..a multi-determined unpleasant emotional experience of a psychological (cognitive, 
 behavioural, emotional), social and/or spiritual nature that may interfere with the ability 
 to cope effectively with cancer, its physical symptoms and its treatment. (National 
 Comprehensive Cancer Network, 2002:3). 
Reviews of psychological conditions have reported point prevalence rates for 
major depression in the 20-25% range, with incidence of adjustment disorders 
also recorded at a similar 25-30% level (Sellick & Crooks, 1999). Furthermore, 
a quantitative survey of American cancer patients indicated that the prevalence 
of psychological distress did not vary significantly across the course of the 
disease, excepting the terminal phase where quality of life issues acquired a 
greater importance (Zabora, Blanchard & Smith, 1997). However, it is not 
simply the scale of these psycho-pathological conditions which demands 
attention to the experience of breast cancer patients. Beyond the realm of 
clinical disorders, the large number of first-person accounts in books and 
chatrooms emphasises what common sense would suggest: that a breast 
cancer diagnosis causes huge disruption and emotional turbulence for the vast 
majority of those who are told they have the disease. In her review of such 
breast cancer narratives, Herndl (2006) argues that these accounts share a 
need to make some sort of meaning from experience. Through the unsettling 
of embodiment, women find themselves required to make sense of their 
multiple identities, both within time and across time.
Recent psychological research has confirmed the link between meaning and 
distress, as well as indicating different forms of making meaning. In a 
substantial quantitative study, Jim and Andersen (2007) investigated 
associations between cancer patients’ social or physical functioning and 
emotional distress. The cross sectional (n=420) and longitudinal (n=227) 
surveys found that the effect of physical functioning on distress was partly 
mediated by measures of meaning in life, while the effect of social functioning 
was fully mediated by meaning. Moreover, in the second survey which 
consisted exclusively of breast cancer patients, younger age was associated 
with higher distress, irrespective of levels of functioning. The relationship 
between meaning and distress is extended by Bower et al (2005), who 
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considered how different types of meaning could be associated with distress. 
This substantial (n=763) longitudinal survey of breast cancer patients indicated 
that participants’ continued to perceive altered meaning and vulnerability both 
five and ten years after diagnosis. Furthermore, while vulnerability was 
unsurprisingly a predictor of negative effect, it was the combination of 
vulnerability and meaning which significantly predicted positive affect. 
However, while firmly linking meaning with distress and/or positive affect, 
these studies’ usefulness is limited by the restricted measures of meaning they 
employ: brief indicators of inner peace, personal growth, spirituality and loss in 
the first study; indicators of changed outlook (meaning) and bodily functioning 
(vulnerability) in the second. Fortunately, these deficiencies are addressed by 
separate work in the area of post-traumatic growth. In addition to confirming 
the potential for both positive and negative change or distress after traumatic 
events, Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) suggest that such change is experienced 
in three main areas. These are identified as perceived changes in the self 
(issues of strength and self esteem); a changed sense of relationships with 
others; and a changed philosophy of life.
Psychologists and medical professionals have explored these forms of meaning 
in two main approaches. The first – and by volume of studies, more 
predominant - approach has been a focus on ‘adjustment’. This has involved an 
assessment of the ways behaviour is altered to accommodate cancer (Cella & 
Tross, 1986; Ell, Nishimoto, Morvay, Mantell & Hamovitch, 1989), or cognitive 
strategies used by people with cancer to respond to the life changes which can 
cancer bring (Jim, Richardson, Golden-Kreutz & Andersen, 2006; Parle, Jones 
& Maguire, 1996; Watson et al, 1988; Watson et al, 1991). Yet as Mathieson 
and Stam (1995) have argued, the dominance of this approach risks ignoring 
other aspects of the construction of meaning. The concern, they propose, is 
not that patients do not engage in cognitive activities as a result of their 
cancer, but rather “the extent to which this theoretical stance is an adequate 
description of the lived experience of a chronic, life-threatening 
disease” (1995: 286). 
As a result, researchers have recently sought to explore changes to identities 
in the face of chronic illnesses such as cancer. Such projects do not see cancer 
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as a personal problem to be solved, mainly through the adoption of appropriate 
coping strategies. Instead, as Mathieson & Stam (1991; 1995) suggest, this 
body of research adopts a broader conceptualisation of the impact of cancer. 
Studies approach meaning as emerging through the lived experience of illness: 
an experience which may be located in the individual body, but created 
through the individual’s existence in a social world and medical system. As I 
shall argue below, these meanings are established through the identities which 
are available to, and created by, people with cancer. This was something which 
became clear to me in my own experience with breast cancer, which preceded 
this research. Following my diagnosis, I was aware of the way in which my own 
choices, and the social (friendship, professional, medical) context in which I 
lived, were implicated in change to a number of identities. The meanings I 
attached to my life were bound up with those identities. 
The focus of this study is thus inspired by personal and professional 
considerations. Building out from my own experience, it was clear that the 
growing incidence of breast cancer among younger women – approximately 
9000 women diagnosed each year in the UK – means that many women like 
myself experience either general or clinical levels of distress. While one way of 
exploring such experiences has been through assessment of cognitive 
adjustment, I propose to take an alternative route which is more consistent 
with my own lived experience of breast cancer. This involves an attempt to 
understand the changes in a woman’s life-world through their manifestation in 
the different identities she holds. 
Before considering these specific identity questions, I will set the background 
for this study by outlining some relevant theoretical issues of identity. In this 
introduction, the term ‘identity’ will be used to refer to the theoretical concept 
of identity, to an overarching sense of self or to single self-as-object 
formulations such as ‘mother’ or ‘partner’. This varied usage is common in 
existing identity research, although I have aimed to minimise confusion here 
by clearly describing the context in which the word is used. The term 
‘identities’ will be used to describe multiple self-as-object formulations. 
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1.2 Defining the field: Some relevant issues of identity
Despite the dramatic rise in the number of studies of identity in the past sixty 
years, prominent academics have acknowledged the difficulty of defining the 
term, calling it an “open problematic” (Wetherell, 2010: 3) or an “essentially 
contested concept” (Mathieson & Stam, 1995: 287). While I recognise the 
amorphous nature of identity, I have also found it important to draw some 
boundaries which can focus enquiry in this study. To this end, I have utilised a 
definition of identity taken from Thoits and Virshup (1997: 109): “who I am in 
my own and others’ eyes”. In invoking the mutual interdependence of self and 
society, this definition alludes to several important aspects of identity which 
have relevance to this research.
Perhaps the most significant tradition underpinning this research is that of 
identity as a “subjective individual achievement” (Wetherell, 2010: 3). In this 
way, identity belongs to a particular person, and is both continuously located in 
a body and also inextricably linked to a particular place in society. Thus 
identity, as Erikson (1950) proposed, is a way of achieving personal coherence 
across a life-time, through the reflexive integration of biological and social 
factors which influence an individual across the years. Such biographical 
coherence was reinforced in Erikson’s theory by a progression through 
universal stages (child-adolescent-early adult-old age). 
Thinking within the experiential traditions – phenomenology, existential and 
humanistic theory – has shaped understanding of this subjective aspect of 
identity. As Stevens (1996) argued, there are three main principles underlying 
this understanding. The first is that we experience ourselves as existing in the 
world. We derive our identity from the particular perspective we have on the 
world, and that perspective is gained from our location in our bodies. Indeed, 
as Merleau-Ponty (1962) proposes, our body and mind may be seen as 
inseparable:
 The body is the vehicle for being-in-the-world, and having a body is, for a living 
 creature, to be involved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain 
 projects and be continuously committed to them. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 94).
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The meanings and identities we draw from our experience come from the 
relationship between our bodies and other objects in the world. Although such 
meaning may be constructed, it is derived from “real” objects and is therefore 
not simply “within the head”. A second experiential principle concerns our 
human capacity for reflexive self-awareness. This capacity is essential to the 
creation of identity, as it forms a basis for the action we take in our lives. 
Linking reflexivity to earlier ideas about the body, experiential traditions would 
argue that, though inseparable, mind (reflexiveness) and body are not 
identical: that “consciousness is “being-towards-the-thing” through the 
medium of the body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 159-160). Finally, the combination 
of our embodied nature and our reflexive capacities means that there is a 
dynamic quality to our existence. We are always in the process of becoming, 
and as active intentional agents we seek to realise goals, in identity as in other 
areas. 
However, while describing the fundamental importance to identity of the 
intentional and embodied nature of human beings, experiential psychologists 
would also acknowledge how identity is simultaneously and vitally shaped by 
our situation in the social world. Here, identity is affected by our social location 
in particular groups and categories which are viewed to have similar or defining 
characteristics. These include wide-scale social categories such as gender 
(Bem, 1981), as well as more specific social roles such as mother, daughter or 
doctor (McCall & Simmons, 1966/1978), and even considerations of personality 
characteristics such as being a helpful or lazy person (Stryker, 1985). However, 
at the same time as raising up issues of similarity, research into social 
identities also stimulated awareness of social differences. Elias (1991) argued 
that people’s contrasting stakes in social life – positions of advantage or 
disadvantage – profoundly affected the nature of identities which individuals 
are able to craft. Thus, as Wetherell (2010) proposes, a more complex notion 
of identity emerges where an ‘identity slot’ – working class woman, Muslim 
woman – could be argued to precede the individual, fundamentally colouring 
the reflexive world and available possibilities for that person.
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Furthermore, Wetherell describes how research linking identities to social 
categories also highlighted the constructed nature of meanings and 
significances attributed to bodies. Of relevance to this research is the ongoing 
debate about the biological and social construction of gender, with a recent 
publication by Fine (2010) arguing that it is societal rather than neuro-
scientific factors which lead to the creation of gendered identities. Disability is 
another area which has emerged as a politicised social identity. Here, as 
Garland-Thomson and Bailey (2010) indicate, the construction of meanings has 
resulted in segregation of, and discrimination against, particular bodies. In his 
seminal work on stigma, Goffman (1963) described how certain physical 
characteristics could be defined as dangerous or discrediting, reflecting social 
perspectives on what was valuable or acceptable. Thus a stigmatised social 
status might affect a woman’s subjective identity, through an individual’s 
relations with strangers and intimates.
This brings us to the important question of how subjective (or personal) 
identity and social identities can be integrated. Indeed, as Wetherell (2010) 
describes, the theories of knowledge of many social scientists would lead them 
to deny that such a question is actually necessary: for some sociologists, the 
individual is entirely social; for many experimental social psychologists, the 
only real and determinate unit is the individual. But for those researchers like 
myself, who see both personal and social identities to be vitally important 
perspectives within the overall field of identity, such responses are inadequate. 
Instead, the idea of a dialectical relationship between the individual and society 
offers a way forward. Building out from the debates between structure and 
agency which Giddens (1991) articulates, this dialectical relationship involves a 
circular process between the individual and society. The individual takes up 
aspects of social material, modifies it to suit her position, and then 
communicates this modified material back into society, where it becomes part 
of the new corpus of social material. 
Wetherell (2010) suggests that such a process has historically rested on 
“binary distinctions between ‘interiors’ and ‘exteriors’ “ (2010:12). Thus 
theories of the self proposed by Mead (1934) comprised an ‘I’ which was the 
locus of agency and unique individuality, while the ‘Me’ was created from the 
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internalised attitudes of others. However, recent work has proposed a more 
dialectical relationship between the I/Me. Jenkins (2004) argues that the 
development of identity should properly be seen as an ongoing dialogue 
between personal self-definitions and definitions of identities offered by others. 
Moreover, in re-asserting the importance of language, reflexivity and social 
interchange to identity development, Jenkins suggests some modifications to 
Mead’s original processes. Following the tradition of Kant (Glover, 1988), the ‘I’ 
becomes the capacity of the self to reflect on itself, and thus to self-realise and 
self-monitor; this ‘I’ is actively bound up in assessing and evaluating 
possibilities for the ‘Me’ available through social interaction, and – as we shall 
now consider – through the regulatory and evaluative discourses available in 
society.
This discursive turn in psychology further complicates conceptualisations of 
identity. The essential question asked by discursive approaches was whether 
identity and experience were straightforwardly given by social location. This 
more ‘critical’ approach focused upon the ways in which accounts of experience 
were constructed, through detailed analysis of the workings of language and 
human meaning-making. While the interactive creation of meaning in 
conversation formed one aspect of discursive approaches, another important 
aspect was the investigation of broad knowledge regimes and positions. Such 
discourses can be described as:
 ...ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic or practice: a 
 cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking 
 about forms of knowledge and conduct associated with a particular topic, social activity 
 or institutional site in society. (Hall, 1997: 4)
More than simply ways of talking, discourses in this sense become “regimes of 
truth” (Macleod, 2002:23), where particular positions (such as those of the 
medical/psychological professions) are constituted as expert scientific 
knowledge, while other positions (such as lay women’s experiences) are 
constituted as having lesser value. As Willig (2001:107) has argued, these 
dominant discourses “privilege those versions of social reality which legitimate 
existing power relations and social structures”.  
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In addition to exploring such regimes of truth at the societal level, research in 
identity has considered how particular discourses are taken up and used by 
individuals. As I shall describe below, my research does not take an extreme 
discursive position, where individuals are seen as being constituted entirely by 
the social identities of which they are composed. Instead, as Walkerdine and 
Bansel (2010) have proposed, individuals can be argued to orient themselves 
reflexively to cultural resources for making sense of their identities. This 
applies equally to embodied identities as to social role identities. In her 
exploration of body projects, Woodward (2000) talks of the ways in which the 
body can become a site for the construction of identity. Discourses concerning 
shape, colour or features promote a social position as to what is valued, thus 
becoming the means through which a person can – to some degree – negotiate 
the value or stigma which becomes attached to the individual body. 
This range of contradictory discourses, and the multiplicity of identity positions, 
has led many to seek to “rescue experience, self-knowledge and authenticity 
from the discursive onslaught” (Wetherell, 2010:15). Many post-positivist 
realist researchers (Alcoff, 2010; McAdams, 1997) now argue that multiplicity 
and fragmentation have gone too far, and that exclusively discursive 
examination of identity and the self ignores persistence, repetition and order 
across time. From such a viewpoint – which this study shares – it is not so 
much that individuals’ identities are created by discourses and structural 
positions. Instead, people collaboratively create these identities for 
themselves, through dialogue on both the interpersonal and social levels.  This 
means, as Wetherell (2010) proposes, that the constitution of identities is not 
transparent, but rather requires careful investigation. Moreover, research in 
this area need to consider the “intersectional nature of identity” (Crenshaw, 
1991). Rather than thinking of identities in terms of discrete categories, 
exploration of this subject must take into account the inter-relationship 
between different aspects of identity, such as embodiment and roles.
This section has described how human lives can be understood to be formed of 
multiple identities. These identities are rooted in our bodies and are actively 
and continuously constructed, as well as being simultaneously personal and 
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social. The next section will consider how issues of identity and cancer have 
been explored in the existing research literature, with particular attention to 
the circumstances of younger women with breast cancer.
1.3 Linking experience of breast cancer with identity
The complexity of research in the area of cancer and identity reflects 
something of the complexity in the area of overall identity studies. There has 
been no systematic pattern of studies, no one methodological approach and 
certainly no meta-analysis of results. This means that some aspects, such as 
the process of change in identity, have been more extensively covered, while 
detailed research into individual identities is less comprehensive. Moreover, 
while some studies are directly focussed on women with breast cancer, the 
absence of a substantial literature on breast cancer and identity means that I 
have also drawn on other work which offers indirect evidence of issues in this 
area. 
In evaluating this literature, I have remained focussed on two questions. What 
evidence is there for change in identities after cancer? If identities are being 
altered, what kinds of changes are taking place? In order to impose some 
structure on this analysis, I will begin with a review of studies whose broader 
research objectives provide insight across a range of identities. This will be 
followed by a review of studies which have assessed the impact of cancer in a 
specific identity area. To assist understanding, a glossary of frequently used 
cancer terms is attached as Appendix 1. 
1.3.1 Issues of identity and cancer – general studies
Although not focussed on identity, research by Ganz et al (1996) provides a 
helpful starting point for this survey. The study aimed to understand the 
psycho-social concerns and quality of life of women diagnosed with early stage 
breast cancer (Stages 0-II), and used mixed methods (surveys, clinical 
measures and semi-structured interviews) as well as a longitudinal frame to 
assess changes at one, two and three years after treatment. A number of 
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interesting findings a emerged from the study. Firstly, a generic measure of 
functioning (the Medical Outcomes Study) suggested that these women were 
performing well in terms of meeting role and social requirements, when 
compared to people with other chronic illnesses. Thus on one level, breast 
cancer might appear to have less impact on identities than other illnesses such 
as heart disease and arthritis. 
However, results from separate assessments of quality of life, sexual 
functioning and marital functioning presented a different picture, with 
significant declines in scores across the time of the study. These global scores 
were illuminated by participants’ statements at interview, and by responses to 
a Cancer Rehabilitation Evaluation System (CARES) questionnaire, which 
provided details of important and severe problems. In terms of bodily issues, 
approximately 70% women reported a reduction in energy and difficulty with 
physical activities, even three years after surgery; when assessing their body 
image, approximately half of the women described being embarrassed to show 
their body, and being uncomfortable with scarring and body changes. In 
discussion, women linked these issues to surgery and to subsequent 
treatment. Both mastectomy and reconstruction were associated with pain and 
lost sensation, while nausea and changes in hair texture and breast form were 
connected with chemotherapy and radiotherapy, and ongoing hormonal 
treatment was held to be responsible for difficulties associated with premature 
menopause, such as hot flushes and vaginal problems. These bodily changes 
were in turn directly implicated in sexual functioning. At the same three year 
point, 47% women reported they were not interested in having sex, while 
scores on decreased frequency of intercourse, difficulty becoming aroused and 
difficulty becoming lubricated were 48%, 48% and 64% respectively. In terms 
of relationships, 20% women felt that their partner did not take sufficient care 
of them, or that it was difficult asking for care; for those who were dating, 
56% women expressed difficulty in meeting dates and 39% expressed fear of 
initiating sex. There were, however, more positive expressions about 
relationships, with approximately 33% women in relationships perceiving that 
their relationship had improved through cancer. Finally, while other issues were 
accorded lower severity ratings, there were also notable scores for 
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psychological distress (frequently anxious 51%/frequently depressed 50%, at 
the three year point).
How does this research inform our understanding of possible identity issues 
after cancer? In their study, Ganz et al (1996) isolate many difficulties which 
would appear to translate into challenges to identities: challenges to sexual 
identity; embodied identities; identity as a partner; potential impact on a 
range of identities through reduced levels of energy. These issues are 
persistent, continuing several years after the end of treatment, and are 
experienced by women who were diagnosed with less advanced breast cancer. 
Some support for the changes in these identity areas comes from research by 
Soothill, Morris, Harman, Francis and McIllmurray (2001), whose examination 
of the significant unmet psycho-social needs of cancer patients indicates issues 
with changed body and appearance, altered sexual functioning, and 
management of others’ perceptions and feelings. However, there are a number 
of important limitations in the research of Ganz et al, both in general and from 
the perspective of my particular focus. There are no baseline reads of any of 
the research measures, and so while change following cancer may be inferred, 
it cannot be clearly measured. Relatedly, the particular impact of cancer on 
sexual or marital functioning cannot be directly assessed, as there is no control 
group of women without breast cancer. The quantitative nature of the study 
means that there is little detailed information about particular identities, while 
use of questionnaires (and questionnaire-led interviews) means that the study 
is firmly oriented in the psycho-social research model of the researcher, rather 
than in the lived experience of the participants. Lastly, with an average 
participant age of 58, the changes recounted by these women may be less 
relevant to the younger women I am considering. Indeed, the previously 
mentioned study by Soothill et al found that younger people were more likely 
to experience unmet needs than older people with cancer, although the age 
band for this category of “younger people” was not defined in their write up.
A wider body of research has examined identity issues from the perspective of 
the person with cancer. As Riessman (2003) has described, these studies 
emerged as a response to the bio-medical focus on technical factors of disease, 
and the consequent neglect of a very different phenomenon: the patient’s 
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experience of illness. In this area, an important source of evidence is the study 
by Charmaz (1995), which describes how serious chronic illness “undermines 
the sense of unity between body and self and forces identity changes” 
(1995: 657). In her investigation of the way body and self intersect in illness, 
Charmaz interviewed mostly older men and women (n=55, 60+ years old) with 
a variety of conditions including cancer. Charmaz proposed that underpinning 
change in identity was experience of an altered body, and this experience 
seemed to take three forms. Firstly, there were physical changes such as new 
(and potentially distressing) bodily sensations and impaired functioning. One 
participant described how activities she used to do easily were now a 
challenge. Secondly, participants described experiencing a radical disruption in 
their previously held notions of body and self; rather than a body which was 
taken for granted, there was a heightened awareness of embodiment, and a 
disturbing sense of the body as disconnected from the self and out of control. 
Thirdly, issues relating to bodily appearance – both the presence of visible 
changes, or the absence of visible changes which could helpfully signal 
potential changes in functioning – affected participants’ ability to maintain their 
previous roles. All these changes to the body were experienced in a social 
context, and so could be associated with guilt and shame: guilt due to 
perceived failure to meet social standards of bodily performance and 
appearance; and shame because “their very existence testifies to a failure to 
meet these standards” (Charmaz, 1995: 663).
While all participants described alteration in their experience of their body, 
Charmaz (1995) argued that such bodily changes do not automatically result in 
changed identity goals. In some instances, completion of treatment might 
leave participants with a greater appreciation of their restored physical state, 
leading to the resumption of previous identities as a work colleague or 
development of new identities through leisure pursuits or work ventures. 
However, participants also reported how markedly altered bodily functioning 
undermined identities such as a mother or a work colleague; this could result 
in lowered expectations or limits being imposed as to the scope of a particular 
identity, or tradeoffs being made between identities. Again, Charmaz 
suggested that these changes needed to be contextualised. For example, in the 
area of work, identity goals were more easily maintained when participants 
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had greater positional power within their employment; moreover, those with 
more money and help appeared to have more choice over the types and 
timings of any tradeoffs in identity. Age also presented itself as a factor, with 
Charmaz proposing that practical and emotional support from partners was 
less apparent for younger women than for older participants in the study. 
One important link between changes in embodiment and identity goals is more 
fully documented in an earlier study by Charmaz, which explores loss of self 
through chronic illness (Charmaz, 1983). Linking with ideas of stigma outlined 
by Goffman (1963), participants with chronic illness perceived themselves to 
be discredited, through both the evaluations of others and also through failure 
to meet their own expectations. This could affect identities in a number of 
ways. Some participants with visible impairments – an amputated leg from 
diabetes, a slower gait due to rheumatoid arthritis - described being publicly 
mortified or discredited by other’s reactions to their changed body, leading 
them to restrict certain activities and identities. Other participants with less 
evident but potentially “discreditable” conditions such as diabetes described 
carefully planning social activities such as parties to manage potential 
embarrassment. 
In summary, then, the work of Charmaz (1983; 1995) provides important 
insights as to the impact of cancer on identity. Firstly, the research suggests 
that cancer results in significant changes to perceived embodiment, which can 
frequently translate into changes across a wide range of role identities: work 
colleague; partner; mother. By anchoring her research in the participants’ life-
world, Charmaz indicates the dynamic relationships between these different 
aspects of identity, and also the way in which an individual’s identities are 
shaped by particular features of their context (class and age), and by social 
valuations which ascribe stigma to particular physical and social qualities. 
However, there are also some limitations in this research. The wide focus on 
changes in body and self mean that, while bodily changes are covered in more 
detail, changes in role identity are only briefly recounted.  The older age, 
mixed gender and spread of chronic illness among participants mean that the 
applicability of these findings to younger women with breast cancer cannot be 
assumed. Finally, the symbolic interactionist perspective within which Charmaz 
91
views her work appears to frame particular aspects of her enquiry. Thus while 
structural and interactive aspects of social context are considered, issues of 
discourse are not mentioned in these studies. Furthermore, the 
conceptualisation of identities appears to be restricted to the area of social 
roles, with the body seen as the foundation of identities but not as a source of 
identities in its own right.
How can other general studies of identity support or extend the findings of 
Charmaz? Several pieces of research have examined the process of creating 
meaning following cancer. There is some question as to the applicability of the 
findings to this study, as the participant groups have had multiple cancers and 
diverse stagings (O’Connor, Wicker & Germino, 1990; Mathieson & Stam, 
1995), as well as a seeming bias towards participants with dominant religious 
faith (O’Connor et al). Despite these issues, and although the focus of these 
projects has not involved systematic exploration of individual identities, both 
studies enhance understanding of the kinds of identity changes which can 
ensue. This is the case in the research of O’Connor et al , who explored 
through semi-structured interviews the personal search for meaning in people 
with breast and lung cancer (n=30). O’Connor et al suggested a number of 
ways in which social roles might be altered. The physical and logistical 
consequences of cancer treatment could interfere with the immediate 
involvement in role identities; for example, one participant talked of finding it 
harder to take care of friends, while another regretted the interruption to his 
work as a taxi driver. However, participants also described how cancer led to an 
increased sense of unpredictability about the future. This provoked an 
assessment of the value of previous roles, which could result in a number of 
actions. People in the study mentioned cancer being a spur to taking up new 
activities; many also talked of a deeper appreciation of friends and family 
members, and of choosing to invest more time in these relationships. This is 
echoed in a separate case study from Finlay (2003), where diagnosis of 
multiple sclerosis led a woman to withdraw entirely from her professional work 
in order to become a full-time mother: a clear prioritisation of this particular 
identity.
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Such changes in social roles hint at a further level of identities, which can be 
read from the research from Connor et al (1990). These identities relate to an 
individual’s personal qualities and their status as a human being. One woman 
who had had a mastectomy extrapolated from her physical condition to her 
state as a person, perceiving that “it’s not as if I’m a whole person right 
now” (1990:171). In assessing how the cancer might have occurred, some 
participants reviewed their behaviour and whether they might have contributed 
to the cancer through their stressful lives or smoking habits. Almost all 
participants mentioned thinking about the possibility of death, and acquiring 
greater awareness of their mortality. Thus there appeared to be a deeper sense 
of the existential nature of being a human. This is also reflected in research by 
Little, Paul, Jordens and Sayers (2002), which suggests that cancer can pose 
existential issues in two ways: firstly, by profoundly disrupting role identities; 
and secondly, by asking individuals to consider what it means to be a mortal 
person. Additional evidence for this kind of change comes in studies by 
Anderson and Martin (2003) and Kayser and Sormanti (2002). In the former, a 
woman with cancer describes a new sense of herself as a courageous person, 
as a result of coming through the fear and physical challenges of her diagnosis 
and treatment. In the latter study, approximately half of the respondents 
(n=41) described themselves using personal characteristics such as strong, 
self-confident, and a fighter, suggesting cancer had heightened their awareness 
of these personal qualities.
Thus the research of Connor et al (1990) supports and extends earlier findings 
concerning the change in role identities, while also suggesting that cancer may 
lead to change in a different set of identities, which are more psychological or 
existential. A second study throws different light on the kinds of identity 
changes cancer can bring. In their qualitative study (n=39), Mathieson and 
Stam (1995) sought to understand the process of giving meaning to illness, 
within the context of social relationships and the medical system. The 
orientation of this work deepens understanding of the way in which societal 
practices can be implicated in changes to identity. One way in which this may 
occur is through issues of stigma. Mathieson and Stam state that all but two 
participants mentioned stigma-related issues at some point during the 
interviews, although a question about stigma was never asked. Linking with 
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the work of Charmaz (1983; 1995), participants’ accounts describe how a 
sense of stigma began through the implicit contrast between the changed, ill 
body and the previous “healthy” body. This was exacerbated through 
awareness of the powerful stigma of body cues, such as visible scars left from 
surgery or hair loss following chemotherapy. This in turn led to changes in 
social interactions. Some whose cancer was made visible by treatment 
described experiencing altered relations through others’ sympathy and pity. For 
others, identities were negotiated through selective monitoring of relationships, 
which could involve either the non-disclosure of cancer or a decision to 
withdraw from friendships. 
A further way in which societal practices were implicated in identity change 
was through the medium of medical treatment. Some described how their 
sense of themselves as human beings was minimised through medical 
professionals’ focus on their disease status. This “objectifying the 
illness” (Mathieson & Stam, 1995: 295) often meant impersonal 
communication and a sense that the medical details of the disease, rather than 
other aspects of life, were the only valid areas of experience. Furthermore, in 
taking up the potentially unfamiliar identity of a patient, participants were 
required to learn information about their disease and the forms of medical talk, 
and then to decide how they might structure their new role. Davis (2008) has 
suggested that medical literature communicates a vision of a “good patient” as 
one who works co-operatively with doctors, and is vigilant and attentive to her 
body. However, participants in Mathieson and Stam’s study describe how their 
sense of what is required of a patient – presentation of exclusively medical 
issues – leads to a perception that the broader impact of cancer within their 
lived experience is disregarded (“To express concerns – it’s just not part of the 
process, like you don’t go in and have chemo and talk about the experience” – 
1995: 299).   
So, in assessing general psycho-social and identity issues following cancer, 
there appear to be a number of broad conclusions. Firstly, several different 
kinds of identities appear to undergo change following cancer. There are 
changes in roles and also in a more nebulous area of psychological/existential 
identities, as well as more expected changes to embodied identities. These 
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changes are sometimes experienced positively, through heightened 
appreciation of physical or personal qualities; however, in many instances, 
these changes are perceived to have negatively affected an individual’s 
identities, by restricting their activities or reducing their self valuations. Within 
the wider social context, the nature of change is often shaped by the social 
stigma which is attached to cancer, and by the style of medical practices. 
There are, however, some important gaps in the evidence. Much available 
research has not investigated the particular situation of women with breast 
cancer. Furthermore, the specific circumstances of younger women have also 
not been properly addressed. Finally, despite a wealth of general information, 
there is no comprehensive investigation of the range of identities affected by 
breast cancer, and nor is there a systematic and detailed examination of 
particular identities. In the second part of this review, I will consider to what 
extent research into particular identities following breast cancer modifies this 
picture. 
1.3.2 Issues of identity and cancer – research into specific identities
In my initial examination of the literature, I was surprised by the very limited 
number of studies exploring the intersection of breast cancer with specific 
identities. There was a small number of studies dwelling on motherhood or 
being a survivor. However, despite several alternative searches, I found little 
specific information on the impact of breast cancer on identities repeatedly 
alluded to in the general studies: being a friend, a partner or an employee. In 
order to frame what was potentially a search of infinite regress, I made the 
decision in the case of these identities to consider studies whose particular 
focus was psycho-social issues. This enabled me to give some shape to most 
identities. However, as I shall discuss later, the incomplete nature of this 
information added focus to my research design.
In considering change in the identity of a mother with breast cancer, two 
studies were of particular interest. Elmberger, Bolund, Magnussen, Lutzen and 
Andershed (2008) conducted a qualitative project (n=20) to understand how 
women perceived breast cancer to affect their ability to be a “good mother”. 
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Their research suggested that cancer not only presented a challenge to their 
previous conceptions of “good mothering”, but also affected other aspects of 
identity. Many women described a struggle to meet the practical needs of their 
children, while experiencing changes in their body, such as fatigue or nausea. 
Being a mother during cancer was associated by many women with preserving 
some kind of normality for their children during the women’s cancer treatment. 
This involved work at the practical level - ensuring previous routines were 
continued – and also at the emotional level, where many mothers described 
presenting a “happy face” (2008: 61), in order to hide their fears from their 
children. Another aspect of this altered role was responding to their children’s 
emotional reactions to cancer; this could require coping with reluctance to 
bring friends home if the mother had no hair, dealing with silence or – more 
cheerfully – receiving encouragement from children to keep going through 
treatment.
In the study from Elmberger et al (2008), and also in separate research by 
Kayser and Sormanti (2002), woman with breast cancer describe wrestling 
with a balance between their perceived responsibilities as a mother and care of 
their own personal needs. Kayser & Sormanti discussed how many women 
appeared to maintain a high level of caregiving, despite the emotional and 
physical costs to themselves; for others, cancer acted as a catalyst to rethink 
the balance of care for self and others. In their research, Elmberger et al 
suggested that many participants managed this balance by making trade-offs 
with other identities: for example, by preserving energy through limiting non-
family social contacts, avoiding people they found difficult to handle, or 
reducing work hours. These changes appear to reflect the higher prioritisation 
of health and families which Kayser and Sormanti observed in many women’s 
response to breast cancer. By being grounded in the lived experience of 
women, and through a focussed engagement with issues of motherhood 
following breast cancer, these two studies appeared to offer valuable insight 
into the extent and form of change for younger women (mothers) with breast 
cancer.
Being a “survivor” had been explored from both quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives, with contrasting views as to the nature and significance of this 
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identity. In a large scale quantitative survey of cancer patients (n=321: breast 
cancer = 41%), Deimling, Bowman and Wagner (2007) asked participants to 
assess themselves against any or none of the descriptors of cancer patient, 
cancer victim or cancer survivor. 86% respondents identified as a survivor, with 
42% as an ex-patient, 13% as a patient and 13% as a victim. Similar response 
levels were received in a cross-sectional questionnaire-based study of cancer 
patients (n=168) from Park, Zlateva and Blank (2009). In this case, 83% 
endorsed the survivor identity, 81% person who has had cancer, 58% patient 
and 18% victim. Deimling et al observed that the identification with multiple 
identities indicated the uncertain nature of cancer, and resulted in people with 
cancer seeing themselves as simultaneously located in multiple positions. The 
team also reported that identification as a survivor was associated with 
cessation of cancer symptoms, a generally optimistic personal orientation and 
also with successful treatment results. Citing responses to an attribution of the 
salience of this new identity, Deimling et al proposed that 66% respondents 
perceived that “being a cancer survivor is an important part of who I 
am” (2007: 762). However, as part of an additional analysis, the researchers 
also noted that 60% participants had not disclosed their cancer to other 
people, casting some doubt over the strength and nature of their sense of 
survivorship.
Other research suggests that survivor identity might owe more to the 
constructs of researchers than to the perceptions of people with cancer. Kaiser 
(2008) undertook qualitative research among women with breast cancer 
(n=39), to understand the extent to which survivorship was embraced and the 
meanings which the identity was felt to hold. The author commented that her 
participants almost never referred to themselves spontaneously as a survivor. 
When asked whether they saw themselves as a survivor, the identity polarised 
responses. Some felt that they were able to take up this new identity, but only 
with extensive and varied crafting of definitions which included personal 
strength, being engaged in an ongoing war, and being a survivor of life in 
general. A similar number of women rejected the identity, for equally diverse 
reasons: uncertainty at having survived; not experiencing their health as 
seriously jeopardised in the first place; and a refusal to be part of what they 
perceived as the social identity of a breast cancer survivor.  
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How can these different accounts of the survivor identity be reconciled? One 
possibility is that the different methodological approaches ask for different 
responses from people with cancer. When directly prompted with choices which 
range from survivor to victim, participants may choose to align themselves 
which those identities which appear to be most associated with longer and 
more fulfilled life: that of a survivor. Therefore, there may be demand 
characteristics inherent within the surveys. However, as Kaiser (2008) argues, 
it may also be the case that this identity is - to some degree - a professional 
construct, which “supports the medical model wherein illness is diagnosed, 
treated and cured” (2008: 86). In the lived experience of women, this identity 
seems to have less salience, and to hold confusing and ambiguous meanings.
Despite the - at times - conflicting evidence, the experience of being a survivor 
and a mother following breast cancer have at least received some attention. By 
contrast, there are few identity studies to guide understanding of the impact of 
breast cancer on being a partner, a friend or an employee/worker. In the 
absence of specific identity research exploring women’s experience of being a 
partner through breast cancer, I considered how psycho-social studies might 
give some sense of this experience. It surprised me that many such studies 
explored the area of partnership in cancer through attention to the perceived 
reactions of the person with cancer’s partner. Such attention appeared to be 
influenced by evidence that the quality of support received from the partner is 
associated with a patient’s positive adjustment to cancer (Lichtman, Taylor & 
Wood, 1987; Northouse, Dorris & Charron-Moore, 1995). 
However, this approach appears to assume a uni-directional nature in 
relationships, and to pay insufficient attention to the way in which the 
experience of cancer is played out through the interactions of both partners. 
Bearing in mind these limitations, cross-sectional (n=170) and longitudinal 
(n=49) studies from Wimberly, Carver, Laurenceau, Harris and Antoni (2005) 
provide useful information as to the ways in which the perception of a partner’s 
emotional involvement and initiation of sex, together with a positive first 
sexual experience after cancer, are associated with many aspects of breast 
cancer patients’ wellbeing (psychosexual adjustment, emotional distress and 
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marital satisfaction). A quantitative survey (n=66) by Brusilovskiy, Mitstifer 
and Salzer (2008) affirmed these findings, proposing that women with breast 
cancer who perceived their partners’ “intimate” adaptation to be positive, 
experienced significantly lower distress. Working from a more systemic 
perspective, Northouse (1990) conducted a descriptive longitudinal research 
project (n=82) to compare the psycho-social adjustment following mastectomy 
of breast cancer patients and their husbands. Assessing the experimental 
group against a non-cancer control, Northouse found that both patients and 
husbands exhibited higher distress scores eighteen months post-surgery; 
although the group average level of distress was at a mild level, 35% patients 
and 24% husbands reported moderate to severe distress at this stage. 
Northouse therefore suggested that adjustment within a relationship was not a 
self-limiting event that resolved itself within a month or two of surgery, but an 
ongoing process; moreover, that there was a sub-group of patients and 
husbands who were at a higher risk of long-term problems.
While these previous studies on partnership involved quantitative assessments, 
research from Kayser and Sormanti (2000) provided a rare qualitative 
viewpoint. Their research involved exploring the impact of cancer on a 
woman’s relationship, with a particular focus on the kinds of support received. 
While the study’s participants (n=40) experienced a range of cancers, the 
focus on younger women (M = 36 years) has relevance to this study. Kayser 
and Sormanti found that more than half the women reported changes 
regarding the performance of household chores and in decision making 
practices, with the partner frequently taking on new responsibilities. While two 
thirds of participants described a higher level of emotional closeness, one third 
felt that they were more distant from their partner. Furthermore, although 
almost half the participants felt they received adequate support from their 
partners, those who desired more support typically identified emotional 
responsiveness (offering comfort and reassurance; talking and listening more) 
as the area which was lacking. The large majority reported that sexual activity 
had significantly decreased. 
In summary, then, diverse sources of evidence indicate that a woman with 
breast cancer may undergo substantial change in her identity as a partner, with 
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negotiation of emotional, sexual and practical issues. While the nature and the 
potential distress implicated in these changes appears to have been sketched 
out, the details of the lived experience of women within relationships have 
been barely studied. The study from Kayser and Sormanti (2000) provides a 
useful comparison point for my research, being grounded in more substantive 
accounts of individual relationships. However, the variety of participants’ 
cancers in their project, and the particular attention to issues of support, may 
have directed attention to certain aspects of experience at the expense of 
others.
While building understanding of the previous identities required considerable 
investigation, similar searches for the identity of friend during cancer revealed 
very little information. The importance of social support in helping individuals 
manage difficult experiences has long been documented within the 
psychological literature (see Miell & Dallos, 1998). Specifically within cancer, a 
quantitative study (n=133) by Waxler-Morrison, Hislop, Mears and Kan (1991) 
indicated that social support had independent effects on the survival of women 
with breast cancer. The number of supportive friends, the extent of contact 
with friends and the size of the woman’s social network were all found to be 
associated with survival. In autobiographies of people with cancer (Diamond, 
1998; Lucas, 2004; Moran, 1989), the importance of both the practical and 
emotional support of friends is frequently recounted. These accounts also 
allude to problems in friendship, due to others’ perceived reactions to cancer, 
as mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. However, understanding 
of the identity of friend from the perspective of a woman with breast cancer 
appears to be missing in the formal psychological literature. 
The availability of relevant research appeared to be only slightly better in the 
area of the final identity which I examined: that of being a work colleague or 
employee. The direction of research conveyed an impression that the 
intersection of cancer and work was explored mainly from the perspective of 
employers, as a means of supporting productivity, rather than from the 
perspective of the employee. However, these studies provided information 
which suggested a number of possible aspects to the work identity following 
cancer. Research from de Boer, Taskila, Ojajarvi, van Dijk and Verbeek (2009) 
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indicated that people with cancer were more likely to be unemployed than a 
control group. The scale of this meta-analysis (reviewing 26 individual studies, 
with a diversity of cancers) conceals the effects of cancer staging. However, it 
is interesting to note that women with breast and reproductive cancers were 
significantly more likely to be unemployed that a non-cancer control group of 
women, whilst there was no difference in employment rates between 
experimental and control groups in the male cancers (testicular, prostate). This 
suggests there is an interaction of gender and cancer in the employment 
identity. A further study by Hassett, O Malley and Keating (2009) indicated that 
the age of women diagnosed with breast cancer had an impact on their 
employment status. Through quantitative assessment of a health claims 
database (n=3233), the researchers found that the vast majority (93%) of 
employed women with breast cancer continued to work after treatment, 
although both type of treatment (particularly chemotherapy) and older age 
(>54 years) were associated with stopping work. 
However, a study from Johnsson, Fornander, Rutqist and Olsson (2010) 
indicates that many other factors beyond gender and age are implicated in 
changes to this work identity. This narrative analysis of women with breast 
cancer (n=16) suggested that, while the study’s participants described wishing 
to return to work, their experience of cancer had altered their perceptions of 
the value of employment. Moreover, when considering the narratives of those 
women who had returned to work and those still on leave, a distinguishing 
characteristic appeared to be the perceived quality of social support from 
employers and co-workers. Thus the existing research literature – though 
partial and varied – appears to suggest that there can be considerable change 
in woman’s work identity following breast cancer, and that may be influenced 
by a number of factors.
I will now draw together the implications from the review of generalised and 
specific studies of identity and breast cancer, before considering the research 
aims of my own study.
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1.3.3 Conclusions from existing research into breast cancer & 
 identities
Following my initial personal and professional interest in issues of identity in 
the wake of breast cancer, I was surprised to find that the current research 
literature does not appear to have explored this area in particular detail. As 
described in this chapter, a number of studies suggest extensive change in 
bodily, social and psychological identities following cancer and – to a limited 
extent – breast cancer. Despite this fact, the range of identities affected by 
breast cancer has not been systematically or explicitly explored, either in 
general studies or through a diverse range of research projects into individual 
identities. As a result, the nature of change in particular identities has also not 
been considered; nor have any broader issues which might link these particular 
changes. The situation of younger women with breast cancer has been 
especially overlooked, and their particular life stage – in the midst of active 
engagement in potential identities as mothers, employees, partners – might be 
seen as putting them at especial risk for disruption and emotional turmoil. This 
may underlie the higher levels of distress reported by Jim and Anderson (1997) 
and Soothill et al (2001).
The absence of such research appears to be an important omission, if identities 
are seen as the place in which the meaning of cancer is located. Through an 
exploration of the lived experience of breast cancer, it will be possible to 
understand the dialectical relationship between the individual woman and her 
social environment, which Wetherell (2010) described. Improved 
understanding of the nature of such identities will benefit counselling 
psychology in many ways. Firstly, it may assist psychologists working 
therapeutically with younger women with breast cancer, by offering perspective 
concerning the utility of current counselling practices and ideas for new 
therapeutic work. This accords with recommendations in the national Cancer 
Reform Strategy (2007), which requires health professionals to offer good 
psychological support services throughout the cancer journey. Secondly, it may 
open up consideration of wider social issues concerning the task of managing 
breast cancer within the UK society. Finally, given the widespread incidence of 
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breast cancer, reading this research may assist counselling psychologists on a 
personal level, in responding to their own – and others’ – experience of cancer. 
1.4 Research aims
Overall research question:
What perceptions do younger women have of the identities experienced after 
breast cancer?
Specific research aims:
1. To understand the range of identities younger women perceive themselves 
to experience after breast cancer
2. To explore the content of these identities, considering
- any differences in identities held before and after the cancer diagnosis
- any positive or problematic aspects of these identities
- the salience of, and links between, different identities.
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2 Methodology
 I am not the outcome or the meeting point of numerous causal agencies 
 which determine my bodily or psychological make-up. I cannot conceive 
 myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, 
 psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot  shut myself up 
 within the realm of science. All my knowledge of the world, even my 
 scientific knowledge, is gained from my own particular point of view, or 
 from some experience of the world without which the symbols of science 
 would be meaningless. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: ix)
_______________________________________________________________
2.1 Overview
Having introduced and specified the research question in the Introduction, in 
this chapter I set out the methodological approach I have taken – my own 
particular “point of view” - in exploring this question. 
My account begins with the choice of a qualitative perspective, and here the 
rationale for my choice is intertwined with the characteristics of the qualitative 
perspective, and so I have presented this section as such. I continue by 
outlining the epistemological parameters which frame my particular study, and 
seek then to show how these are reflected in the choice of method: 
interpretative phenomenological analysis. This leads to details of how the study 
was carried out and elaboration on the process of data analysis. The chapter 
closes with sections which address how the credibility of this study might be 
evaluated, and a discussion of the ethical considerations which informed the 
work.
I have been aware that my methodological approach to the research question 
has inevitably contributed to the context of the phenomenon I am exploring, 
and I have aimed to draw out these influences within the ongoing discussions. 
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However, there were also wider reflexive issues relating to issues of method, 
and I have addressed these in a separate section which closes the chapter.
2.2 Rationale for a qualitative perspective 
My fundamental reason for choosing a qualitative approach was the kinds of 
answers which it would provide to my research questions. My understanding 
accorded most strongly with Willig (in press), who suggests that qualitative 
research is driven by a focus on meaning. This meaning is subjective, and 
drawn from participants’ accounts of their own experience. A qualitative study 
will therefore use an inductive, “bottom-up” approach to explore the texture of 
experience; it will seek to describe or possibly interpret experience, rather than 
to quantify phenomena or predict causal relationships. This focus on subjective 
experience and meaning anchors descriptions in a particular context, which 
also becomes part of the meaning. Langdridge (2007) describes how this 
context can include the intersection between the personal life and the 
historical, cultural and structural settings within which a person moves. Thus 
the kinds of answers possible from qualitative research are subjective, 
contextual descriptions or interpretations of meaning drawn from an 
individual’s lived experience. The nature of these answers seemed to me to fit 
most appropriately to the nature of my research questions. Given the limited 
and partial scope of existing research in this area, a qualitative approach would 
allow me to produce work which provided new and unexpected insights as to 
the individual, social and cultural aspects as reflected in women’s sense of their 
identities following cancer.
My second motivation for choosing a qualitative approach was that this 
perspective explicitly acknowledges what Woolgar (1988: 10) terms “the 
methodological horrors”. The issues of indexicality (how an explanation is tied 
to a particular circumstance), inconcludability (that no explanation is ever full 
or final) and reflexivity (that researcher characteristics shape attention and 
perception) are worked with and struggled over, rather than denied. Given my 
awareness that my own particular experience of cancer had stimulated my 
research, a qualitative method would enable me explicitly to consider these 
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issues as they related to this study, as well as to my participants’ experience 
within the research.
Political issues underlined my final reason for settling on a qualitative 
approach. As Kitzinger (1990) has argued, the fact that qualitative research is 
grounded in lived experience means that it is better able to respect the 
meanings of participants. The inductive nature of this approach allows those 
taking part in research to give voice to their experience in a more extended 
and less controlled way than in quantitative studies. This was important to me, 
as both my own contact with cancer and my work as a trainee counselling 
psychologist suggested that this opportunity was only rarely accorded to 
patients within the medical treatment process. Moreover, as a member of the 
counselling psychology profession, I wanted not only to work within the 
healthcare system, but also to consider what changes need to be made to the 
system. The explicit acknowledgment of indexicality within qualitative research 
means that, alongside personal descriptions, it can also be possible to explore 
political meanings. I conceived of this research as grounded primarily in the 
understanding of experience, and it was possible that the participants might 
themselves raise issues of power and positioning. However, following Kitzinger 
and Hollway (1989), I was conscious of wanting to avoid the trap of 
substituting personal accounts for political ones, but instead to be able to 
illuminate dominant social practices and power relations implicated in the way 
women make sense of their experience. Thus the adoption of a qualitative 
approach enabled me not only to raise up women’s accounts of their 
experience, but also put forward a consideration of conditions bound up in this 
phenomenon. 
This brings me to a discussion of the epistemology and method.
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2.3 Epistemological framework
Flew (1989) suggests that epistemology is the exploration of what we know, 
how we know, and whether or if we can know. When considering the latter 
issue, I perceive that my research is anchored in a world which I can know. My 
belief is that there are underlying phenomena and structures which exist, but 
that our perception of these phenomena is – to a greater or lesser extent- 
mediated by our own individual perspective: our social situation; our biological 
state; historical and cultural contexts. Thus I situate myself within critical 
realist approaches, as described by Parker (1998). These epistemological 
beliefs do not rest on proof, but upon two arguments. Firstly, following 
Greenwood (1994), I believe that social determinants do not refute underlying 
phenomena. For example, although the way we talk about or act on emotions 
may reflect contextual influences, it does not follow that these words or actions 
do not relate to underlying emotional processes or entities. This feels 
particularly important when considering the material reality of a cancer tumour. 
Secondly, following pragmatists such as James (1890), I consider that belief in 
a reality beyond my experience is indispensable to the organisation of that 
experience: it helps me begin discussions with medical professionals, or argue 
over the distribution of tangible resources. So in answer to the question of 
whether I can know, I believe that I can access some knowledge of the world, 
although this knowledge will be affected by both my own position and the 
position of that which I am considering. 
This leads to the question of what I know. Willig (in press) has usefully 
expanded this issue, arguing that a researcher must warrant not only the 
status of the data, but also the status of the analysis of the data. Turning to 
the status of the data, and in the light of the theory of knowledge outlined 
above, I believe that this research does in a large degree correspond to a ‘real 
world’ which is shared and inhabited by others.  Participants’ views are 
statements shaped by constructions drawn from their personal situations and 
choices, and from the cultural and historical resources available to them. 
However, these statements also correspond to an underlying social, biological 
and existential reality which can be comprehended and used by others. 
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Similarly, considering the status of the analysis, I believe that research is 
inevitably affected by the individual characteristics of the person collecting and 
analysing the data. However, providing that these personal characteristics are 
adequately explored and evaluated – something I shall discuss further below – 
then I consider that such data can provide knowledge not only of the 
participants’ worlds, but can also be used to create a dialogue with other 
research considering related aspects of this shared world.
Returning to Flew (1989), my final challenge is to consider how I know. Here, 
understandings of epistemology overlap with beliefs about ontology. My 
argument is that knowledge is derived from three sources: from our essential 
subjectivity; from our existence in a social world; and from our physical 
bodies. Considering the ideas of Heidegger (1962) concerning Dasein (or 
“being-in-the-world”), Langdridge (2007) suggests that the concept of an 
individual viewpoint is inherent within the correlation between what is 
experienced and the way something is experienced: “Dasein is an entity which 
is in each case I myself: its being is in each case mine” (Heidegger, 1962: 
150). This reflects my personal belief in the ability of an individual to explore 
and make sense of the world, underpinned by the notion of reflexivity or self-
awareness. However, in a rejection of simplistic Cartesian theory, I believe that 
while our human position is essentially subjective, it is also inevitably 
connected to the context in which we find ourselves. Again following Heidegger 
(1962), this being-in-the-world means that the physical, psychological, social 
and historical nature of our situation are the background against which we 
work out our individual positions. Furthermore, both our being-in-the-world 
and our reflexivity are fundamentally dependent on language, which Heidegger 
(1947: 217) notably described as “the house of Being”. Yet while perceiving 
language to be critical to subjectivity and the social world, it stands in a more 
problematic relation to the third source of knowledge. Burkitt (2003) explored 
the idea of a field of being, which includes the human body but of which the 
body is only one aspect. He bases this conception on ideas from Merleau-Ponty 
(1968: 248): “this flesh of my body is shared by the world, the world reflects 
it, encroaches upon it and it encroaches upon the world”. Burkitt goes on to 
suggest that meaning is not derived primarily through language or reflection, 
but through the “sensible-sentient body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 136). The 
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implications of accepting this aspect of knowledge are several. Firstly, it links 
with the idea of reflexivity, in that an individual’s knowledge can be seen to be 
tied inextricably with physical being: what Merleau-Ponty (1962: 231) termed 
“the body-subject”. Secondly, it connects with existential issues outlined by 
Heidegger, in his proposition that our being is ultimately a being-towards-
death: our situation in the world is defined by the transience of our flesh and of 
the world surrounding us. Finally, it brings us back to questions of realism, 
relativism and inconcludability. Grounding knowledge in this field of being 
implies a world “out there”; as Merleau-Ponty (1968: 133) suggests, that 
“there is a world, there is something....there is cohesion, there is meaning”. 
However, this realism is limited by the problem that language can never fully 
capture what Burkitt (2003: 331) terms “the mute world of the sensible”, and 
so there must be a constant dialectic between language and these pre-
reflective sensings. 
I shall take these considerations further in the next section, when I explore my 
particular research method, and the kinds of knowledge it can facilitate.
2.4 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)
2.4.1 What is IPA?
Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009) view IPA as a qualitative method which 
examines how people make sense of lived experience. It aims to gather 
detailed material which captures the quality and texture of this experience. A 
researcher will invite accounts from participants, with the focus of such 
accounts often resting on events of especial significance, such as changes in 
health or personal status. Once recorded, these accounts are analysed by the 
researcher, whose findings are perceived not only to be grounded in the data – 
the participants’ interpretation of their experience - but also to involve an 
inevitable interpretation by the researcher: what Smith and Osborn (2003: 51) 
termed “the double hermeneutic”, or two-fold aspect of meaning-making.
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Smith et al (2009) suggest that IPA does not operationalise a particular idea, 
but draws on several philosophical traditions.  Drawing from phenomenology, 
Smith et al (2009) argue that experience is reflexive, situated, embodied and 
existential. IPA acknowledges the significance of Husserl (1982), who 
advocated that science should be grounded in personal experience; it was only 
through attentive, systematic examination of awareness that science could 
develop second order concepts and theories. However, Husserl also suggested 
that this awareness is problematic, because to understand the things 
themselves, we need to strip away our pre-conceptions and ‘bracket’ habitual 
ways of viewing phenomena.  Smith et al argue that the ideas of Heidegger 
(1962) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) have also been formative to IPA. As 
described above, the concepts of Dasein and the body-subject propose that 
human experience is shaped by our physical bodies, our social context and our 
capacity for self-awareness. Moreover, citing Merleau-Ponty, Smith et al 
suggest that the individual physical unit of our body means that our 
relationship to others must begin from a position of difference. We can never 
entirely share an experience, because our experience is rooted in our individual 
embodied position. Furthermore, Smith et al invoke the ideas of Sartre (1948) 
to suggest that the phenomenon of experience is contingent upon the 
developmental and processual aspects of being. Awareness of death, absence 
and the time-bound nature of existence are inherent in our experiencing.
Underpinning the interpretative aspects of IPA, Smith et al (2009) ground the 
method in the tradition of hermeneutics. Human reflexivity means that IPA 
must be inherently interpretative, and Smith et al theorise ways in which IPA 
can work with the interpretation of the double hermeneutic. Firstly, they invoke 
the idea of the hermeneutic circle. Following Gadamer (1990), they suggest 
that assessment of experience is always based on prior assumptions, but that 
these assumptions can be made manifest and modified through contact with 
experience. Therefore understanding comes from a dialogue between the 
researcher’s assumptions and an account, not from the extinction of the 
reflexive self: “the important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the 
text can present itself in all its otherness, and thus assert its own truth against 
one’s own fore-meanings” (Gadamer, 1990: 269). Thus IPA will involve an 
iterative cycle of interpretation between the researcher and the account, and 
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between the parts of the text and the whole of an account. Smith et al suggest 
that IPA also works with interpretation by adopting a stance towards the status 
of an account. Based on the ideas of Ricoeur (1970), they propose that IPA 
occupies the centre ground between a “hermeneutics of meaning-
recollection” (an unquestioning and essentially realistic acceptance of the 
status of participants’ accounts) and a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (a critical 
analysis of the structural influences underpinning a particular account). This 
means that IPA must fundamentally be grounded in the details of a participant’ 
life world, but should also consider as part of its interpretation the nature of 
the situated experience which is being described.
Finally, Smith et al (2009) suggest that IPA is anchored in idiographic 
traditions. They argue that this involves a focus on the particular, both through 
a concern with detail and through the perspective of a particular person and 
context. However, they challenge the idea that this equates to an exclusive 
focus on the individual, suggesting that although a person may be uniquely 
embodied, their experience is always situated and relational. This idiographic 
focus means that while multiple accounts may be reviewed to gain 
understanding of a particular kind of experience, the distinctive voices within 
each account need to be preserved while considering shared themes.
2.4.2 Considerations in using IPA
There are a number of reasons why I judged IPA to be an appropriate method 
for this study. An important consideration was a match between the broadly 
critical realist stance which IPA adopts, and my own epistemological position. 
As Willig (2001) describes, IPA accepts some element of construction on behalf 
of the researcher and the participant, but holds that there is an empirical world 
out there which must be respected. I believe that this tension between 
phenomenology and interpretation is relevant and useful in answering my 
research question, and has previously been shown to be valuable in examining 
health issues (e.g. Bramley & Eatough, 2005; Brewer et al, 2007; Murray & 
Harrison, 2004).
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Another consideration in the choice of IPA was the flexibility of its method. This 
meant that participants are typically given considerable latitude in the manner 
and content of their responses, and researchers have many options in the form 
and type of questioning they adopt. This flexibility seemed to offer most 
opportunity for participants to explore a range of meaning, and to consider the 
cognitive, affective or embodied aspects of the phenomenon. However, it also 
enabled me to ask questions of participants (Smith & Osborn, 2003) if aspects 
of experience appeared to be missing or only partially disclosed. This led me to 
prefer IPA over alternatives such as narrative analysis, where, as Herndl 
(2006) describes, the narrative connectedness can result in the painting of an 
unproblematic picture. I felt that in this research such selection would impede 
my gathering the fullest description of experience. 
The complex role of the researcher within IPA was also an important factor in 
choosing this method. Willig (2001) has criticised the method for the lack of 
clarity in the researcher’s position, and whether she is “discovering” or 
“constructing” reality. My understanding of the role I have undertaken in this 
research is that I am doing both – and that it is by doing both that I will be 
able to make better sense of the phenomenon. For example, in the course of 
field work and early stages of analysis my focus is on detailed understanding 
the participants’ experience: mostly discovery, but some construction due to 
the inevitable subjectivity of researcher and participant positions. In later 
analysis and discussion, I will be using these “discoveries” to construct links 
with more conjectural or theoretical levels of interpretation.
Despite enthusiasm for the potential of IPA to provide meaningful answers to 
my research question, I am nevertheless mindful of its limitations. As Willig 
(2001) argues, perhaps the most significant of these limitations is the reliance 
of IPA on the representative validity of language. Eatough and Smith (2008) 
acknowledge that while IPA enables some consideration of how language 
shapes experience, it does not permit analysis of how individuals are 
constructing themselves and others in their use of language; nor does it allow 
more radical explanations of the structures in society and the ways in which 
these constitute individuals. From a political point of view, IPA studies may 
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therefore provide a less aggressive challenge to existing systems than radical 
constructionist research.
Willig (2001) suggests that a further issue with the IPA method is the 
challenge of obtaining suitable accounts. She argues that participants’ creation 
of these accounts requires insight, personal strength and sophistication of 
understanding. While acknowledging the appropriateness of this challenge, I 
believe that it is an issue relevant to many, if not all, qualitative approaches. 
The difficulty of achieving and accessing reflexivity, and of gaining nuanced 
accounts which adequately capture lived experience, is not unique to IPA.
A final criticism of IPA raised both by Langdridge (2003) and Willig (2001) 
concerns the phenomenological status of IPA. Here the problem appears to lie 
in the role of cognition. Langdridge proposes that cognition is not properly a 
part of phenomenology, which is more appropriately focused on the pre-
reflective characteristics of experience such as feelings and moods on the edge 
of consciousness. However, my own awareness of phenomena accords with the 
arguments of Smith et al (2009), who propose that experience contains both 
pre-reflective and reflective activity, and both are proper subjects of attention 
in phenomenology. Thus while research may strive to uncover perceptions 
which have previously not received conscious attention by participants, it will 
also attend – as part of the effort to understand being-in-the-world – to those 
embodied cognitions with which an individual approaches a phenomenon. 
Having explored in detail the main characteristics and parameters of IPA, I will 
now discuss how this method was applied in my particular research study.
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2.5 Research plan
2.5.1 Choice of data collection method
Smith et al (2009) argue that, to obtain the detailed subjective accounts 
required for an IPA study, interviews and diaries have to date proved the most 
appropriate data collection methods. Although I examined the use of diaries in 
the work of Boserman (2009) and Smith (1999), I decided that semi-
structured interviews would better enable me to find answers to my research 
questions. Kvale and Brinkman (2009) discuss how the inter-subjective context 
of the interview provides an opportunity to explore ambiguous and 
contradictory statements, as well as to raise or legitimise the more sensitive 
topics that might be ignored in diaries. I felt my experience as a counselling 
psychologist in training equipped me to create a dialogue where topics could be 
explored and expanded, and to sense where aspects on the edge of awareness 
could be productively followed up. Furthermore, I also responded to Kvale and 
Brinkman’s belief that there is an ethical element behind the choice of an 
interview format. While mindful not to move the status of the meeting from a 
research interview to a therapeutic counselling session, both my own history 
and the research literature (e.g. Aaronson, 1991) suggested that an interview 
could in part be a witnessing of experience, and in some sense, a way of giving 
something back to participants for their involvement in my research.
Drawing on Flowers (2008), I chose to do one-off rather than multiple 
interviews. This design places a greater pressure on the interviewer to build 
rapport quickly and to ensure the interview schedule has been fully covered. 
However, I perceived these disadvantages to be outweighed by the 
advantages: more coherent narratives resulting from the simpler design; and 
the practical benefits to participants from having to tell their story only once. 
2.5.2  Initial interview structure
In developing an interview schedule, I used guidance from Smith and Osborn 
(2003). The order and content of the initial schedule were based on my 
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research questions; these were translated into more accessible language, with 
follow-up prompts based on areas suggested by the literature review in my 
research proposal (Appendix 2). However, during a reflexive interview to raise 
my awareness of my own cancer experience, significant issues in interview 
structure became apparent. My initial schedule asked participants to describe 
the identities which they felt had existed before cancer, and then to review 
those which they felt they held now. Aside from the phenomenological issues 
concerned with a retrospective assessment of the past, this temporal shift 
resulted in a disconnected interview, with what seemed to me like an excessive 
degree of researcher intervention. Furthermore, my initial schedule began with 
an outline of past and present identities, to be followed up with a more 
detailed explanation later. Yet this partition meant I experienced my account as 
being abruptly terminated at the start; I was delivering pieces of information to 
the researcher, but not being able to get into the flow of describing my 
experience. I felt frustrated and as if my story was being “managed” by 
someone else.
My experience of my initial schedule during this reflexive interview led me to 
develop a substantially revised schedule for the pilot study. This involved 
adapting the Twenty Statements Test (TST: Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) as a 
stimulus for qualitative research into identity issues.  In its original conception, 
the TST asked participants for spontaneous responses to the question “Who 
Am I?”. These answers were coded and quantitatively assessed to measure 
conceptualisation of, and attitude towards, the self. Kuhn (1964, cited in Turner 
and Schutte, 1981) described how this conceptualisation was founded on 
underlying identities:
 Central to an individual’s conception of himself [sic] is his identity; that is, his 
 generalised position in society deriving from statuses in the groups of which he is a 
 member, the roles which stem from those statuses, and the social categories to which 
 his group memberships lead him to assign himself. (Kuhn, 1964: 630-31).
In adapting the TST for qualitative work, I felt that participants could be asked 
to write down who they felt they were after their experience of cancer. These 
responses could then be explored one by one in conversation, with the 
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researcher asking questions to understand the meaning of these responses: 
what the response alluded to; the positive or negative emotions attached to 
the response; and any ways in which this response was affected by social 
structures outside the participant. 
Two questions needed addressing with this new format. The first was how to 
gain understanding of change in identity since diagnosis with cancer. I decided 
this could be best accomplished by asking participants, during the exploration 
of each response, how they felt this area had changed since their diagnosis. 
While this still involved an element of post-hoc reconstruction, I felt this 
approach at least had the merits of being faithful to their perceived experience 
of their identities in the present. The second question was how to raise identity 
issues which I considered might be relevant but had not been included in 
participants’ list of responses. This involved sensitive areas such as sexuality 
and femininity, which have been documented in several studies (e.g. Ganz et 
al, 1996) as problematic and often hidden aspects of women’s lives after 
cancer. I was also aware that any identity not immediately included could be 
sensitive for an individual, although on face value seeming less controversial 
(e.g. working woman). Following advice on interview schedule design in Kvale 
and Brinkman (2009) and Smith et al (2009), I decided that a full exploration 
of the phenomenon meant I should try delicately to ask about these “missing” 
identities. However, this questioning would take place after discussion of 
participants’ spontaneous responses, when participants might be better placed 
to gauge whether this was something they wished to express to me, and with 
the recognition that participants might prefer not to answer.
This revised interview structure concluded by asking participants to consider 
those identities most important to them following their cancer diagnosis, and 
how this had changed since before cancer. This new schedule was written up 
(Appendix 3) and used as the basis of a pilot study.
2.5.3  Pilot study & revised (final) interview structure
There is some debate about the different functions of pre-testing, with Yin 
(1994) distinguishing between pre-studies which involve exploration of 
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different possible options and those which constitute a “dry run” of procedures. 
In line with Robson (2002), I viewed my pilot study as a dress rehearsal of the 
interview format I hoped to run on a larger scale. My objective was to 
understand whether the interview schedule would enable me to gain the rich, 
detailed accounts I was seeking, within an appropriate time frame. As 
importantly, I was also seeking to ensure that the schedule was stimulating but 
also sufficiently comfortable for a participant.
Given my desire for explicit and frank feedback on their experience of the 
interview schedule, I chose to do this pilot work with a woman connected to 
me through a friend. Madeleine1 was exactly representative of my proposed 
sample. In telephone discussions prior to meeting, we discussed that, although 
she would be helping me test and critique the interview schedule, Madeleine 
also felt she would benefit from exploring her experience in a detailed way. 
Despite the more informal contact, I ensured that full recruitment and consent 
procedures were followed.
The pilot study was run exactly as the interview study described below. Results 
and feedback from the pilot were both positive. The TST device generated a 
personalised “agenda” for the interview which allowed Madeleine to tell her 
own story in a rich and detailed way. In her feedback, Madeleine said that she 
felt that she had said “all the things that I needed to say”, and that taking part 
in the interview had been both enjoyable and insightful for her. Moreover, 
although she had been surprised by the request to complete the TST sheet at 
the start of the interview, she found that it had made her respond to the 
question spontaneously and in a different way from the way she would 
normally have told her story (i.e. chronologically). Therefore, the TST had 
provided an efficient and productive way of gaining access to her experience. 
In terms of exploration of sensitive issues, I found that an alternative way of
addressing these questions might be to raise them where an appropriate 
opportunity presented itself. 
_____________________________________________________________
1 Not her real name.
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In summary, then, the pilot study reassured me that the revised interview 
schedule was able to provide rich, detailed and meaningful data for both the 
researcher and the participant, and that this data addressed the main research 
questions identified for my study. My next step was to organise the full-scale 
study.
2.6   Participants
Smith et al (2009) recommend that homogeneity is sought among participants 
in IPA studies, to further the method’s objective of illuminating a particular 
experience. However, they also suggest that the criteria for homogeneity 
depend on each individual study. The first criterion put forward is theoretical: 
what factors are indicated in research as important influences of experience? 
The first factor indicated was a focus on the experience of women aged 
between twenty eight and fifty years old. Studies from Bower et al (2005) and 
Soothill et al (2001) indicated that the need for self-transformation appeared 
to be experienced most acutely by younger women, perhaps due to the cancer 
presenting a more unexpected threat to still-developing identities. An 
additional selection factor was for participants to have been diagnosed with 
cancer between four and eighteen months before their response to the 
research flyers. This related to indications in research by Bower et al; although 
change continued to be experienced many years after cancer diagnosis, the 
first eighteen months appear to involve the most active renegotiation of self-
image. In a similar vein, I chose to recruit participants for whom this was the 
first diagnosis of cancer, and whose diagnosis specified an early staging of the 
disease (Stage 0, 1 or 2). Although I was not able to find formal research 
literature to justify this choice, many books written by women with cancer 
(e.g. Kuner, Osborn, Quigley & Stroup, 1999) suggested an earlier staging 
(0-2)  defined qualitatively different experience from a later staging (3-4). 
Finally, treatment modality – surgery, radiotherapy and/or chemotherapy – was 
not chosen as a screening factor, as studies by Carpenter, Brockopp and 
Andrykowski (1999) and Bower et al suggested that change is experienced 
across all treatment types. Details of actual participants are summarised in 
Table 2.1 below. 
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Age (years) at diagnosis
Mean=42 Range=36-50
Ethnic origin All White
Location Leeds: 4 London: 4
Time (months) since diagnosis Mean=11 Range=6-18
Cancer staging Stage 0: 2 Stage 1: 4 Stage 2: 2
Cancer treatment Surgery: 
8
Radiotherapy:
 5
Chemotherapy:
2 
Table 2.1: Summary of participant characteristics
Smith et al (2009) also raise the issue of practical criteria for participant 
selection. My consideration of such issues was weighed with another aspect not 
raised by these authors: the ethical criteria underpinning selection. Given the 
large number of women who fitted my theoretical criteria, I decided I would 
select purely in order of response to recruitment material. To facilitate 
arrangements, all participants needed to be able to speak, write and 
understand English. While recognising that the requirements of the study 
might have led to some self-selection, my political desire for the study to be 
open to anyone who felt able to participate meant that I chose not to screen by 
educational background or occupation. 
To understand what socio-demographic factors might be implicated in the 
experience of my actual participant group, I asked each participant to consider 
completing an optional questionnaire which reviewed these factors (Appendix 
4). The actual participant group were all of Caucasian origin; this was not by 
intent, but due to implementation of my previously mentioned recruitment 
procedure. I hypothesise that the lack of ethnic diversity may reflect user 
characteristics at the host charity, but may also be related to cultural patterns 
regarding treatment of cancer, as I shall consider in the Discussion. A further 
practical consideration at the screening stage was that participants should not 
have another chronic illness such as heart disease, as this might muddy their 
ability to attribute meanings gained from cancer alone. Finally, to safeguard 
the welfare of participants, I decided that I would screen for a history of major 
psychiatric illness or moderate-severe depression and anxiety. My judgement 
119
was that there was a greater, unacceptable risk that women in these situations 
could find the research distressing, rather than enabling. 
2.7  Sampling plan and sample size
As Smith et al (2009) describe, IPA studies seek participants who have 
experienced a particular phenomenon. This requires purposive sampling. To 
this end I established a connection with Breast Cancer Haven (BCH), a UK 
charity which offers support to women diagnosed with breast cancer, and 
gained permission to advertise my research to their clients (see Appendix 5). 
Participants were recruited by placing flyers (Appendix 6) in the reception 
areas of the Leeds and London centres of BCH. In line with the findings of 
Aslam (2006), flyers were coloured yellow to attract attention.
Although Brocki and Wearden (2006) noted the wide range of sample sizes 
used in previous IPA studies, they also observed that a consensus towards 
smaller numbers had emerged. Considering the objectives of this research, I 
felt that a sample size of eight participants would enable me to explore 
adequately each person’s experience, while also providing opportunity to 
consider convergent and divergent perspectives of the research phenomenon. 
As each participant would be interviewed only once, this total of eight 
interviews fell within the range of four to ten interviews suggested by Smith et 
al (2009) as being suitable for the scope of practitioner doctorate research.  
2.8  Procedure
A potential research collaboration was agreed with the BCH charity, and 
research approval sought from City University, London. At this stage, I began a 
reflexive journal, which considered personal and theoretical aspects shaping 
research development. Following decision on the IPA data collection method, I 
developed an initial interview schedule. A research colleague interviewed me 
using this initial schedule, providing both reflexive and schedule-specific 
learnings. With the exclusion of recruitment, all aspects of field work – 
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telephone screening interview, consent forms, revised interview schedule – 
were then evaluated in a pilot study. Following a successful pilot, flyers were 
distributed in two BCH centres. I conducted telephone interviews (see 
Appendix 7) with respondents to describe the purpose and nature of the study, 
to verify inclusion criteria, and to describe the significance of informed consent. 
All those who met inclusion criteria and expressed interest in participating were 
sent an information email or letter, confirming the telephone conversation and 
re-confirming interview details (Appendix 8). 
Interviews took place at BCH centres. Prior to starting each interview, I asked 
participants to sign a consent form (Appendix 9) to show that they understood 
the purpose of the research and what was required of them. This form also 
included consent to audio-tape the interview, and to the subsequent 
publication of material from the interview, subject to confidentiality 
requirements. I then asked participants to complete a questionnaire concerning 
demographic and cancer treatment information (Appendix 4). Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with each participant, according to the revised 
interview schedule (Appendix 3). Each interview lasted between ninety minutes 
and two hours. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. Prior to starting analysis, 
I undertook a further process of reflection, including further consideration of 
autobiographical areas influencing my research and an exploration of my 
outsider/insider status. I analysed transcripts by examining one interview in 
detail before going on to others, using the process documented in Smith et al 
(2009). Following initial readings of the first transcript, I noted preliminary 
insights, observations and comments concerning use of language right hand 
margin. I then reviewed the transcript again to establish emerging themes. 
These themes were at a higher level of abstraction but remained grounded in 
the participants’ lifeworld.  The themes were noted in the left hand margin. 
Emergent themes were then analysed for connections, and grouped together 
where appropriate into super-ordinate concepts. Throughout these stages, I 
used an iterative process of analysis, checking my interpretations against 
supporting data in the participant’s account. To complete the analysis of this 
first account, I tabled super-ordinate concepts under the participant’s name 
and with key identifiers (supporting evidence and page reference in transcript 
– see sample as Appendix 11). At this point, certain themes were de-
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prioritised, pending evidence from subsequent transcripts. The remaining 
interviews were similarly analysed, except that the initial tabling was used as a 
basis for confirmation, revision and addition to the list of themes and concepts. 
Following analysis of all transcripts, I compiled a final table of super-ordinate 
concepts from across all eight accounts (Appendix 12). Criterion for inclusion 
within this final table involved not only frequency of occurrence (Appendix 13), 
but also richness of insight and potential to shed light on other concepts or 
themes. At this point I shared a summary of overall study’s findings and 
conclusions with participants for their comments. Additionally, my 
interpretation of interviews was considered by a counselling psychologist with 
experience of IPA, to enhance my reflexivity. This analysis of transcripts was 
written up, and the super-ordinate concepts were considered in the light of 
relevant theory and previous research.  
2.9 Transcription
My approach to transcription was influenced heavily by Kvale and Brinkman 
(2009), who argue that transcription is an interpretative process and thus 
needs to be explicitly reported. In transforming material from a recording to a 
written text, researchers need to be aware what material they are including 
(and excluding), and to what end. As Smith et al (2009) describe, the aim of 
IPA is primarily to interpret the meaning content of a participant’s account, and 
so a detailed transcription of the prosodic features of an interview such as 
pauses or non-verbal utterances is not necessary. However, I felt that certain 
details were necessary in order that an informed linguistic and psychological 
analysis (see below) could be made. I therefore decided to note incidence and 
length of pauses, emotional expressions such as crying and laughing and 
emphases in intonation. Dialectal phrases were transcribed verbatim. All 
features except emphases were noted in the transcripts by text within square 
brackets, while emphatic intonation was noted by underlining the relevant text.
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2.10 Analysis
Smith et al (2009) propose that the essence of IPA lies in its analytic focus, 
which is directed towards participants’ efforts to make sense of their 
experience. However, at this stage, I also found it important to remember that, 
in line with both my epistemological position and with the theoretical 
underpinnings of IPA, the task of this analysis was not to find one true 
meaning. Instead, as Kvale and Brinkman (2009) argue, the objective of 
analysis is to obtain a legitimate and warranted interpretation.
When beginning analysis, there were two main considerations in my efforts to 
develop this legitimacy of interpretation. The first was to re-confirm what Kvale 
and Brinkman (2009) describe as my explicit formulation of the research 
questions to the text. Rather than simply accepting that the stated research 
questions were my focus, I also sought to increase awareness of personal 
factors impinging on that focus, through a further period of reflexivity prior to 
analysis. This involved both autobiographical work and an in-depth review of 
my insider-outsider status, as well as a new section in my research diary for 
comments on analytic work.
My second consideration was to decide what process should be used to analyse 
participants’ accounts. Acknowledging the inevitable hermeneutic circle 
described above, I understood that, as Smith (2007) outlined, the analysis 
would follow an iterative and inductive cycle: from and between the particular 
to the shared and the descriptive to the interpretative. While the analytic 
process was therefore not linear, it was based on the six stages described by 
Smith et al (2009), which are detailed below.
2.10.1   Reading and re-reading
Choosing to start with a particularly rich account, I aimed to focus my 
attention on the participant’s lifeworld by listening to the audio-recording and 
by repeated reading of the transcript. Smith et al (2009) suggest this stage 
can allow the researcher to become more aware of the development of 
narrative throughout the interview. I noted ideas which arose during this 
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stage, in an attempt to bracket such understanding until I had completed a 
detailed review of the participant’s account.
2.10.2   Initial noting
During this stage, my aim was to produce a “comprehensive and detailed set of 
notes and comments on the data” (Smith et al, 2009: 83). In line with 
suggestions from Smith et al, I began by developing descriptive comments 
which captured the content of the conversation. I then noted linguistic and 
conceptual comments; the former considered how content and meaning were 
presented, and included attention to language use and non-verbal elements, 
while the latter assessed the participant’s implicit and overarching 
understanding of the matters under discussion. Importantly, these wider and 
more abstract interpretations remained grounded in the participant’s account.
All these exploratory comments were handwritten in the right hand margin of 
the transcript (see sample transcript as Appendix 10). Descriptive statements 
were noted in black, with linguistic and conceptual comments in red and green 
respectively.
2.10.3  Developing emergent themes
Smith et al (2009: 92) indicate that this stage involves producing “a concise 
and pithy statement of what was important in the various comments attached 
to a piece of transcript.” This required balancing description and interpretation. 
Although themes emerged located at a particular point in the transcript, their 
significance within the whole of the account was also considered. Moreover, 
these themes drew not only on the participant’s words but also upon the 
psychological interpretations of the researcher. I noted these themes in the left 
hand margin of my transcript.
2.10.4 Searching for connections across emergent themes
My aim at this stage was to map the relationship between emergent themes. 
In line with suggestions from Smith et al (2009), I explored a number of 
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alternative connections. Abstraction involved considering whether a number of 
themes could be subsumed under a new over-arching theme, while 
subsumption examined whether several themes could be grouped under an 
existing but more all-encompassing theme. Polarisation involved exploring 
differences between themes, while contextualisation required considering 
whether themes linked to particular contextual or narrative aspects of an 
account. Numeration led me to review the frequency with which themes 
emerged, while a review of function helped me assess how themes were 
implicated in the participant’s presentation of self. 
After this review, I compiled a representation of the three super-ordinate 
themes which appeared best to represent the meanings within the participant’s 
account (see Appendix 11). Under each super-ordinate theme was recorded 
supporting themes; these were annotated with page and line references, and a 
short quote from the participant.
2.10.5  Moving to the next case
I reviewed the first transcript in its entirety before turning to the second 
account, in line with the idiographic process advised by Smith et al (2009). 
Stages described in sections 2.10.1 – 2.10.5 were repeated for each successive 
transcript, whilst I aimed to bracket prior assumptions and do full justice to 
each particular account.
2.10.6  Looking for patterns across cases
To consider patterns across accounts, I repeated the processes described in 
2.10.4, and also reflected on the power of each themes. At this stage, while 
recognising that frequency alone should not determine significance, I also 
heeded the caution of Smith et al (2009), that recurrence across cases is 
important when considering the credibility of findings. Therefore, I decided that 
a recurrent theme needed to be present in at least half (four) of the accounts, 
and confirmed the presence of themes systematically through a table of 
recurrence (Appendix 13). This analysis resulted in an overall table of super-
ordinate themes for the group (see Appendix 12), which indicated how themes 
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were nested within group super-ordinate themes, with evidence from individual 
participants for each theme. 
The full process of the analysis of accounts was then written up.
2.11 Evaluation of research
As Willig (in press) has argued, the criteria used to evaluate research should 
be consistent with the epistemological stance taken with respect to the data 
and the researcher’s status. Validity (the “truth” or accuracy with which a 
phenomenon is captured) and reliability (the consistency with which such 
results can be achieved) are appropriate criteria for assessing research where 
a straightforward correspondence is assumed between research and an 
external reality. However, Madill, Jordan and Shirley (2000) suggest that these 
criteria are problematic when applied to research operating within a critical 
realist perspective; although there is some sense that data is being 
‘discovered’, there is also an acknowledgement of an inevitable construction 
through the subjective meanings of participant and researcher. Thus it 
appeared to me that I had two choices. The first was to adopt the approach of 
Kvale and Brinkman (2009), and to re-define validity and reliability in the 
context of my research’s epistemological status. However, I rejected this 
avenue, as I believed that evaluating according to these criteria would have 
been to operate with concepts ultimately created from a different world view. 
Therefore I adopted the second approach, which was to evaluate the authority 
of my interpretation and the utility of my study according to criteria specifically 
developed for qualitative research conducted outside a naïve realist paradigm.
In this study, I have tried to measure myself against the four qualitative 
research criteria proposed by Yardley (2000).  The first criterion is sensitivity 
to context. This requires that research is adequately grounded in related 
theory and in the philosophy of the approach. It also asks that a study be 
appropriately aware of its socio-cultural setting, with attention given to the 
norms, ideologies, historical, linguistic and socio-economic influences on beliefs 
and expectations. Finally, the criterion requires sensitivity to the social context 
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of the relationship between researcher and participant, and consideration not 
only of the information given by the participant but the way in which – both 
generally and specifically – this information has been shaped by the 
researcher. I have aimed to address these issues in several ways. The 
Introduction has set out this study’s connections to the existing research 
literature, while the Methodology section has highlighted the theoretical 
principles underlying the implementation of this research.  Clarifying my critical 
realist perspective, I have sought in the Introduction, Findings and Discussion 
sections to ensure consideration of relevant socio-cultural influences, as with 
the examination of the importance of discourses of bodily self-control within 
the final chapter. This exploration of socio-cultural influences also formed a 
part of my reflexivity as a researcher; I have aimed to articulate my voice and 
thinking throughout the research, as well as to explore this issue explicitly 
within the Methodology and Discussion chapters.
The second criterion raised by Yardley (2000) is commitment and rigour. This 
requires that the research demonstrates strong engagement with a topic, and 
competence in the research approach; it also asks for completeness in both 
data collection and data interpretation. In considering these issues, I have 
taken a number of actions. In addition to wide reading about cancer in the 
research and popular literature, I undertook a six month specialist therapeutic 
training in working with people with cancer. To improve my understanding and 
skills in interpretative phenomenological work, I attended research seminars 
and groups where I practised the work of analysis, and read philosophical 
theory and IPA studies. I ensured that my data collection was complete; the 
number of participants was appropriate both to the aims of the study and the 
scope of this work, and the interviews provided the rich, textured accounts 
necessary for analysis. Finally, in the process of analysis I worked hard to pay 
attention to the voices of all individual participants, and to ground my 
comments in data; however, I also developed my interpretation of the 
phenomenon to a sufficiently deep level, mindful of the pitfall of the too-basic 
analysis raised by Smith et al (2009).
Transparency and coherence – the third criterion which Yardley (2000) 
described – is addressed in several ways throughout this study. As laid out 
127
above, I have aimed for a strong fit between the research question and the 
epistemological perspective and method used in this study. In presenting the 
analysis and the data, I have detailed all aspects of the collection process in 
the Methodology section, and provided comprehensive access to data both 
through tables and samples in Appendices and through frequent excerpts 
within the Findings, so that the reader can discern relevant patterns. In 
conducting and writing up this research, I have attempted to disclose key 
relevant aspects of the research process. This has involved documenting not 
only concrete issues, such as the recruitment of participants or the procedure, 
but also non-concrete or reflexive issues, such as my personal motivations for 
the research, and beliefs impinging on my choices. Lastly, this research has 
been written in a way that seeks to provide background and support for its 
choices, and in which issues of methodology and data analysis are addressed 
thoughtfully, systematically and cogently. However, I recognise that despite my 
best intentions, an evaluation of this research’s persuasiveness can rest only in 
the hands of its reader.
Yardley (2000) proposed that impact and importance should be the fourth and 
final criterion for research. One aspect of this is that research offers a new way 
of understanding a topic, and, as addressed in the Discussion chapter, I believe 
that my research questions have elicited information which creates significant 
new information about the wide-ranging change in identities experienced after 
a breast cancer diagnosis, and about social practices implicated in these 
changes. Yardley suggests research should strive to make an impact on society 
and culture, and as described below, this work was conceived with the 
inherently political objective of documenting the accounts of women’s 
experience, rather than quantifying that experience as a series of disembodied 
numbers. However, in addition to representation within the research literature, 
I have already begun to use this study to raise implications for counselling 
psychology practitioners (Nelson, Smith & Nicolson, 2010); I hope to expand 
use of this study as a platform to challenge attitudes through more popular 
media, and as the basis for developing new approaches within my therapeutic 
work at a cancer centre, thus linking research to practice.
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Having explored the way in which I believe this study can be evaluated, I will 
now address my approach to the ethical issues raised by this work.
2.12  Ethical approach
2.12.1 Conception
The British Psychological Society has outlined ethical principles (BPS, 2006) 
and guidelines for research (BPS, 2004), which require a researcher to act with 
care and sensitivity, so as to respect the dignity and psychological wellbeing of 
participants. However, rather than seeing such issues as a procedural checklist, 
I have adopted the perspective of Kvale and Brinkman (2009), who argue that 
ethical issues are embedded in all stages of research. This begins with the 
conception of the study. I was aware, following feminist researchers such as 
Hollway (1989), that the production of knowledge is not neutral; my critical 
realist position involved recognition of the consequences and conditions of 
power relations in the world which Foucault (1980) has illuminated. Thus in 
choosing to focus on the experiences of women with breast cancer, I aimed to 
ensure both that these participants had a beneficial experience of the study, 
but also that the data gathered in this study would be used to enhance the 
experience of a wider population of women with breast cancer, through 
publication in academic and general literature and through translation into 
counselling psychology practice.
2.12.2 Design & implementation
The design of the study involved several ethical considerations, whose nature I 
judged particularly important given the psychological impact of a cancer 
diagnosis. Key among these was the issue of informed consent. In line with 
recommendations from Tindall (1994), I developed a process where 
participants were given several opportunities to review their involvement in the 
research, through both a telephone discussion and also a further email or letter 
prior to interview. Both telephone and written contact elaborated fully upon 
what the research would involve, and also possible risks and benefits from 
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involvement. I believed that this process, which occurred over a time span of 
three to six weeks, gave appropriate opportunity for informed consent, which 
was further enhanced by discussion and signing of the consent form on the 
interview day, prior to starting research. Research was undertaken as outlined 
in the consent form, and as Kimmel (1988) advises, I made no attempt to 
mislead participants. Before starting the interview, I made it clear to 
participants that they could withdraw from the research at any time; to reduce 
any difficulty over withdrawal, and to lessen the sense of power differential 
between myself and the participants, no payment was made for interviews. 
A further ethical consideration at the design stage was the assurance of 
participant anonymity. Smith et al (2009) argue that confidentiality is not 
appropriate, as this implies that data will not be seen by others. However, I 
ensured anonymity of material through the use of pseudonyms in all written 
documents, while ensuring that any potentially identifiable details (e.g. 
locations, personal descriptors such as ages and job titles) were modified in 
any write-up. Consent forms, a master list of pseudonyms and copies of any 
communication were held in a locked filing cabinet. I maintained transcripts 
and analysis on a computer with password protection, to which only I had 
access. 
A final consideration in the study design was my duty of care, both towards 
participants and towards myself. Wortman (1984) and Carter (1993) reported 
that people with cancer often appreciate the opportunity to clarify their 
situation through discussion with others, and perceive benefits from doing so. 
My experience as a trainee counselling psychologist working in a hospice, and 
my specialist training in working with people with cancer, seemed to equip me 
to be able to conduct such research sensitively. Furthermore, I hoped that by 
screening for more severe mental health issues, and through the lengthy 
consent process, those participants taking part would be likely to benefit from 
the experience. However, I was aware that participation might result in 
discomfort, and I addressed this in a number of ways. Firstly, the method 
asked participants to lead off by raising their own “agenda” of topics, and I 
prefaced any remaining questions about non-agenda or more sensitive aspects 
of identity such as sexuality with an acknowledgement that participants may 
prefer to skip such issues. Secondly, on the two occasions when participants 
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did exhibit any sign of distress (e.g. tears), I took time to re-confirm whether 
participants were comfortable continuing with the research. At the end of the 
interview, all participants received a full debriefing, in line with ethical research 
guidelines (BPS, 2006). At this point, I explored whether participants had 
experienced any unforeseen distress, and reminded them that they could 
contact me or my supervisor if they experienced concerns following the 
research. All participants were given a resource list containing details of 
written and personal support, while the location of research within BCH 
premises meant that - although this option was not needed - connection to 
therapeutic support was immediately available. 
In terms of self-care, I used research supervision to isolate a number of 
considerations. Research interviews were arranged at the premises of BCH, to 
avoid any possibility of physical danger. Looking at my emotional resilience, I 
felt that my participation in a six month specialist cancer training course, in 
addition to my main counselling psychology training, had enabled me to 
explore my personal experience of cancer, as well as to immerse myself in the 
possible aspects of others’ experiences. A period of time had also elapsed 
between my own cancer diagnosis, and the interviews for this research. 
However, as documented below, I decided to make active use of reflective 
journals as well as personal therapy, to ensure I was adequately considering 
my own thoughts and feelings.
2.12.3 Write-up
While the design and implementation of research involved many significant 
ethical considerations, I was also aware of important ethical issues as I 
completed the write-up of my study. In addition to anonymity issues, I 
attempted during transcription to provide an account which respected 
participants’ meanings and remained as grounded as I was able in their 
original phenomenological experience. Similarly, while going through the 
process of analysis, I spent many hours dwelling in the data, aiming for the 
deepest possible penetration of the data, and also to select the most telling 
excerpts in which the participants could speak forth. In addressing issues 
raised by Yardley (2000) concerning the transparency of my account and my 
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reflexivity as a researcher, I was aware of an ethical need to ensure that the 
research was inspected by others. Kvale and Brinkman (2009) suggest such 
processes lead to ‘verification’ and a securer sense of knowledge. Working 
within a critical realist paradigm, I was aware that there might be different 
angles on my data interpretation, but hope that others’ perspectives would 
shed light on my position, while also allowing common ground to emerge. Thus 
my overall research findings were reviewed both by a counselling psychologist 
with experience in IPA work, and core overall findings were also reviewed by 
participants themselves. Smith et al (2009) argue that such member validation 
is not necessary for analysis of a phenomenon, but I felt that a return to 
participants was appropriate for two reasons: while not taking away my 
ultimate control as a researcher, it felt like a more democratic exchange, and 
one which could provide additional perspective on the way I had shaped their 
experience.
With this in mind, I shall close this Methodology chapter with a discussion on 
reflexivity.
 
2.13 Reflexivity
My understanding of reflexivity – awareness of influences on my ideas and 
actions – has been significantly affected by Finlay (2008). While authors such 
as Ashworth (1996) argue that these prior understandings need to be 
separated off to achieve an appropriate and essential sensing of an object, 
Finlay aligns herself with Wertz (2005), who proposes that researchers’ 
understanding of their experience can enable them to enter and reflect more 
deeply upon the lived experience of others. In this way, reflexivity is a 
“dialectical dance” (Finlay, 2008: 3), where past knowledge is both restricted 
and used to interrogate meanings. This suggests some important 
characteristics of reflexivity, which became clear to me in the development of 
this study. Reflexivity is a process; for this study, it began months before 
starting research with a personal diary and reading during my own experience 
of breast cancer, and continued throughout the research process in the form of 
a reflexive journal, reflexive interview, autobiographical work and insider/
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outsider status reviews. Reflexivity also seemed to involve openness; openness 
to my own experience, which enabled me to be open and empathetic towards 
the otherness of the participant. Finally, I reflected that the nature of this 
dance meant that my research – as perhaps with any research? – could never 
account for all the influences shaping it. As Brooks (2008) argues, pre-
reflective and non-cognitive understanding of our practices suggest that even 
explicitly reflexive work is, to some degree, blind.
Therefore an achievable objective was for me to lay out the major ways in 
which I understood myself to have shaped this research. Wilkinson (1988) 
provides some helpful distinctions, suggesting that researchers should explore 
personal, functional and disciplinary factors when assessing reflexivity. Turning 
to personal features, most obvious is the fact that my own experience of 
reassessing my identity after breast cancer had prompted my interest in this 
subject. As Willig (2009) documents in her exploration of cancer, such 
endeavours can be a way of making sense of the apparently senseless. Bound 
up in my cancer experience were feelings of surprise and of anger. Gray (2008) 
suggests our histories are coloured by emotion, which both motivates us and 
also indicates what is permitted, in public and in private. I was surprised – 
shocked – to be diagnosed with cancer, when I didn’t correspond to any of the 
‘risk’ factors. I was angry, because although the medical care was excellent, 
the concern for my mental health was negligible. At no point was I asked how 
the treatment was affecting me, or how I was coping. Luckily for me, I had 
been able to digest my experience with family and close friends, and to apply 
my psychological knowledge to interrogate my own understanding. However, I 
was angry because I felt I should have been asked, and because I believed 
that many other women would not be in as fortunate a position.
This links to two further personal factors which have shaped this research. My 
feminist principles meant that, while not driven explicitly by feminist theory, I 
was concerned to do work which had a relevance to women, and held women 
as the central focus. My personal experience of cancer treatment suggested 
that this treatment did not encompass or address the meanings of such 
treatment for women. While I understand that time and training mean that 
medical care may not have space to address such issues, I felt that it was 
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important that these female meanings be adequately represented; 
furthermore, that a female model of holistic care be set against what has been 
described as a more masculine model of functional or physical care (e.g. 
Ussher, 1990). This belief in holistic care was supported by my personal 
grounding in humanistic ways of working, and a desire to start by valuing the 
felt experience of the individual human being. Feminist and humanistic factors 
thus played a part in both my choice of research topic, and also my research 
methodology and method. A qualitative methodology enabled me to give space 
to women’s voices, and IPA allowed those voices to tell their individual stories. 
However, I am aware that these choices, while consistent with my critical 
realist perspective, have inevitably limited the way I can present these identity 
issues. I chose this method because it was precisely the intersection of the 
personal with the social which interested me. However, I recognise that this 
focus on agency risks playing into existing cancer discourses, which, as Willig 
(2009) describes, blame the victim and position cancer as an individual 
problem. While considering social practices, this research does not focus 
entirely on these political issues, and is in that way less emancipatory at a 
social level. Moreover, my focus on individual lived experience positions this 
work away from the quantitative research desired for evidence-based practice, 
thus reducing its political power in a different way.
My perception of my function as a researcher was an important influence on 
this study. I was aware that my background as a scientist-practitioner gave me 
a different kind of access to experience from those available to non-
psychologist women with cancer. During my own treatment, I was conscious of 
reading health leaflets not only for content, but also for the positioning and 
structure which they conveyed: my status as a ‘survivor’, the stereotypical 
promotion of femininity through pink bows and pink products. As mentioned 
above, my fundamental priority was the accurate and respectful engagement 
with women and their experience. This concern for respectful engagement 
meant that I was sensitive to my choice of terminology, and the constructive 
power in language which Willig (2001) describes. One reason for my delight in 
the revised interview format was that the main ‘agenda’ was written in the 
participants’ own words. I was careful to follow up and explore their language. 
When raising more sensitive identities, I chose to use factual labels, such as 
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“physical body” or “sexual person”. While I recognised that these were clumsy, 
the labels seemed to allow access to the areas of experience I was hoping to 
explore, and were not as jargon-ridden as alternatives such as “embodied 
person”. However, although mindful in my local use of language, I rejected the 
excessively critical stance towards academic discourse which Langdridge 
(2007) discusses. Instead, I sided with Gough (2003), who suggests that 
extreme concern over the expert position of the researcher is self-indulgent. 
Drawing on my own experience, I believed that my professional background 
meant that I would be able to add additional perspective to the accounts given 
by the women in my study, and that IPA would enable me to create a more 
useful, multi-layered interpretation of this phenomenon.
My particular personal-professional position led to further considerations of 
function. Le Gallais (2008) has reflected on her own dual insider-outsider 
status in research, and this threw light on my own experience. In many ways I 
saw – and indeed positioned - myself as an insider, due to my own experience 
with cancer. This was an advantage, in that I was familiar with the breast 
cancer terminology and sensitive to nuances, such as the feelings felt when 
viewing your body after surgery. After much reflection, I chose to disclose my 
own experience, but at the recruitment stage only. I hoped that nature and 
timing of this disclosure would reassure women of my commitment to the 
research and help to build rapport, while keeping the focus on the women’s 
experience at the interview stage; this seemed to be borne out by participants’ 
feedback after the interviews.  However, I was also mindful of the dangers of 
this insider status. Over-identifying with the participant group as a whole, or 
with particular views, could reduce the sharpness of my insights. It might 
mean that I failed to explore difference, and result in the shoddy interpretation 
which Kvale and Brinkman (2009) deride. In summary, while feeling a strong 
‘kinship’ with participants throughout this study, I was conscious of my over-
arching duties as a researcher, and ultimately my outsider status as the 
interpreter of their experience. My experience was usefully captured by the 
research commentary from Mama (1987, quoted in Hollway, 1989:130); 
talking about being multiply positioned, she asserted that it enabled her to 
“abstract myself enough to be able to identify with discourses, yet empathise 
enough to recognise them and identify with participants”.
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This brings me to my final area of concern in reflexivity: disciplinary issues. 
This required me to consider the stance which I hold regarding the status of 
phenomena, my position as a researcher, and the ultimate political purpose of 
my research: “with what voice, to what end, using what criteria” (Kvale & 
Brinkman, 2009: 272). While the status of phenomena and researcher have 
been addressed in earlier sections, I would like to conclude this Methodology 
chapter with a consideration of this “end”. From the beginning of this research, 
I have seen it as exemplifying the potential of counselling psychology at many 
levels. At a micro level, my use of self which I developed as a trainee 
counselling psychologist enabled both the instigation of this research, and also 
its implementation in ways which, as I shall discuss later, were described by 
participants as useful and meaningful for them. On another level, I see this 
study as fitting with counselling psychology’s challenge to normative patterns 
of thinking, and in particular its critique of tyranny of the medical model, as 
described by Strawbridge and Woolfe (2003).  Medical procedures often ignore 
the individual experience, the social context, and the psychological impact of 
treatment. This research aims, in its own small way, to redress that issue with 
regard to younger women’s experience of breast cancer. Lastly, while this is not 
action research, I have always been mindful of using this study to inform my 
ongoing counselling psychology practice with people with cancer. Since starting 
this research, I have already been able to establish a specialist therapeutic 
group for younger women with cancer, at the centre where I work. I hope, 
again in some small ways, to continue making sense of my experience by 
being better able to help those coming after me.
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3 Analysis
 
 I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the family  tree, in 
 social place, in the geography of social statuses and function, in my 
 intimate relations to the ones I love, and also crucially in the space of 
 moral and spiritual orientation within which my most important defining 
 relations are carried out.  (Taylor, 1989: 35)
___________________________________________________
3.1 Overview
Before delving into the detail of the analysis, I would like to provide some 
background as to the principled choices and overall structure of the material 
presented.
3.1.1 Principles guiding analysis
In this chapter, I have sought rigorously and honestly to convey the perceptual 
content of participants’ accounts. This has been attempted through selection of 
material which is both representative of the core experiences of the participant 
group, and which also ensures a voice for each member of the group within the 
full analysis. In some themes, the phenomenon appears best represented by a 
wider range of accounts which capture the different colours of experience; in 
other themes, I have chosen to follow up a narrower range of quotations 
whose richness of language or perception cast particular insight. As a 
supplement to these instances, a full set of quotes for each theme is included 
within the table of super-ordinate themes (Appendix 12).  
In writing up this analysis, I decided to exclude theoretical literature as I felt 
this would direct attention too far away from the lived experience. I have 
chosen instead to focus on interpreting the detail of participants’ accounts, and 
the links between these accounts. Importantly, while aiming for a legitimate 
presentation of a phenomenon, I have also tried to preserve some holistic 
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integrity in women’s accounts, through consideration of personal 
interconnections between themes. These considerations form the basis for my 
interpretation of participants’ interviews, thereby creating the multi-layered 
exploration of meaning or “double hermeneutic” (Smith & Osborn, 2003) which 
is the objective of IPA.  
3.1.2 Overall organisation of analysis
Use of the “Who Am I?” (WAI) sheet resulted in a large amount of vivid and 
relevant material, and I am grateful to my participants for their commitment to 
detailed description, and for allowing me insight into emotionally significant 
issues. One advantage of the initially un-structured WAI tool is that it allowed 
participants to convey their own sense of identities, free from potential 
constraints of psychological framing which an interviewer might have brought. 
Thus I feel that the representation of identities outlined below describes a 
phenomenon which is at once broader and more intricate that the one which I 
had envisaged at the start of this study. When analysing this material, I 
maintained my focus on the key research aims of understanding continuity and 
change in the content of identities after breast cancer, and illumination of 
positive, problematic and salient aspects of such identities. 
My analysis resulted in three super-ordinate themes, which represent the 
content of identities which participants described experiencing after breast 
cancer. Amongst my participant group, six of the eight women described 
experiencing significant overall change in identities, while two women felt they 
had generally undergone only modest change. However, within the different 
themes, the extent and nature of change varied considerably. Despite the 
wide-ranging nature of the subject, I found that these three super-ordinate 
themes were able to contain the range of individual experiences across the 
group. In creating these themes, I have aimed to hold the tension between 
being sufficiently psychological and interpretative, whilst also maintaining 
connection with participants’ words. This is encapsulated in the titles of the 
three super-ordinate themes, which marry psychological language with 
quotations from participants. The majority of subordinate theme titles are also 
drawn from women’s accounts.
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While each theme addresses particular areas concerning the content of 
participants’ identities, there are – as so often with IPA – intimate and intricate 
relationships between the themes. These are briefly drawn in Table 3.1 below, 
and outlined in greater detail within the analysis and in the closing section of 
this chapter. “Challenges to embodiment: The body does its own thing” 
explores how perceptions of, and changes to, the body can have profound 
implications both for participants’ overall sense of self and for particular 
identities. “Negotiated roles: What are you looking for now?” describes 
participants’ experience of change in their social roles following their diagnosis 
with breast cancer. This includes the re-evaluation of previous roles, and the 
consideration of new roles arising from their cancer experiences. The final 
theme is “Emotional-existential dilemmas: Re-learning what life’s all about”. 
While grounded and connected to the particularities of the first two themes, 
this final theme comprises more global issues of identity relating to mortality, 
autonomy and meaning. 
Figure 3.1 Representation of Super-ordinate Themes
Challenges to embodiment:
The body does its own thing
- Something alien in my body
- Just me in a body
- Coming to terms with how I look
Negotiated roles: 
What are you looking for now?
- Partner
- Mother
- Employee/work colleague
- Friend
- Survivor
Emotional-existential dilemmas: 
Re-learning what life’s all about
- Facing my own mortality
- Assessing autonomy: Strength & 
vulnerability
- Following a different path to before
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3.2 Challenges to embodiment: The body does its own thing
This super-ordinate theme captures how breast cancer led the participants to 
become more aware of their physical state, as they were asked to reassess 
previous embodied identities and wrestle with new issues of embodiment. 
Within the super-ordinate theme fall three different themes. “Something alien 
in my body” considers how breast cancer triggered new experiences of the 
body as out of control, repugnant and - ultimately – stigmatised. “Just me in a 
body” addresses participants’ experience of a shift in the understanding of, and 
relationship between, their body and their sense of self, both during and after 
cancer treatment. Lastly, “Coming to terms with how I look” explores how 
breast cancer affected these women’s sense of their appearance, and the 
resulting impact on different aspects of their identity.
3.2.1 Something alien in my body
The diagnosis of breast cancer – the paradox of a potentially fatal disease in a 
part of the body associated with nurturing life – asked participants to make 
sense of this situation within their bodies. For Ursula, as for many participants, 
the response was to construe the cancer as something alien.
 It did feel odd at one point that there had been something alien in my body...which 
 sounds a bit weird. That did feel strange. [..]
 (I) There was a sense of something happening in you?
  
 [Ursula makes sudden roaring scary monster sound, and moves as if to pounce 
 with her arms]
  
 [..] So it did feel odd, especially since he said it had probably been there for a  year.
 (I) That feeling of having something inside you which was working against you, 
 almost?
  
 Yeah, yeah. The enemy within...   (Ursula: 7,4-10)
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Ursula’s perception of her cancer as “alien” can be understood on many levels. 
The cancer is alien in that is foreign to her body, an objectified “it” or a 
separate “something”. However, in Ursula’s dramatic non-verbal enactment of 
cancer, it also seems to take on the frightening form of an alien being from 
another world, almost as if a creature from myth. Furthermore, Ursula 
suggests how this shape-shifting cancer can be experienced as alien by being 
conceived as a malign agent, working against the “state” of the body (“the 
enemy within”). In these ways, breast cancer appears to be positioned as 
something other than the body, which has its own force and agency. There 
appears to be a sense of the body being engaged in a war with a hostile force, 
and this is echoed in other participants’ accounts. Becky describes the horror 
of breast cancer as being like “a foreign invasion in your body” (29,6), while 
Lesley also recalls the terror of finding “something alien” (4,6).
This sense of an active, alien presence in the body is not restricted to 
diagnosis, but can be experienced after treatment has been completed.
 And if I’m sat in the car, to get out of the car sometimes it hurts. Then you see 
 I’ll start to worry then, maybe it’s more than that, maybe it’s moving and it’s in 
 me bones. It’s just a constant worry all the time. (Zoe: 10,21)
Despite having completed chemotherapy and radiotherapy, Zoe describes how 
she anxiously wonders whether new sensations in her body may be caused by 
the spread of breast cancer. Again, cancer is construed as something separate 
from the body, with its own agency (“maybe it’s moving”). It appears that this 
construal of the cancer is associated with a lack of trust in her body, which is 
seen as harbouring something dangerous. However, this sense of something 
alien is not limited to the cancer. The treatments for breast cancer can cause 
women to experience their bodies as something tainted.
 
 Physically, I felt contaminated. I felt like I’d got some, well, I know it’s like poison. I 
 just felt I didn’t want me kids to kiss me. I just felt....horrible, that’s from the actual 
 drugs going in. (Zoe: 37,10)
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In her use of the word “contaminated”, Zoe indicates how she sees her body as 
polluted by chemotherapy. The intensity of her perception is reinforced by the 
subsequent simile which likens the drugs to poison, something which destroys 
life. Zoe’s sense of contamination is so strong that she does not want to kiss 
her children, possibly from a fear that she will endanger them. Thus this sense 
of being a contaminated body requires Zoe to separate herself from others, as 
if she is someone with a dangerous and stigmatised condition. 
Louise’s account extends our understanding of the ways in which breast cancer 
treatment can lead to disconnection from the body and a sense of the body 
becoming alien.
 
 This awful drug they put in me made all my hair [..] it was kind of coming off. And I 
 remember waking up one day and it was in my mouth, it fell off in my sleep and it was 
 in my mouth..[..] Going in the shower and literally you’ve had to take clumps of hair out 
 the plug hole. And it’s like nobody, it’s like that was part of, your hair is part of your 
 identity, isn’t it? (Louise: 5-15)
Louise begins by describing “my hair”, but as the chemotherapy causes her 
hair to come out, she turns to using the impersonal pronoun “it”, perhaps 
suggesting the transition from something which belongs to her to something 
alien or disconnected from her. Moreover, the shift from use of the personal 
pronoun (“my hair”) to use of the second person position (“you’ve had”) might 
be seen as a further disconnection, which in some ways protects from the 
emotional distress of witnessing parts of your body fall away. In the last line, it 
appears that she is wrestling with the nature of changes to her embodied 
identity. Louise begins by construing the association between hair and identity 
in the past tense, but then rephrases this, as if to assert its continuing 
importance. This temporal uncertainty might be seen as reflecting Louise’s 
challenge in understanding what does indeed constitute her physical identity.
The challenge of dealing with something alien can extend beyond treatment 
and diagnosis. Nina chose an augmented reconstruction as part of her 
treatment for breast cancer, but this left her dealing with mixed feelings about 
her breasts.
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 Um the boobs, um, they’re complicated, in that, um, the one I had the mastectomy on, 
 then had the tissue from my tummy put inside it, and, um, I can’t feel it. So although 
 it’s physically there, I do find it kind of weird in that [..] they never really feel like your 
 own any more. [..] I have felt in the past that they belonged more to my doctor than 
 they did to me. (Nina: 38,14-24)
As with earlier participants, Nina uses impersonal language which appears to 
distance herself from her breasts (“the boobs”; “they”). However, she also 
describes another kind of separation from her body, which derives from her 
experience of not having any sensation in her reconstructed breast. For Nina, 
the weirdness traces to that fact that her breasts “never really feel like your 
own any more”, but she goes on to elucidate a double meaning in the word 
“feel”. It is not only that she cannot experience sensation in her breast, but 
also that she perceives that her re-constructed breasts are no longer part of 
her, but rather belong to her doctors. In this sense, she appears to be 
questioning the integrity of her embodied identity, and whether this new body 
is fully her own.
Finally, although almost all women described some sense of alienation from 
their bodies, Rachel commented on her awareness that she had not 
experienced this change. Instead, she observed what appeared to be an 
absence of resentment towards her body:
 I didn’t feel a way about my body you know like as in... my body has done this to me, 
 it’s developed cancer. (Rachel: 19, 21)
In her interview, Rachel mentioned that she had experienced eating disorders 
in her twenties. While on one level this might have been considered to increase 
her vulnerability to body issues, I hypothesise that Rachel’s previous 
engagement with questions of embodiment may have left her with a pragmatic 
accommodation to her physical state. This accommodation appears to be 
echoed in a later embodied identity relating to appearance.
In summary, this theme has explored how breast cancer led most women to a 
new and disturbing experience of their bodies as something alien. This alien 
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quality can be seen to take many forms: a frightening monster or bogeyman; a 
malign and cunning agent; something which is contaminated and impure; 
previously integral things which are now disconnected or the property of 
someone else. Furthermore, this sense of something alien is experienced not 
only in connection with the cancer, but also with many aspects of the body. In 
various ways, therefore, these experiences appear to be prompting women to 
consider to what extent they can control and trust their bodies, and to what 
degree they perceive these bodies to be part of, or something separate to, 
their sense of self. This question is amplified in the second theme.
3.2.2 Just me in a body
This theme explores how treatment for breast cancer affects women’s 
understanding of the relationship between their sense of self and their bodies. 
Throughout these accounts, there appeared to be a constant questioning of the 
relationship between between physical condition and mental states:
 
 ...now I honestly feel some days that I’m just me in a body and I just get from A to B 
 like a bod, you know, like a, like as if, I’m almost just, not shut off emotionally [..] but I 
 just um my whole life at the moment is just cancer, cancer, drug taking, um, battling, on 
 my mind all I think about is trying to lose the weight, trying to get my life back. (Louise: 
 19,32)
My understanding here is that Louise perceives herself to have been reduced to 
operating at the level of a “bod”: a quasi-mechanical creature whose existence 
involves moving from one physical cancer issue to another. The repetition and 
use of lists (“cancer, cancer, drug taking..”) indicates both the relentless nature 
of this physical struggle and its domination of her existence, to the point where 
she feels other aspects of her functioning - such as her emotions – are almost 
closed down. Louise describes herself as engaged in battle for her life; whilst 
this can be interpreted on one level as a fight for survival, her earlier 
comments (“just me in a body”) suggest that getting her life back may also 
mean a return to an existence where preserving her physical state does not 
take over her whole life. The use of military imagery here, and throughout 
many descriptions of cancer identities, indicates that participants find such 
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discourses useful in capturing the intense struggle for life, and also perhaps 
the sense of separation between the mind and a body occupied by the enemy 
cancer.
Zoe’s understanding of her experience indicates how breast cancer can subvert 
women’s usual chronological sense of their bodies, thereby throwing mental 
constructions of identity into flux.
 
 I feel, physically I feel older, coz I feel absolutely shattered and worn out and like 
 an old woman sometimes. I seem to ache all over, which I know is the after-effects of 
 the treatment and will improve, but I just feel...feel older in meself. (Zoe: 7,20)
Many participants talked of the overwhelming exhaustion and fatigue caused 
by their breast cancer treatment. In her interview, Zoe described how happy 
she had been with her body before her cancer diagnosis; she perceived herself 
to have been fit, toned and outwardly healthy. In stark contrast, she outlines 
here how physically she feels used up (“worn out”) and is constantly in pain. 
While Zoe describes “knowing” that her physical state is linked to her 
treatment, she repeatedly asserts how she “feels” or experiences her condition 
as similar to that of an old woman: an apparent dissonance between her 
cognitive and phenomenological states, or at least between her interpretations 
of her sensations. Although Zoe is less than forty years old, her physical state 
appears to have catapulted her into a different life stage, that of an “old 
woman”. As we will explore later, Zoe’s sense of feeling older relates not only 
to her physical experience, but also to her mental experience.
Louise and Zoe were both prescribed the full range of breast cancer treatments 
– surgery, chemotherapy and radiotherapy – and therefore might be 
considered to have undergone the most severe physical experiences. However, 
the accounts of those receiving less extensive treatment also indicate that a 
change in the perception of the body’s capabilities is associated with a change 
in self.
 I still get pain from the areas around about the operation, there’s still scar tissue 
 there and obviously I still have the hot flushes, um, I sometimes feel tireder than I 
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 did previously.[..] I had the opportunity to go skiing earlier this year and I called it off 
 [..] because I was frightened that someone would bang into me or I would fall or hurt 
 myself. So that kind of dare-devil streak, that’s gone, to be replaced with a bit more of a 
 measured um assessment of my physical capabilities. (Becky: 27,1-13)
Becky underwent surgery and radiotherapy to treat breast cancer, and is now 
taking Tamoxifen medication with the aim of preventing recurrence. In her 
comments here, the juxtaposition of statements about ongoing physical 
symptoms with her fears for her safety while skiing suggests that breast 
cancer has created a new sense of the limitations and frailty of her body, which 
she did not previously hold. Becky’s description of the loss of this care-free, 
“dare-devil streak” indicates how she sees her identity to have been re-shaped 
by her new, more “measured” understanding of her body.
While this changing relationship between body and self was more frequently 
perceived as negative, there were certain participants who experienced either 
minimal change or a more enabling relationship. Lesley had had many serious 
– and at times, life-threatening – physical conditions before she was diagnosed 
with breast cancer. She describes how having breast cancer caused her to 
transform her understanding of her physical condition, and ultimately of her 
self.
 Till that time...that I got breast cancer and came through everything, I just thought I 
 was a very weak person physically.[..] But I have turned that on the head now and I 
 believe that I am strong because I have come through all these things [..] maybe I’m 
 not as strong as some others lifting things and whatever, but I do believe I’m strong 
 because if I wasn’t strong after having all these experiences I have had, I wouldn’t be 
 here. (Lesley: 2,24-3,7)
Lesley’s account suggest that, rather than viewing breast cancer as a further 
sign of physical weakness, she instead developed a belief that coming through 
these multiple physical issues was an indication of her strength. She carefully 
delineates between different aspects of strength, seeing her own as relating 
not to day-to-day measures such as lifting weights but rather to her capacity 
to stay alive. As will be discussed later, Lesley goes on to relate this physical 
resilience to her understanding of mortality, and also to the overall meaning 
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which she perceives in her ongoing existence. While these issues are not 
explicitly mentioned here, the repetition of the word “strong” can perhaps be 
seen to convey significance beyond the simple description of a physical state.
Drawing together the varying aspects of this theme, it appears that 
participants’ experience of breast cancer prompted a re-appraisal of their 
embodied state, and the way in which mental states are contingent upon this 
embodiment. It is also clear that participants perceived this embodiment to be 
the foundation for their ability to engage with a broader range of life activities, 
and thus the taking-up of other identities. Within the theme of “Just me in a 
body”, this re-appraisal of the embodied state has been restricted to 
perceptions of the physical condition or “running capabilities” of the body. 
However, in the final theme in this section, attention moves to participants’ 
awareness of how the appearance of their bodies shapes available identities.
 
3.2.3 Coming to terms with how I look
It is perhaps unsurprising that breast cancer led all participants to an 
assessment of their appearance. All experienced at least some modification of 
their bodies, through surgery, radiotherapy or chemotherapy. In their accounts, 
each woman’s sense of these changes appeared to be mediated both by her 
previous sense of their body, and by her new perceptions of her body within 
the wider social context. These assessments resulted in an evaluation of the 
new status of their body, as implied by their appearance.
Both Gilly and Rachel underwent reconstructed mastectomies as part of their 
treatment for breast cancer. They relate their sense of how earlier embodied 
identities interacted with interpretation of their body’s appearance after 
surgery. Gilly described her satisfaction with her altered body, but also went on 
to ground this change in the wider meaning of breasts for her embodied 
identity.
 Obviously, he’s done a fantastic job, the breast surgeon, so um and I could wear a 
 bikini, you’d never know, except for my back, the scar on my back... (Gilly: 42,7)
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 I’ve never had you know fabulous boobs so it wasn’t my asset [..] I can see to  some 
 women you know it would be you know, I never liked mine or had a great love affair with 
 them [laughs]. (Gilly: 45,1)
Gilly appears pleased with the appearance of her body after surgery. She 
measures the surgeon’s “fantastic job” by the way her breast reconstruction is 
barely apparent, even in a bikini: something she alludes to elsewhere as “my 
little secret” (40,13). Gilly’s comments suggest that one way of satisfactorily 
coming to terms with a new appearance is through the preservation of a public 
face, where no change can be discerned by others. However Gilly’s account 
also indicates how her previous attitude towards her breasts may have 
influenced this evaluation. Gilly construes “fabulous boobs” as an “asset”, 
something which possesses useful qualities, which in this case may presumably 
relate to social presentation or the attraction of partners. From her comments, 
and my sense of her seemingly pragmatic laughter, I inferred that her breasts 
were not a central part of her positive evaluation of her embodied identity 
before her experience with breast cancer, and thus perhaps that her 
subsequent altered body has been easier to accept. 
Rachel appears less positive than Gilly in her assessment of her new 
appearance. Despite this, she indicates this assessment has affected her less 
than she had feared. 
 I think I thought it would be worse, it’s not as bad as I thought it was, I mean I 
 go through, it’s funny, I go through like phases of being really upset still about it, 
 thinking oh even if, even when the reconstruction’s done this one’s still actually 
 generally going to sit down here and this one’s going to be, you know, round and 
 sit right up here, and... (Rachel: 17,16)
Discussing a previous “fractious relationship” (16,13) with her body which 
included disordered eating, she indicates that, although upset with the differing 
appearance of her two breasts, she has not yet experienced the “total 
disgust” (18,20) with her body which she had felt in earlier situations, and had 
worried might occur again. It is possible this may trace to the fact that her 
reconstruction was ongoing at the time of interview, and therefore she was 
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hopeful of future improvement. It may alternatively trace to a strategy of 
“putting things aside” (20,25), to which Rachel alluded in our discussions.  
Nina’s account also demonstrates how earlier evaluations of embodied 
appearance interact in complex ways with post-cancer assessments of physical 
looks. As well as the reconstruction following a mastectomy, Nina chose to 
have her breasts enlarged.
 
 Because I’ve had a boob job, I do feel more feminine. It does feel really nice to 
 have boobs for the first time in my life that are quite presentable, you know, they’re two 
 or three times the size of the ones before.[..] Um, it’s just the scars, you know. (Nina: 
 40,18)
 
Although mindful of the scars, Nina seems generally to perceive her new 
appearance to be an improvement on her previous, pre-cancer body. She takes 
pleasure in the larger size of her breasts, which she associates with a sense of 
greater femininity, potentially through her sense of better fulfilling social 
criteria for womanhood. This appears to have given her greater confidence in 
her appearance; by being more “presentable”, it seems that both she - and 
others? - judge her body as better equipped to perform her gendered role as 
woman.
While some participants’ evaluation of their appearance seems to involve 
acceptance of and accommodation to the surrounding social context, Louise is 
notable for her analysis of how her personal evaluation of her appearance is 
made problematic by wider social values. Using stark and extreme verbs, she 
describes initially the intense hatred and shame she feels for her new 
appearance. 
 I’m just I’m disgusted with my body now. I hate it. I look in the mirror and I hate it. I 
 don’t recognise myself at all. I hate it and I just, it wouldn’t be so bad with the chemo 
 [..] but with the Tamoxifen, it’s for five years, it’s almost like having to come to terms 
 which I haven’t yet that this could be my body for five years!  (Louise: 7,2)
Louise is frank in her rejection of her appearance: she does not recognise this 
new embodiment as representing her self. She indicates how the altered 
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appearance which has resulted from her cancer treatment has provided her 
with an alternative, unwanted and (implicitly) devalued identity as a cancer 
patient.
 ...while I’ve got the headscarf on, the weight gain and all around the middle, the spongy 
 chemo weight, I look like a cancer patient and I don’t want to be a cancer patient any 
 more. (Louise: 52,4)
Louise goes on to explain how cancer can not only lead to implication in less 
attractive or desirable identities, but can also make it harder to comply with 
social regimes and standards for appearance.
 ..it is this whole media thing now of perfection. And if you haven’t got perfection in 
 today’s  society [..] you can pay for perfection. And everybody aims for this perfection 
 coz it tells you you have to be. So when you’ve got something wrong with you that’s out 
 of your  control, you know that you’re kind of one step behind everybody else. (Louise: 
 17,25)
In this excerpt, Louise appears to suggest that in the cultural context of UK 
society, “perfection” of appearance is not only desirable but morally required; 
that not to have a certain look is a stain on character (“you have to be”). 
Moreover, the phrase “one step behind everyone else” indicates how Louise 
feels that impact of cancer treatment on her appearance has left her socially 
disadvantaged, and as we will explore later, she explicitly associates this with 
the competitive search for a partner. 
However, Lesley’s account suggests that there are different social discourses on 
appearance, and these may be variously employed in the service of different 
embodied identities. 
 I’ve never liked my body [..] maybe at one time I might have thought about having 
 liposuction or botox or whatever and I think they are such idiots and fools now, you 
 know, in the respect of you do not mess with nature, you don’t know what you’re going 
 to get yourself into [..]. You have to accept how you are and make the best of yourself 
 [..] and ...therefore, embrace yourself. (Lesley: 6,15-27)
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Lesley indicates that, prior to cancer, she was dissatisfied with her appearance, 
and would have considered social practices such as cosmetic surgery which she 
felt would enhance her body. Yet following her experience with cancer, she 
seems to have greater respect – and perhaps also some element of fear? – for 
the natural state of her body (“you do not mess with nature”), which may link 
to Lesley’s new sense of her body’s strength, as discussed in section 3.2.2. As 
part of this change, Lesley’s account suggests she has taken on different social 
discourses, which lead her to be more accepting of her appearance.  
Throughout these quoted examples, participants have indicated the extent to 
which breast cancer has involved a – largely negative - reassessment of their 
body’s appearance and “visual” identity. It is worth noting that comments 
about this visual embodied identity emerged spontaneously from participants; 
while they are obviously connected to particular role identities such as 
“woman” or “cancer patient”, they also in many cases stand independently 
from these roles. These women’s accounts suggest that such body images or 
identities are influenced by body images held before diagnosis with cancer, the 
degree of physical change resulting from cancer treatment, and by social 
discourses relating both to women’s bodies and to cancer. 
In this first super-ordinate theme, then, I have considered how women 
experienced changes in their embodied identities. These experiences included 
perceptions of the body as alien, and a sense of the body as fundamental to – 
and controlling of – other identities. Participants’ accounts also suggest an 
awareness of the appearance of the body not only as representing one’s self, 
but also as an indicator of moral and social worth, and as a facilitator of other 
identities. This leads us to the second super-ordinate theme.
3.3 Negotiated roles: What are you looking for now?
The second super-ordinate theme encompasses those role identities which held 
significance for participants after their experience with breast cancer. The 
identities could be considered as dividing into two camps: role identities 
present in participants’ lives prior to cancer, and new role identities thrown up 
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by cancer. Word-count limitations mean that I have had to curtail the number 
of roles represented. Within this thesis, I will cover the re-evaluation of the 
previously held identities of partner, mother, friend and employee/work 
colleague, and also consideration of the new identity of cancer survivor. 
Identities mentioned by participants but omitted here are those of daughter, 
woman, sexual being and patient. When considering which roles to include 
within this thesis, I chose to include those which had the widest representation 
across participants, and roles which I judged to have the richest descriptive 
material and greatest salience or spontaneity of recall for participants. As with 
the previous super-ordinate theme, my analytic focus was on participants’ 
experience of continuity and change in these identities. Due to the varied 
experiences of participants within each identity, I have chosen to use simple 
role descriptors, as I struggled to find one participant’s words which would 
adequately stand for the group.
3.3.1 Partner
With one exception, all participants appeared to feel that their experience with 
breast cancer had raised the importance of this identity. This was the case, 
whether participants were currently single (five women) or in a committed 
relationship (three women). While coping with unfamiliar experience of breast 
cancer, Zoe seemed to find her marriage an importance source of stability: a 
quality captured in her description of her husband Jamie as a “rock” (15,12). 
Zoe perceived that cancer had changed her nature of her marriage.
 He’s just carried everything and carried on [..] Five, six years ago, I didn’t probably 
 open up to Jamie. I didn’t feel like I needed him, for me, you know, but I certainly do 
 now. I mean, it’s, that’s, I suppose that’s a good thing to come out of this, we’re 
 closer, and I think we’ve got ...we’ve got to a different level really. (Zoe: 17,34-18,8)
Zoe appears to value Jamie not only for the general support he offered (“he’s 
just carried everything”) but also for the emotional support which he provided 
to her. Zoe contrasts her previous emotional self-sufficiency and lack of 
openness with Jamie with her sense of greater personal vulnerability following 
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cancer, which she sees as having enabled her to reach a different level of 
emotional intimacy. 
Lesley and Nina’s accounts also describe how they became closer to their 
husbands. However, in Lesley’s experience, this change in identity traced not to 
a sense of vulnerability but to the realisation of “how much he loved me and 
wanted to protect me” (46,21).  As with Zoe, Lesley perceived this support to 
have been expressed in both emotional and practical ways.
 
 He did everything he possibly could [..] That first night after being diagnosed [..] I just 
 laid in his arms all night crying and being emotional [..] He was there with me every 
 step of the way, you know. Every specialist treatment I had, even now he comes and 
 sees the specialist with me...  (Lesley: 46,22-31)
As in Zoe’s account, the value which Lesley places on the relationship seems to 
stem in part from the ability to express emotional distress at moments of 
existential crisis, such as the first night after diagnosis mentioned here. From 
the use of singular pronouns such as “I” and “he”, I hypothesise that Lesley 
was still aware at this time of an existential difference between her condition 
and that of her husband. However, she appears to have drawn comfort from 
the constant and ongoing support which her husband offered. This contrasted 
with the experience of Nina, where despite a sense that cancer initially “did 
bring us together” (16,34), she perceived a decline in intimacy and attention 
over time.
 He’s entitled to his own life but it does consume a lot of his thoughts and you know...I 
 think I feel a bit forgotten sometimes. (Nina: 20,23)
While Nina seems to continue to place a high value on such attention and 
intimacy, the description of her husband’s behaviour suggests he may now not 
accord these qualities the importance he did earlier in the cancer experience. 
In using the word “forgotten”, I speculate that Nina may feel that her partner 
has moved on from the cancer experience and this different connection with 
his wife, while she herself feels that this experience requires longer and more 
sustained recognition within their relationship.
153
Among those participants who were single, there appeared to be an equally 
high importance placed upon relationships both before and after cancer. 
However, participants were now much more pessimistic about their chances of 
achieving such a relationship. 
 
 I couldn’t even find a boyfriend when I had a fully, you know when I had an ordinary 
 body and now I’ve got, you know, it’s going to be even worse...(Rachel: 37,17)
Rachel links her belief in her reduced chance of a relationship to the loss of an 
“ordinary” body: a body that has got something which she cannot bring herself 
to name (“and now I’ve got”). This shadowy sense of the stigma of cancer 
compounds earlier concerns Rachel had had about forming a relationship.
 It attaches itself to my old...things [..] it’s a more tangible reason why I’m right that I 
 will always be on my own, and now I’ve got proof in a way. (Rachel: 38,4)
The phrase “I’ve got proof” might be interpreted on one level as conveying the 
greater difficulty in starting a relationship, within a society which views cancer 
as dangerous and undesirable.  However, I wondered whether Rachel hinted at 
another level of meaning: that cancer was a moral judgement which implied 
proof of some lesser value in her self. Yet in one regard, Rachel sees that 
cancer might help her realise this identity as a partner, by being an efficient 
screening tool for the kind of man she is looking for.
 
 I can say well actually...I’ve had cancer and had a mastectomy so [..] if they stick 
 around [..] they’re interested, actually interested in me as a person rather than the 
 physical body... (Rachel: 39,30-40,3)
Here, Rachel appears to suggest that stigmatising social conceptions of cancer 
may act in her favour. Her new embodied condition will act as a way of 
discriminating between men who choose relationships purely on physical 
criteria rather than on an attraction to the whole person. However, like her 
fellow participant Louise, who describes her single state as a “life 
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sentence” (15,6), Rachel seems to be pessimistic about her chances of 
achieving such a relationship.
 Looking at how our animal instincts of survival of the fittest, are you necessarily going to 
 pick somebody who’s had a life-threatening disease? (Rachel: 42,16)
Echoing Louise’s earlier views on appearance and embodiment, Rachel appears 
here to see herself existing in a world where she is competing against others to 
be selected for a relationship. Her experience with cancer is a Darwinian 
stigmata, a sign of weakness which compromises her ability to achieve the 
identity she desires. 
Within the participant group, Becky is notable for the reduced importance she 
now places on a relationship.
 
 ...for the first time in my life I really do not want to be in a relationship [..] ...if it 
 happens, it happens, if it doesn’t, that’s fine as well. Um but that kind of contentment is 
 directly a result I think of the cancer and of realising that, you know, life is there to be 
 enjoyed and it’s down to you to make it enjoyable, not somebody else. (Becky: 30,4-23)
Having come out of a long-term relationship shortly before being diagnosed 
with breast cancer, Becky describes here how she now feels less need to be in 
a relationship. She attributes this directly to her experience with cancer, and a 
new sense of her own capacity and responsibility to supply her own enjoyment. 
This links to an aspect in the final super-ordinate theme, which is Becky’s 
awareness of her personal autonomy.
In summary, the role identity of partner appears to have increased or 
maintained its significance for the majority of participants. Only one woman 
perceived the partner role to be of lesser importance than before cancer, and 
this related to an existential re-assessment of the support which should be 
derived from others and from oneself. Those women in relationships appeared 
to place greater value on the role, through the appreciation of the emotional 
and practical support which they received during their experience with cancer. 
However, for those women who were not in relationships before their breast 
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cancer diagnosis, there is no change to the value they place on this identity, 
but rather a bleak assessment of their chances of achieving it. These women’s 
accounts suggest they perceive their “marketability” has been reduced by the 
stigma attached to cancer.
3.3.2 Mother
All participants experienced some degree of change in their actual or potential 
identity as a mother. In some ways, this change was experienced as enabling. 
Ursula was unusual in her relief that, as a woman without children, she was 
spared the emotional distress she felt this might bring.
 Because I haven’t got children, it makes a huge difference ..[..] that must be awful. 
 (Ursula: 19.20)
For those like Gilly who were mothers before being diagnosed, having children 
was seen as a fundamental source of strength.
 
 They give me purpose at the moment, you know, they make, I know they still need me. 
 (Gilly: 7,25)
It is this concern for her children which Gilly perceives to motivate her to 
persist with another identity, that of an employee, despite the overwhelming 
exhaustion she experiences after cancer treatment.
 I think that’s what drives me to work and keep everything going because I want you 
 know my daughter’s learning to drive, she’s at a private school [..] you need all these, I 
 want them to have things. (Gilly: 12,30).
However, mostly women who were mothers described a difficult struggle to 
protect their children from the emotional and practical consequences of their 
breast cancer. Nina summarised the efforts of many mothers, when she talked 
of organising things so that “my husband would have as normal a life as he 
could, and the kids could go on going to school normally” (6,30). Yet the 
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severity of different cancer treatments and availability of care meant that it 
was not always possible to preserve this normality, as Zoe describes.
 I just did what I could...but for the first week or whatever I was just sort of in bed and 
 being ill, and I know I couldn’t help it but I still felt guilty, because the kids still need 
 you, don’t they? I mean, they’re innocent, aren’t they, they’re just, they need their 
 mum. (Zoe: 2,29)
Zoe’s account suggests how her physical condition makes it hard to be the 
mum she wants to be. But her words also indicate how she feels guilty for her 
failure to fulfil this role, even though she understands that she has not chosen 
to have cancer. This juxtaposition of her guilt as a mother with the innocence 
of her children might be interpreted as connecting to the previously mentioned 
description of herself as “contaminated”: that the stigma of cancer can itself 
contaminate role identities central to the self. Cancer appears to be 
experienced not only as a social judgement, but also as a personal moral 
judgement of the self.
This struggle to protect children extends from day-to-day routines to deeper 
issues of physical and emotional welfare. The incidence of breast cancer in 
Zoe’s family led her to fear a genetic cause, which might affect her daughters 
as well as herself.
 See, you want to protect your children, and I do everything I can, you know, but this is 
 out of my hands, it’s...That’s hard to deal with, that. It’s like a clock ticking away. (Zoe: 
 5,19)
Despite everything Zoe does, Zoe indicates how breast cancer has highlighted 
her ultimate impotence as a mother to protect her children. Her image of a 
clock ticking away brings to mind the sense of time being counted down, or 
possibly a time-bomb waiting to explode, and is one of many similar images in 
her interview (“turn back the clock”, 4,24; “the clock was ticking”, 12,28). It 
suggests that cancer has confronted her aspirations as a mother with the 
limitations of the physical reality of the human body, and the existential nature 
of human existence. These physical realities also preoccupy Lesley, who 
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describes how she perceives it to be part of her role as mother to make her 
children aware of the biological impact of cancer.
 I didn’t hide anything from them because I think that it is wrong, they need to know to 
 be aware. (Lesley: 39,27)
However, when dealing with the emotional impact of cancer, Lesley mentions 
choosing deliberately to hide the distress she was experiencing.
 I tried to be ...um...as happy as I possibly could but I mean obviously there was dark 
 times, especially at night [..] But we tried to make it...a positive time for the children. 
 (Lesley:40,26)
 (I) ...you were putting on...
 A front [..] to, you know, to show...that it wasn’t going to get me. (Lesley: 41,2-8)
Lesley’s account conveys how her experience of being a mother with cancer led 
her to construct a public façade to reassure and protect her children, and 
conceal from them the emotional distress she suffered.  
For those participants who were not mothers at diagnosis, there seemed to be 
a general sense of grief for this potentially lost identity. To minimise the 
recurrence of cancer, many women with breast cancer are advised to take 
hormone medication for five years, while avoiding getting pregnant. Louise 
starkly described the potentially awful paradox, in this altered, life-death 
relationship to motherhood.
 
 I can’t afford to get pregnant, because it could, it would kill me, coz the 
 oestrogen... (Louise: 64,4)
Despite not seeing herself as particularly maternal before cancer, Louise now 
found herself to be sad at the prospect of missing out on the experience of her 
own child, and of the shared joy she could provide to a partner through 
motherhood.
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 I’d really like to have seen what a little me would have been like. (Louise: 16,14)
 I’m never gonna do something or be pregnant where my partner is so pleased. (Louise: 
 16,27)
While Becky also observed that she had not felt especially maternal, she 
experienced sadness - and possibly anger? - at the loss of control over the 
possibility of being a mother.
 It’s one thing not wanting children, or deciding not to have them, it’s another being told 
 you can’t. (Becky: 45,4)
Rachel’s account emphasised how the potential loss of this highly valued 
identity made her question the value of her own existence.
 Because of the treatment, tablets, it was like, oh well, now I’ll never have kids at the 
 early stages, that I did continue with that, well, what is even the point of me going 
 through with all this treatment? (Rachel: 46,5)
In a long statement in her interview, Rachel describes her dilemma over taking 
the hormone medication, and its possible implications for motherhood. The 
quote here captures the root of her dilemma: that the cancer medication may 
prolong a life which is empty of the identity she so treasures. In this sense, in 
limiting Rachel’s potential to be a mother, breast cancer also seems to be 
asking Rachel to make fundamental questions about the meaning of her life. 
In summary, then, the experience of breast cancer appeared to be associated 
for most women with largely negative changes in the identity of mother. This 
needs to be set against the high value placed on this identity by many women, 
as indicated by their spontaneous raising of the role, and its frequency of 
occurrence across participants. For those who were already mothers, these 
changes involved a struggle to protect their children from the emotional and 
practical implications of breast cancer, as well as accompanying emotions of 
fear and guilt. For women who had not had children, there was a prevailing 
sense of sadness at the reduced likelihood of being a mother.  
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3.3.3 Employee/Work Colleague
Of the participant group, seven women were in paid employment at the time of 
their cancer diagnosis, while one woman worked full-time caring for her 
children. Their work identity appeared to raise particular challenges for 
participants during their experience of cancer, due to it being a point of 
intersection for managing issues such as embodiment, the social construction 
of cancer and the meaning of cancer.
The physical impact of cancer and employers’ reactions to cancer were issues 
with which all women wrestled. Rachel worked in a healthcare setting, and 
perceived herself to be lucky in the support she had been offered.
 My managers, they would say, just take whatever you need [..] I would be tearful and 
 so not really coping very well at being at work [..] they got a locum in to do some of my 
 patient  work [..] and I get five months off full pay. (Rachel: 24,24-25,9)
Moreover, she did not feel that her absence during cancer treatment had 
affected her standing within the organisation, as she noted that “I actually just 
got a promotion, a couple of weeks ago” (25,16). For Nina, her experience with 
breast cancer meant that she deferred plans to return to work outside the 
home, as she felt she needed more time to deal with the effects of ongoing 
medical procedures.
 I’ve still got another operation to go [..] and I [..] don’t want to load it on myself yet. I 
 think I need another year. (Nina: 46,12)
However, many women described difficult experiences as they struggled to 
balance their physical condition with the work environment. Gilly made a 
dramatic comparison between her capacity to work before and after cancer.
 Before I could cope with it because I had more physical strength but now it’s killing 
 me [..] I go to bed as soon as I get home at four... (Gilly: 20,12)
In her description of work “killing me”, Gilly seems to be expressing the huge 
toll which the demands of work are making on her life. However, I wondered 
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whether there was another level of meaning in the phrase, as in the final 
super-ordinate theme she appears to link the arrival of cancer with stress in 
her life; in this sense, work might be more directly involved in “killing” her. It is 
clear from this excerpt that work is not only having a debilitating physical 
impact on her, but also limiting her capacity to engage in other areas of her life 
– linking to ideas in the first super-ordinate theme, “Just me in a body”. In her 
interview, Gilly mentioned that she had not disclosed her breast cancer to work 
colleagues, as she was not particularly friendly with them. However, from 
comments elsewhere it appeared possible that this non-disclosure might relate 
to concerns about how her employers might react to her cancer:
 
 They’re still paying a lot of money for you to do a job, you shouldn’t be working in their 
 eyes, probably...(Gilly: 33,23)
As described earlier, the motivating force underlying Gilly’s work identity is her 
role as a mother, and her commitment to provide for her children. She seems 
here to be fearful that others’ perceptions of her cancer might affect her 
capacity to work, thereby affecting not only her work role but potentially also 
her role as a mother.
Difficulties managing the physical impact of cancer and employers’ reactions 
were also observed by other participants. Louise found she was at risk of losing 
her work identity altogether. Her employers did not appear to appreciate the 
wider personal significance of cancer, but perceived absence from work for 
treatment as a loss of productivity, with consequent elimination of salary.
 Coz I’m only a contractor, when I was first diagnosed they weren’t going to pay 
 anything. (Louise: 27,31)
 Due to the interventions of one manager, Louise was able to be paid to work 
from home. However, within a treatment regime requiring surgery, 
chemotherapy and radiotherapy, she described feeling that “the whole cancer 
thing has become my life” (30,3). Her absence from work, combined with her 
physical state, meant that she was feeling less confident about her capabilities 
and status in her work role.
161
 I just need to be refreshed on all these things [..] I just feel that I’m not in control any 
 more [..] I’m just Louise their administrator who’s had cancer and hasn’t really been 
 able to do very much for them. (Louise: 25, 18-23)
Towards the end of this extract, Louise appears to be presenting herself as she 
feels others might see her, with the perception that cancer has subtracted from 
her role competence in colleagues’ eyes. Her account also raises existential 
questions about her experience of the boundaries of personal control, in links 
with the third super-ordinate theme. This is an issue which Lesley struggled 
with explicitly. She first recalled the difficulty she experienced, combining 
cancer treatment with work.
 
 When I was going to start the radiation I went to pieces again with it all, so this is when 
 I had to give the job up because I was exhausted a lot of the time. (Lesley: 18,11)
However, Lesley then described that, following an agreed period of work 
absence, she was made redundant by her manager.
 I don’t even believe she had any intention at that time even to take me back, it was a 
 way of getting me out without having to pay me any redundancy or anything. (Lesley: 
 20,30)
The emotional intensity of Lesley’s anger and sense of rejection appeared 
partly captured in her blunt summary that “she didn’t want me and I just felt 
very cheated” (19,29), and I perceived a deep feeling of betrayal in the slower, 
deliberate phrasing of Lesley’s words and her firm tone. Perhaps Lesley’s sense 
of being cheated traced to the fact that her employer had not been open, or 
followed appropriate rules and processes. However, I also felt there might be 
another interpretation, where cancer becomes the agent which swindles her 
out of her job. Whatever the interpretation, in this particular work context 
cancer also was associated with being de-valued as an employee.
In addition to coping with challenges to their value as an employee, many 
women also discussed challenges relating to the social context of work. There 
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appeared to be two aspects to this issue. The first related to the women’s own 
ability to manage social situations thrown up by cancer.
 
 I were very upset all the time, I could have easily....I didn’t want people to see me 
 upset, basically. And I didn’t feel very good about myself. I felt, you know, I was a really 
 bad colour. (Zoe: 28,18)
Zoe chose not to go into her work premises during cancer treatment. Here, she 
talks of being worried that she would break down in front of others, and of 
feeling embarrassed by her looks. Louise also mentioned concerns about her 
imminent return to the office.
 This person who they always thought was so glamorous [..] I feel like a bit of a fraudster 
 now. (Louise: 27,8)
The contrast between her appearance before and after cancer treatment seems 
to leave Louise feeling a sense of shame: she sees herself as a “fraudster”, 
pretending to be someone she is not. In their different ways, the kinds of 
cancer treatment Zoe and Louise received appear to have resulted in an 
appearance which is socially devalued, causes them shame, and leads to 
difficulties for them in the management of a public work identity. However, 
these difficulties do not trace only to their own reactions and to appearance; 
they also trace to the difficulties others experience dealing with participants’ 
cancer.
 It’s other people’s reactions really, coz I saw someone in town ...[pause: 5 secs]...she 
 kind of  avoided me, this girl...She wasn’t part of the team, she works in the same 
 branch, and maybe she didn’t see me, but I think she saw me and avoided me. (Zoe: 
 26,11)
Here, Zoe perceived herself as someone whom others wanted to avoid.  
Considering the linguistic constructions in this account, I was left with the 
sense of oppositional forces: “I” versus “other people”; “she” versus “me”. Zoe 
went on to suggest that it can be awkward addressing cancer issues with 
others, as the absence of social protocols means people “don’t know what to 
say or how to deal with it” (28,31). Thus participants perceived cancer as 
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raising stigmatising social issues in the workplace, both through the 
presentation of their altered bodies and through the lack of accommodating 
discourses with which cancer can be discussed.
Set against these negatives challenges to their work identity, many participants 
also reported changes in their relationship to work which they viewed more 
constructively. Some women made similar statements to Zoe, who indicated 
that the priority of work in her life had altered.
 I’m not going to take it seriously..[].. it’s only work. (Zoe: 27,17)
For two women, the experience of cancer had led to a significant re-evaluation 
of content of work, and the meaning which work assumed in their lives. Becky 
described how a shift in values was leading her to consider a new career.
 All the petty um things that people worry about, office politics, just seem to me 
 absolutely ridiculous [..] I spend my whole life making money for other people, most of 
 whom are not very nice and wouldn’t you know hesitate trampling all over you, um. I 
 don’t want to do that any more, er...it pays the bills, um, but I want to do something 
 where I’m helping somebody else and that’s where the counselling comes in. (Becky: 
 46,2-11)
In this extract, Becky seems to suggest that she no longer feels comfortable 
with the business and practices of her work. She indicates that her experience 
with cancer is encouraging her to explore work where, rather than competing 
with others, she is supporting others. After leaving her former job, Lesley also 
describes seeking an alternative career working with disabled children, and her 
account amplifies potential identity issues which underpin such moves:
 ..it’s just pin money but it’s more for...me feeling that I’m, I am somebody and I’m 
 giving, helping these children that, it’s giving me strength as well and helping them in 
 the same process.  (Lesley, 14,3)
 
 Make them ...have a better form of life, you know, if I can give them some of my 
 strength of some of my time...and make them laugh [..] then I think I’m doing my job. 
 (Lesley: 16,26)
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It appears the particular content of Lesley’s new work allows her to feel 
valuable (“I am somebody”); in this way, the particular work she has chosen 
both gives her strength, and allows her to give of the new embodied sense of 
strength alluded to in the first super-ordinate theme. My hypothesis, then, is 
that such changes in career after cancer can be a means not only of expressing 
different, more altruistic values, but also a means to re-build an individual’s 
personal strength after a debilitating cancer experience. 
In summary, the majority of participants experienced significant changes in 
their work identity through cancer. In part, these related to the difficulty of 
managing the physical impact of cancer treatment while performing work 
responsibilities, and a perceived understanding or support from employers. But 
participants also experienced difficulty in negotiating the social environment of 
work, where the stigma of cancer appeared to affect both their own reactions, 
and those of their colleagues. More positively, cancer had in some cases led to 
desired changes in work identity, where participants sought careers which 
offered more altruistic values. For all these reasons, the work identity seemed 
to be experienced as a complex and challenging one.
3.3.4 Friend  
All participants noted changed perceptions of their identity as a friend. 
Interestingly, these perceptions appeared to fall into two broad patterns, both 
of which included positive and negative changes. These patterns within the 
friendship identity did not obviously relate to marital status, and seemed to 
trace more to intra- and inter-personal situations.
The first pattern of identity changes revolved around a greater appreciation of 
friendship. Indeed, some participants believed their friendships were critical in 
coping with their breast cancer.
 
 They’re the people who have really got me through it and supported me. (Louise: 32,6)
Louise was not in a romantic relationship when she was diagnosed, but her 
single status does not appear to have been a decisive factor in this valuing of 
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friends. Lesley was married, but also placed immense importance on the 
contribution of her friends, whom she perceived as “giving me strength to 
carry on” (4,26). However, alongside the overall increased importance placed 
on friends came a greater discrimination of friendships. Several participants 
highlighted a smaller group of what Zoe termed “true friends” (29,25) who 
could be trusted to show emotional understanding as well as practical help.
 They were just there to ...tell me they cared. To make me meals, take me out to eat, to 
 listen to me when I was low and upset... and they were there when we could have a 
 laugh together  as well. (Lesley: 29: 25)
The opportunity to express difficult emotions was also noted by Zoe, who 
commented that “I could cry in front of her and it didn’t matter” (30,8).  
Perhaps this characteristic may have acquired particular importance in 
friendships, because of the need to restrict emotional display in other identities 
such as mother or work colleague, for the perceived protection of self-image or 
the wellbeing of others.
 
However, within an overall raised appreciation of friendship, such discrimination 
also resulted in some friends being judged as falling short. Rachel described 
her disappointment at the behaviour of one of her oldest friends:
 I was just so upset. I told her what...and she just didn’t ring to say, how you doing, 
 when’s  the operation, you know. Nothing....(Rachel: 28,17)
Again, Rachel’s account reinforces the earlier point concerning the increased 
importance of emotional understanding within friendship during the experience 
of breast cancer. Against the heightened need for support, such failures in 
support acquire greater value. In Lesley’s case, she perceived the emotional 
abandonment by her former friend as meriting the word “abuse”.
 There was one friendship that’s gone totally the other way [..] I feel she abused me [..] 
 she just wasn’t there for me and that hurt a heck of a lot, and that friendship now has 
 died. (Lesley: 30, 7-14)
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As Lesley indicates here, for many women the discrimination in friendships 
resulted in the editing of their friendship groups. Ursula expressed this as a 
decision to “clear out a few bits of dead wood” (11,19), and went on to explain 
the reasons for her choice.
 I think you can outgrow friends [..] I don’t want to waste time on people I don’t like any 
 more. (Ursula: 12,5-14)
Ursula’s account suggests that the experience of cancer has made her re-
evaluate the worth of her friendships, and within the context of a finite life, to 
make more brutal choices as to whom she spends her time with. Moreover, she 
also indicates that her own experience of growth through her cancer 
experience has given her different perspectives, which may also provide 
criteria for choosing some friends over others.
Set against one pattern of a greater valuation of friendships is another pattern, 
where there is an awareness of the lack of much-needed friends. Gilly 
described how breast cancer had exposed an absence of support among those 
people she had considered friends.
 The people you thought were friends you realised weren’t friends at all [..] I wouldn’t 
 really say any of my friends have been actually there for me. (Gilly: 26,6)
In her experience after cancer, Gilly perceives connections between her 
physical state and her different identities. She is upset at her lack of friends, 
but sees it as a result of prioritising the roles of mother and employee, within 
her current limited physical state.
 That’s what’s so sad about my life, I don’t have time for friends [..] My life’s all about 
 work, my children and going to bed. I’m too tired! (Gilly: 28,24-28)
Becky’s experience of cancer also highlighted to her how she “didn’t really 
have that many friends as such...[they were] all work acquaintances” (21,25). 
However, this had led her to begin seeking out new friendships, which offered 
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her qualities of reciprocal emotional support which she perceived had been 
missing before.
 Somebody giving you a hug when you’re down...being able to do the same for other 
 people...(Becky: 22,11)
However the state of friendships was assessed, almost all participants 
commented on the challenges of communicating with friends through cancer. 
Sometimes the challenge could be practical, as Louise mentions here.
 The winter months I was quite isolated because a number of them couldn’t see me 
 because they had infections. (Louise: 32,22)
Here, Louise’s altered embodiment appears to be affecting her identity as a 
friend, as her compromised immunological state separates her from others. At 
other times, the challenge of communication appears to lie with the complex 
personal and social constructions with which cancer is invested. Becky 
described that she was cautious in disclosing her own experience to others, as 
“people [..] I thought were close [..] just couldn’t deal with talking about 
it” (23,16). She explored her reaction to this in a complex image:
 It’s almost like [..] you’ve flashed at somebody...and you feel like you’ve exposed 
 yourself, and you really kind of wish you hadn’t. (Becky: 24,14)
The potent simile within Becky’s account of having “exposed yourself” indicates 
the depth of social shame that may be felt when the acknowledgement of 
cancer is not well received. While others’ reactions may be a function of social 
practices relating to the uneasy discussion of cancer, it also appears that 
participants often feel that much of this social awkwardness attaches to 
themselves, and by likening herself to a “flasher”, Becky appears to be 
indicating the stigmatised status she feels in such conversational situations. 
Perhaps this links with the final challenge in communication, which was noted 
by Nina.
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 You can tell your friends what’s happening, but there’s an awful lot not happening, it’s 
 just being. (Nina: 24,28)
Whatever the value of friendships, Nina appears to perceive that it is easier to 
convey the factual process of cancer than the experience of having cancer. As 
we shall see later, this qualification of the limits of the friend identity links with 
the theme of autonomy, in the third super-ordinate theme. 
In summary, the experience of breast cancer led all women to a greater 
appreciation of their identity as a friend. For some participants, this was a 
broadly positive experience, resulting in a greater appreciation of existing 
friendships. For others, the experience was more challenging, due to an 
awareness of the lack of the friendships they desired. Moreover, the 
achievement of this identity was made more difficult for all women, due to the 
communication challenges of building and maintaining friendships during 
cancer.  
3.3.5 Survivor
The identity of a cancer survivor is different from other identities mentioned 
here, in that it is self-evidently only made available through participants’ 
experience with breast cancer. It is notable that, while frequently mentioned in 
patient support literature on cancer, the identity was only raised spontaneously 
by two participants. However, in subsequent interviewer questioning, it was 
clear that many participants were aware of the identity and had reflected on it. 
This hesitancy in mentioning the identity may trace to its newer status, but it is 
also possible that it derives from the polarising reactions it provoked. While a 
few participants actively embraced the survivor identity, there were an equal 
number who violently rejected it. These differing reactions appeared to stem 
from varying definitions of the identity’s content, and the value participants 
attributed to this content.
Even amongst those who viewed the identity positively, there were differing 
conceptions of the identity’s content and their allegiance to the identity. Ursula 
defined the identity literally, as “somebody who has had cancer [..] but has not 
169
died” (37,4). Her willingness to embrace the identity seemed linked to the 
positive prognosis she had received when diagnosed.
 I’ve felt a survivor right from the start. They were that confident with me. (Ursula: 
 37,12)
Ursula’s interpretation of the survivor identity supports another identity 
described later in the third super-ordinate theme, which relates to autonomy, 
and thus the identity can be accepted. Nina also appears to accept the survivor 
identity, although with a different definition.
 ...there is always an amazing feeling of having survived it. You know, it is emotionally 
 and physically a big thing to go through, and you have done it. (Nina: 51,7)
Here, the identity of survivor is described as a euphoric feeling, derived from 
emotional and physical accomplishment. While Nina’s use of “you” rather than 
“I” suggests she may be slightly bashful about claiming the achievement, she 
perceives that being a survivor denotes the effort and wonderment of 
successfully completing cancer treatment. For Lesley, there is more uncertainty 
in claiming the survivor identity. She reflects that “I feel like I’m a survivor”, 
but then goes on to assess the grounds on which she perceives the identity to 
be based.
 I am on the Tamoxifen for five years, which is supposed to keep it at bay, if anything, 
 any nasties reoccur, but whether I’ll be totally mentally free from cancer, I don’t know. 
 (Lesley:51,5)
Lesley’s account suggests that she equates being a survivor with being both 
physically and mentally free from cancer. While she can tentatively believe her 
ongoing medication will avoid the physical recurrence of cancer, she appears to 
be less confident of leaving behind the psychological experience of cancer.
Other participants are reluctant to claim the survivor identity, believing that 
they don’t fulfil its requirements. Louise perceives that she will only be eligible 
to be a survivor “in five years’ time when I’ve had the all-clear” (59,8). She 
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uses the military imagery she employed elsewhere to describe her embodied 
engagement with cancer, suggesting that she has “survived the battle but I’m 
still on the journey” (59,19). In this way, she appears to define the identity by 
robust physical prognosis. For Gilly, being a survivor seems to be associated 
more strongly with her psychological state. She is clear that “I don’t feel I’ve 
survived it. I’m not a survivor at the moment” (79,20). While she does not 
appear to reject outright the possibility of being a survivor at some stage, she 
asserts that “I don’t think I’ve even got anywhere near the realisation, because 
you know everything’s such a whirl” (79,29). As with Ursula, the willingness to 
consider the survivor identity seems to connect with other identities; Gilly’s 
description of herself as “lost” within the third theme of the final super-
ordinate theme seems to link with her struggle to see herself as a survivor at 
this stage. 
Finally, some participants reject the survivor identity outright. Many women 
voiced the difficulty of capturing their relationship with cancer, and Becky’s 
struggle is echoed by other participants such as Lesley.
 I find it quite difficult [..] to know what to say. (Becky: 50,3)
 I never know [..] how to describe myself. (Lesley: 51,2)
However, Becky’s experience with cancer has led her to reject any cancer-
specific identities, in favour of simple description.
 I wouldn’t use any of them [..] too emotive words. (Becky: 51,27)
 I’ve said I had cancer last year. (Becky: 52,1).
Becky appears to suggest that, for her, the identity of survivor is too laden with 
feelings and connotations which she is not willing to embrace. While she does 
not elaborate on this directly in her account, it is possible her unwillingness 
relates to the intermittent depression and fear of cancer’s return, which she 
alludes to within the later theme “Assessing Autonomy”. 
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Rachel is clear and categorical that she “didn’t want to be seen as a cancer 
survivor” (52,1). Initially, she suggests that this is because she wants to move 
on from the experience of cancer, rather than have a label which is a 
continuing reminder.
 If you’re a cancer survivor, it’s almost like you’re proud that you’ve had cancer. And it’s 
 not that I’m ashamed that I’ve had cancer, it’s about wanting it to be done. (Rachel: 
 62,29)
However, this extract also raises something of the complicated, “emotive” 
connotations that the survivor identity can assume. Rather than being proud of 
the achievement of surviving cancer, Rachel seems to suggest that being a 
survivor could be seen as being proud of having cancer itself. While she 
immediately states here that she is not ashamed of having cancer, a 
subsequent comment hints at a social awareness of taking up an identity 
attached to a potentially stigmatising subject.
 I don’t want to tell everyone that I’ve had cancer [..] and that I’ve survived cancer. 
 (Rachel: 63,11)
For Rachel, and perhaps Becky, a continuing association with cancer as a 
survivor appears to be seen as allying one’s identity with something which is 
socially awkward and devalued, and thus the identity is rejected. 
In summary, the new identity of cancer survivor was one which all participants 
had considered, but which all almost found to some degree problematic. In 
part, this traced to lack of clarity regarding the content of the identity. 
Participants reflected on the varying ways in which physical survival could be 
defined, as well as considering the issue of emotional survivorship or 
psychological wellbeing after cancer. Moreover, the uneasy social status of 
cancer meant that while surviving cancer could be seen as a significant 
achievement, being a cancer survivor could also be viewed as a potentially 
stigmatising identity. As a result of these different definitions, some women 
appeared to consider expanding their identities to include the new role, while 
others explicitly rejected it.
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The second super-ordinate theme has considered how, in the wake of their 
cancer experience, women re-evaluated previous role identities and considered 
a new identity. While some change was valued, much change was experienced 
as difficult, largely due to social constructions which stigmatise cancer and 
position the display of distress as a weakness. The connection between 
embodiment and role identities has been evident in each role. However, there 
are also vital links to emotional-existential identities, which will be outlined in 
the next section.
3.4 Emotional-existential dilemmas: Re-learning what life’s all about
One definition of identity regards it as “the condition of being a specified 
person” (CED, 1984). This final super-ordinate theme addresses issues relating 
to the fundamental nature of being human, and how these issues are played 
out in an individual’s life. The experience with breast cancer appeared to ask 
these women to consider the limits of their embodied personhood, and this is 
represented in the first theme, “Facing my own mortality”. The second theme 
deals with participants’ perceptions of their own capabilities, and is entitled 
“Assessing autonomy: Strength and vulnerability”. The final theme, “Following 
a different path to before”, explores the extent to which participants experience 
breast cancer as having led them in a different direction with their lives. 
The overall title of this super-ordinate theme needs further elaboration. In 
responding to the question “Who Am I”, participants responded spontaneously 
with these emotional-existential responses, which seemed to be given the 
same weight and status in identity terms as other responses (e.g. role 
identities). Thus, this theme should not be seen in any way as inferior to other 
super-ordinate themes. Indeed, as I shall suggest at the close of this chapter, 
this might be seen as the most significant of all themes, in terms of over-
arching identity concerns. Moreover, the choice of the word “dilemma” was 
deliberate; although a somewhat hackeyed term, it does capture the 
unresolved and unsettling quality of many of these identity issues.
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3.4.1 Facing my own mortality
Participants in this study had been diagnosed with earlier rather than advanced 
cancer stagings. However, for all women this diagnosis appeared to have 
resulted in consideration of their own mortality. This consideration took several 
forms: assessment of the nature of life; understanding their own personal 
relationship with death; and taking a position on socially-raised issues which 
might be associated with their mortality. Participants’ quotes were notable for 
the variety and vividness of the imagery they employed, suggesting the 
emotional depth – and mythic nature? – of the identity issues raised.
Many participants commented on the way breast cancer brutally confronted 
them with a sense of the fragility of their lives. Becky seems to convey feelings 
of shock, horror and disbelief on receiving the diagnosis:
 How can you be okay one minute and then in the middle of a nightmare the next? 
 (Becky: 34,2)
In her account, Becky describes the speed with which her perception of life 
changes. By employing the image of a nightmare, she seems to imply that the 
cancer feels almost unreal: a bad dream, where definitions of reality are 
distorted and frightening. Zoe’s account also emphasises the speed and impact 
of being diagnosed with cancer, but here the image is one of being violently 
assaulted:
 And then you get hit, you find that out, and everything changes. You can never go back 
 to being like that, never. (Zoe: 6,33-7,2)
Zoe seems to be suggesting that her sense of life and living has been 
fundamentally and comprehensively (“everything”) changed by her contact 
with cancer. Her reiteration of the word “never” perhaps conveys her sense of 
the impossibility of un-knowing this knowledge: that cancer has brought about 
irrevocable change in the nature of her existence. Louise finds the sense of 
fragility captured not just through before-after temporal differences, but also 
through real-time comparisons with another.
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 And she [Jade Goody] was the flipside of the coin. This is like me fighting it to survive, 
 but this is what can happen. And I remember the day she died, I can remember just 
 thinking, where’s she gone? Where’s she gone now? Coz in my mind it was so close to 
 what could happen to me... (Louise: 38, 4-9)
Louise’s image of the flipped coin evokes the idea of an impersonal fate, in 
which mortality is decided in the lucky toss of a coin. In taking up media 
coverage of Jade Goody’s death, Louise explores a cancer experience which 
parallels her own in time, but which leads to a different outcome. The 
rhetorical questions in her account indicate her own struggle to comprehend 
the mystery of death, and how an embodied being like herself can disappear.
Louise’s comments link to a second aspect of this theme. The experience of 
cancer required participants to consider their own personal relationship to 
death. For many women, this was a dark and difficult area, and their 
descriptions hint at the emotions of fear and sadness underlying their 
experience. Becky appears to describe a sense of lost innocence and 
confidence, where she no longer perceives that she has the power she thought 
she possessed.
 It made me face my own mortality [..] before that you just go on like a child, thinking 
 you’re invincible. (Becky: 8,21)
Becky’s two images suggest different aspects of her experience. In her phrase 
“face my own mortality”, the physical sense of “facing” someone may allude to 
a different placement towards death; almost a feeling of squaring up to death, 
both physically and psychologically. Becky contrasts this new stance with her 
perception of herself pre-cancer, and the image of a child appears to mark her 
sense of having aged in her attitudes and identity. Other participants echoed 
similar experiences. Gilly described feeling frightened at “the thought of death 
closer to me” (60,17), and this image appears to evoke the sense of death as a 
presence which is now in much greater proximity to her.  Like Louise, Gilly 
made use of media accounts to provide perspective on her own experience.
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 I thought sixty was young to die [..] but then look at Natasha Richardson, you know, she 
 dies of skiing. (Gilly: 61,7) 
Gilly seems to suggest that her own experience of death seeming closer is not 
excessively pessimistic, given the death of the actress in her forties. Whilst she 
previously appeared to consider death as something which occurred at an older 
age, the possibility of death at a much younger age now seems much more 
present to her. This is something which Zoe also addresses directly.
 The only thing that we’re sure of in our life, that one day we’re going to die. I suppose I 
 were being a bit premature then, but...you don’t want to die when you’re forty or thirty-
 nine, do you? You want to see your kids grow up [..] You’re faced with that...and I’m not 
 ready for it, I just want...so I think I’ve aged in that way. (Zoe: 9,3-9)
Linking with her earlier description of experiencing her body as much older, 
Zoe considers here how she feels herself to have aged psychologically, through 
contemplating existential issues such as death before the normal time. Zoe 
seems to capture here much of the dilemma for many of the younger woman 
participants, where active involvement in mid-life identities such as being a 
mother or work colleague is abruptly juxtaposed with the possibility of the end 
of life. The difficulty many participants found in recognising this new, mortal 
self appears to be captured in the switch between “I” and “you”; for example, 
in her extract here, Zoe could be interpreted as using the you-form to embody 
the alternative death scenario (“you don’t want to die”), with the “I” being 
used for her own present situation (“I’m not ready for it”).
While many participants were fearful of the possibilities of more imminent 
death, some women described a more benign stance towards their mortality. 
Ursula viewed herself as “lucky” (1,8).
 This potentially dreadful thing’s happened, but [..] it’s happened in a way that’s not 
 going to kill me. (Ursula: 3,2)
Here, Ursula’s description of the “potentially dreadful thing” appears to 
resonate with scary monster evoked in the first theme, and indeed the “thing” 
seems to have the agency to “kill” her. However, Ursula’s diagnosis of early 
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stage breast cancer, and her confidence in her doctors’ opinions, meant that 
she perceived cancer as not being connected with death for her personally.
 Had the utmost confidence in the doctors when they said it’s not going to kill you [..] 
 never [..] at that point where I’d think, oh God, I’ve got cancer [..] therefore I’d better 
 make a complete lifestyle change. (Ursula: 18,26)
Ursula’s experience of mortality appears to differ from previous accounts, in 
that while she conceives of it as a possibility, she does not describe 
experiencing it in such present and personal terms. This difference in sense of 
mortality, and sense of clarity of prognosis, seems to link to Ursula’s readiness 
to take up the identity of a cancer survivor, as mentioned in the second super-
ordinate theme. However, another participant seemed to draw reassurance not 
from a distancing from mortality, but from engagement with death. Within the 
super-ordinate theme of Embodiment, I presented Lesley’s account of the new 
strength she perceived in her body after cancer; here, Lesley appears to 
connect this new embodied identity with an altered approach to mortality.
 My body obviously fights these things...you know, me mother says I’m a cat with nine 
 lives... (Lesley: 5,26) 
By employing the image of the “cat with nine lives”, Lesley suggests that she is 
a creature for whom death will come, but that it has not been her time so far. 
In the symbolism of the lucky cat, Lesley perhaps alludes to some element of 
good fortune in her situation, but she also reflects on the power of her own 
body to resist death. 
Finally, in facing their mortality, many participants appeared to be confronted 
with social commentaries concerning life practices and cancer. Rachel talked of 
the difficulty she experienced reconciling her previously healthy lifestyle with 
the cancer diagnosis.
 People have said to me, you’re the healthiest person I know [..] so that’s just made me 
 think, is that just a load of rubbish? (Rachel: 21,20)
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Within a general society which promotes eating patterns and exercise to 
prevent cancer, Rachel seems to emphasise her scepticism through the use of 
extremes (“healthiest”-“rubbish”). Nina also questioned the value of 
information supplied after diagnosis, concerning environmental factors which 
were potentially linked to cancer.
 They [..] talked about a lot of things you can change: your diet [..] whether you use 
 perfume. I don’t want all that information. I don’t want to feel that I’ve got to change 
 everything, because nobody knows what it is. (Nina: 43,7) 
In her repeated use of the phrase “I don’t want”, Nina appears to convey 
frustration with socially-recommended practices which she perceives might 
have a significant impact on her life, but cannot be shown to have an impact 
on mortality. There is perhaps also a sense of anger with the way cancer 
becomes an individual responsibility, which parallels the way in which cancer 
can be represented socially through the stigmatising of individuals: in its 
extreme, cancer becomes a personal “choice” or judgement. However, Ursula 
viewed these same practices differently, and made the decision to change her 
diet and take up more exercise.
 
 Why trust everything to luck, if there’s something that I can do that might make a 
 difference. (Ursula: 5,9)
In what might be seen as a qualification of her previously articulated sense of 
good fortune, Ursula seemed to believe such practices worth trying in case 
they do positively impact her mortality.
 
In summary, the experience of breast cancer appears to have asked 
participants to assess where they stood, in relation to death. This identity is 
related to, but not the same as, the issues of embodiment described in the first 
super-ordinate theme. Here, the embodied nature of the women is the starting 
point for existential questions concerning mortality, and their associated 
emotions. Participants commented on significant changes in this area of 
identity: their new sense of the fragility of their human existence, and how – 
for the majority of women – they experienced a different proximity to death 
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after cancer. Social practices such as diet and exercise were assessed for utility 
and value in coping with their mortality.
3.4.2 Assessing autonomy: Strength and vulnerability
 As a result of breast cancer, almost all participants appeared to experience 
altered perceptions of their own capabilities. For some participants – or for 
some qualities within an individual participant – this change was minor, and 
involved only reaffirmation of previously held perceptions. At other times, the 
experience of cancer added a significant new awareness of capabilities. These 
changes fall into two broad areas: those where capability was perceived to 
have been enhanced, to which I have given the overall title of “Strength”; and 
those where capability is perceived to have been diminished, entitled 
“Vulnerability”. It is worth noting that perceptions of both strength and 
vulnerability were often experienced within the same participant. 
3.4.2.1 Strength
Some participants suggested that their experience of cancer had reinforced 
their sense of personal capability. Ursula viewed herself as a “tough old 
bird” (42,26), who had always looked after herself and got on with life. Coming 
through breast cancer seemed to have affirmed this identity, representing a 
personal achievement against a formidable challenge which endowed her with 
particular status.
 In a morbid kind of way, a bit special, because [..] I’m one of a small group of people 
 that have had breast cancer and survived. (Ursula: 48,33)
For Gilly, breast cancer had provided further evidence of her ability to survive 
despite very difficult circumstances.
 Against all the odds, losing lots of money through relationships [..] no support, I’ve 
 brought up two beautiful children and kept my head above water. (Gilly, 34,11-16)
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In links with her identities as mother and employee, Gilly appears to see 
herself as “successful” (34,9) due to her ability to support her children and to 
keep going, in the face of what she perceives as particularly demanding events 
(“against the odds”).
However, for some women these perceptions of strength were more 
problematic. Rachel asserted that “I feel that I’ve coped with it [breast cancer] 
very well” (50,18), but then acknowledged issues she had perceived to be 
associated with such coping.
 It’s this terrible thing, it’s kind of like a sense that I’ve...I’m strong because I ...don’t 
 really need any help...and it’s in such a contrast of this feeling of being alone and 
 wanting to be around people...(Rachel: 50,28)
Rachel seems to be raising questions about the appropriateness – and value? – 
of this sense of being strong, in that this identity appears not to enable her to 
voice her loneliness or need for support: a distressing paradox she names “this 
terrible thing”. In equating the social performance of being strong with the not 
asking for help, Rachel appears to be inferring social rules required for valued 
public behaviour; this echoes Zoe’s experience in her work identity, where she 
described how she was concerned about displaying her distress within the 
office environment. Louise describes similar issues with the quality of bravery, 
and suggests that such issues may arise from a social context which values 
particular behaviours.
 They say, ...you’ve gone through, you’re on your own, you’re so brave. (Louise: 43,29)
 
 I am brave as in I don’t let the side down, telling them all (Louise: 44,2)
 They don’t realise that when they left I probably would be in floods of tears, because I 
 was putting on. (Louise: 45,4)
In these extracts, Louise highlights the difference between friends’ definition of 
her bravery, and her own understanding of this term. Within the wider social 
context, she perceives others to define her bravery by her ability to cope 
without the support of a close partner. However, Louise’s personal definition of 
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bravery appears to involve keeping the difficult experiences of cancer away 
from her friends. She seems to allude to a sense of informal codes of 
performance which require such behaviour (“I don’t let the side down”), 
resulting in a discrepancy between her public display and privately-held 
emotions (“I was just putting on”). Indeed, Louise later questions the true 
substance of this strength, suggesting that – on external requirements for 
bravery - another way of viewing this quality might be to judge her a 
creditable performer.
 I’m brave as in, either that or a good actress. (Louise: 45,19)
Louise’s comments appear to link this identity with that of being a friend, which 
– as described earlier - she highly values. However, these statements also 
reinforce previously mentioned issues concerning communication within 
friendships, as well as highlighting the way social context can constrain the 
realisation of individual identities.
An important change for some participants was greater self-respect. Rachel 
described how, through the requirement to cope with an experience as 
significant as cancer, she had felt more able to assert her own needs.
 I’m a bit less prepared to put up with the, where you know in the past I would never 
 have said anything [..] It’s been like every one of my friends has had a big thing going 
 on [..] there’s been part of me which has thought, yeah, but I’ve got cancer. (Rachel: 
 56,18-30)
Rachel’s account suggests that she perceives the experience of coping with 
cancer to be a greater challenge than those experienced by her friends. This 
has made her less willing to accept inadequate support from others.  Becky 
describes a similar change, but attributes this difference not to comparison 
with others but – in a link to the previous subordinate theme - with her 
heightened awareness of mortality.
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 More able to say that now [..] if they don’t like it, tough [..] Life’s too short to waste 
 time being with negative people [..] not people who are down or upset or frightened... 
 [..] generally, right miseries, you know. (Becky: 12,8-18)
Here, Becky describes how breast cancer has given her a sense of life’s brevity, 
and this has given her greater confidence to choose to be with certain kinds of 
people. Moreover, this choice might be seen as a virtuous circle which 
reinforces her sense of strength, as Becky mentions that she aims to “be with 
nice people who are positive [..] making me feel positive...everything is geared 
towards being kind to myself” (13,3).
3.4.2.2 Vulnerability
While participants often described their capabilities as being reaffirmed or 
strengthened through the experience of cancer, there was also frequent 
mention of the ways in which cancer was perceived to have negatively affected 
their ability to cope. Louise describes her general sense of loss, and her 
feelings of being unfairly treated by life.
 I kind of felt cheated that I’d literally found happiness and then I got this. I felt cheated 
 that I was too young to have this and I felt cheated that it’s, it stole my body, and um. 
 And I felt cheated as well that I um didn’t have a family that was there, too...(Louise: 
 42,26-31)
The iteration of the phrase “I felt cheated” seems to convey the extent of 
Louise’s anger: that cancer has arrived at an unusually young age, and has 
both taken away things she prized (her body; her happiness) and exposed her 
lack of family support. Moreover, in the phrase “it stole”, Louise seems to 
experience cancer as a malign thief, who has swindled her out of things which 
were rightfully hers. While Louise has elsewhere suggested her sense of being 
brave, she indicates here that her sense of autonomy has been compromised 
by life events, and this has been particularly highlighted through her 
experience with cancer. Rachel also described how having a mastectomy had 
left her with a different sense of unhappiness from before cancer.
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 It’s different from how I’m ordinarily unhappy because there’s an actual reason, rather 
 than just get quite low [..] it was something that I couldn’t control. (Rachel: 35,14-18)
Rachel’s comments suggest that while this qualitatively different unhappiness 
traces partly to being grounded specifically in cancer, it also links to her sense 
of loss of autonomy: she has had no choice about having cancer. In both 
participants’ accounts, then, cancer appears to be presented as something 
definite and solid, a force to be reckoned with.
All women described feeling vulnerable, in their fear that the breast cancer 
might return.  Becky mentioned how this new anxiety had disrupted previous 
activities such as reading or focussing at work, and the dimension of the fear 
she feels is accentuated by her choice of the adjective “dreadful”.
 Really hard for me to sit and think about [..] I have a dreadful fear [..] that if it comes 
 back it’s not gonna be quite so simple as it was the first time. (Becky: 43,26)
As alluded to earlier, it is possible that this sense of vulnerability is what makes 
the survivor identity so difficult for many women, for whom the sense of fear is 
particularly present. Zoe touched upon another aspect of this vulnerability: the 
discrepancy between her outwardly cheerful behaviour and her inwardly fearful 
thoughts.
 I try and be positive...and I say positive things, but I know in my heart of hearts that 
 I’m just being realistic, and thinking, well, it could happen, because it’s happened 
 already [..] I put that act on, but when it’s just night time, or when I’m on me own...I 
 can’t hide from that, it’s there in me mind...(Zoe: 14,5-31) 
Zoe suggests that she makes an effort, both for herself and for others, to 
believe that she will not have breast cancer again; she equates this with being 
“positive”. However, while performing “that act” may reassure others, she 
seems to say that private experience of fear of recurrence is not something 
from which she can escape. Moreover, whilst the use of the phrase “I can’t 
hide” has resonance with the inescapable nature of our mortality in the 
previous theme, it also connects with the mythic, monster-like quality of 
cancer alluded to within the first super-ordinate theme.
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In summary, the experience of breast cancer appeared both to enhance and 
diminish participants’ sense of their capabilities, in differing but often inter-
connected ways. Coping with the physical and emotional demands of cancer 
led many participants to perceive in themselves a new or reaffirmed strength; 
however, this experience also appeared to have thrown up areas of 
vulnerability, where fear and unhappiness seemed ultimately to trace to lack of 
autonomy or control. 
3.4.3 Following a different path to before
All participants described how the experience of cancer led them to review 
where they found meaning in their lives. This aspect of identity appeared to 
have a wide significance, affecting the range of a person’s other identities, yet 
operating at a level above them. For some women, cancer seemed to have 
wholly or partly overturned previous meanings in a destructive way; others 
were excited by new meanings found through the experience with cancer, while 
yet others described a more modest adjustment to meaning. 
Gilly observed that her experience of breast cancer had left her feeling totally 
“lost” (53,5).
 I am a mother, I am a very hard-working person, I am a teacher, I’m all those things, 
 but I don’t know who I am any more. (Gilly: 5,22)
Gilly’s comment indicates that she perceives her self – the “I”- to be in some 
ways distinct from the occupant of the roles of mother or teacher. This 
experience of being suggests that role identities are a necessary but not 
sufficient part of our total identity as a person; that there is something else 
which adds coherence and meaning to these individual identities, which may be 
hazarded as a set of personal characteristics, values or beliefs. In her 
interview, Gilly repeatedly stated that her experience with cancer had totally 
overturned her sense of these linking or over-arching values, leaving her 
without bearings in an utterly disordered world.
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 I just don’t know who I am any more [..] my whole world is upside down. (Gilly: 
 2,6-10).
Many women noted how life had taken on a bittersweet quality, which affected 
both their role identities and this overarching sense of self. Louise captured the 
change in her overall self in describing how “I’ll be going back to the life I had, 
but I won’t be the same person” (Louise: 30,32). Here, I understood Louise to 
suggest that while she would be occupying similar roles to her life before 
cancer, she would be holding different values and sensibilities to those roles: 
while the roles remained the same, the content had changed. She was 
categorical in rejecting the frequently-raised idea of cancer as a gift which 
enhanced life; however, she felt that cancer had helped her better appreciate 
everyday things, because they meant she was alive.
 They’re actually glad they went through it, and I was, my God, what was your life like 
 before? (Louise: 20,8)
 I’ll always appreciate it because I’ll know what the flipside is [..] however bad life, 
 whatever throws at me in life, I’ll always think, it’s nothing compared to what I went 
 through. So I’ll always appreciate life, so when I open that wardrobe door and 
 everything in that wardrobe fits me, I gonna so appreciate it. I’m gonna appreciate 
 getting into bed and getting out of it in the morning and washing my hair and blow-
 drying it. (Louise: 53,31-54,7).  
For Louise, the change in meaning appears to trace to a different significance 
which future activities will take after cancer. She perceives that new problems 
will seem of lesser scale when compared with her struggle with cancer, while 
previously mundane activities such as blow-drying hair acquire greater value, 
as they are a sign of living an apparently cancer-free life. In this sense, 
Louise’s meaning seems to be drawn from imagining comparisons with her 
previous experience. Zoe’s sense of new meaning is also derived from 
comparisons to her cancer experience.
 People have said to me, like my sister said to me, you know it makes you, it changes 
 you coz it makes you appreciate every day and live for today [..] and that’s fine, it’s 
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 thinking all that, but...the reason why I’m thinking all that is because it might not be, 
 you know. The  dread of ...it all coming back...(Zoe: 21,26)
Zoe describes how she is enjoying spending more time with her children, but in 
the extract above she suggests that appreciation of such daily activities arises 
not from joyful comparison with the past which Louise experienced, but from 
fearful comparison with a possible future. Moreover, in an echo of Louise’s 
comments above, Zoe appears to struggle with social discourses which position 
cancer as a gift, as she finds cancer not only intensifies but also limits her 
appreciation of life.
Other participants described how cancer led them to reposition their overall 
sense of self. Rachel explicitly acknowledged this process of re-evaluation. 
 People say you know they evaluate their life [..] whereas actually I feel I don’t have a 
 lot of things left that I wanted to do and haven’t done [..] The only thing that I would 
 feel I have missed out on [..] I would like to be in a relationship coz I really would like 
 to have kids. (Rachel: 43,13-26)
Here, Rachel appears to be deriving meaning from her life from an assessment 
of her accomplishments. Rather than perceiving significant change in her sense 
of self, Rachel describes how cancer has reinforced the importance she 
attaches to the particular role identities of partner and mother. However, Nina 
is clear that her overall sense of self has changed through her experience with 
cancer. 
 It’s just having a new identity, having a new um feeling of being normal, but it’s just a 
 different normal from how it was before. (Nina: 33,13)
Like Gilly and Louise, Nina appears to perceive some over-arching sense of 
self, which is different from that which she had experienced before cancer. Her 
comments suggest that re-establishment of this new equilibrium is one of the 
difficulties following a disease such as cancer, when so much change is 
required in the multiple identities a person holds. Nina mentions that, in 
creating this new normal, she has chosen to take up new roles which amplify 
186
her previous identities; however, she observes that she feels she has lost 
something of her earlier power and potential.
 
 I have made an effort to do more things for myself than before. I’ve joined an art 
 group [..] what I did before was I had friends, went out and was a mum...(Nina: 
 34,15)
 I do feel ...a bit of a shadow of my former self. It’s slightly ...a lost dreams kind of 
 thing [..] I just don’t think I would be as ambitious with myself and what I want to do 
 next as I probably would have been before. (Nina: 29,21)
In this first extract, Nina suggests that cancer has led her to develop identities 
which are more expressive of her personal talents, such as membership of an 
art group. Thus it seems that, in this respect, her experience has encouraged 
her to effect greater realisation of her individual capabilities. By contrast, 
Nina’s description of feeling a “shadow of my former self” indicates that she 
has a sense of an overarching self which has been weakened by cancer: 
indeed, she reflects that “I don’t think we can cope some of the time” (29,3). 
Thus in links to the subordinate theme of autonomy, Nina’s perception of her 
greater vulnerability has led her to redefine her global sense of self, and to 
reduce her ambitions accordingly; this space between previous and present 
self-identity has left her with a gap which she captures in the phrase “lost 
dreams”.
Finally, there were participants who appeared to find enabling and inspiring 
meaning through their cancer experience. Becky described how she was 
“pulled up short and put on a different path to the one I was going down 
blindfolded (18,5), indicating both the sudden and fundamental nature of the 
change and her sense of an alternative path enhanced by new vision. Having 
discussed a significant shift in focus from career to building friendships through 
wider interests such as music and theatre, Becky elaborates further on this 
change:
 ...this whole experience of realising life’s short [..] I realise now exactly what is 
 important and people are important and I didn’t really think that before...(Becky: 
 4,8-12)
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 ...it’s good to talk to people, it’s good to share experiences, it’s good to find out new 
 things,  um it’s good to have friends and people who like you and that makes you feel 
 good. (Becky: 4,24-7)
From her emphases in these extracts, Becky indicates that cancer has raised 
the existential issues of mortality and isolation, and she now places much 
greater value on the support of others. However, she also seems to convey 
something at the phenomenological level: a new discovery of the pleasure of 
relating to others, and the feeling of being appreciated by others and engaged 
with others (“it’s good to share experiences...that makes you feel good”). This 
sense of being alive to possibilities appears to be a key change from her 
earlier, more critical approach.
 Instead of beating myself and other people up, I now embrace [..] life...and that’s the 
 key difference. (Becky: 52,17)
The desire to embrace life was something which Lesley also recognised in her 
account. The enhanced awareness of her mortality enabled her to develop a 
more concrete understanding of what she valued, and the frequent use of 
terminology such as “I want” and “I managed” in the following extract perhaps 
indicates her greater determination and passion to achieve these things.
 I want to be able to say, I’ve done everything I wanted to do with this life, and I 
 managed to do it, whether it’s seeing the world, whether it’s helping more unfortunate 
 people than myself, I want to be saying, I’ve lived my life to the full. (Lesley: 16-20)
But there was also a further level of meaning which Lesley perceived in her 
experience with cancer, and which she described in connection with her choice 
to pursue new employment working with disabled children.
 I believe there is a reason why I’m still here. And I believe....I’m still here because 
 ....there’s something I still have to do, and in my opinion it is to help other people as 
 much as I can,  whether they’re disabled or a friend in need. I just feel that because I’ve 
 come through....and I have got this strength, that I have to be there now for others. 
 (Lesley: 10,1-7). 
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Lesley appears to connect her cancer prognosis to a belief that there is an 
ongoing fundamental purpose to her life in this world. Although this is not 
explicitly mentioned in her interview, her account suggests a sense of a 
mission consistent with a religious approach to existence. Rather than being 
alienated from existence through an awareness of her mortality, Lesley seems 
to have found that cancer has given her a stronger connection to life, through 
awareness of a deeper purpose.
In summary, all participants reported that their experience of breast cancer 
caused them to assess the meaning of their lives. All participants described 
change, although the scale of this change varied considerably across the 
women according to their personal circumstances. Moreover, while issues such 
as accommodation to mortality, sense of autonomy and ability to fulfil role 
identities were implicated in this change, the importance and value attached to 
each issue varied by participant, resulting in individual conclusions as to the 
negative or positive nature of the change.
This final super-ordinate theme has considered wide-ranging identities which 
relate to the condition of being human. These emotional-existential identities 
involved the women taking positions regarding their mortality, their capabilities 
and the personal meaning of their lives. As with the second theme, there are 
many examples of life-enhancing change; however, the majority of changes 
seem to have been experienced as difficult and un-desired. 
3.5 Drawing together the super-ordinate themes
Before relating participants’ experience to theoretical literature in the final 
chapter, I felt that this analysis would not be complete without consideration of 
wider relationships between the various super-ordinate and subordinate 
themes, which emerged from my interpretation of these women’s accounts. 
These comments consist of five points, although each point also has 
implications for the others. 
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Firstly, although there was a high level of commonality in the kinds of identities 
being reviewed, the degree and nature of change differed within the participant 
group. The majority of participants reported a large degree of change across 
the range of their identities. However, there were two women – Ursula and 
Rachel – whose descriptions suggested that the degree of change experienced 
within many identities was less significant than for others. Looking at the 
overall nature of change, there were some changes in embodiment or 
emotional-existential identities which participants viewed positively. Yet, 
considered as a whole, it appeared that the majority of the transitions were 
difficult and painful ones.
Secondly, it appears from these accounts that participants’ overall sense of 
identity, as well as their potential for role identities, is fundamentally grounded 
in the body. “Challenges to embodiment” highlights how identity is linked to 
the appearance, sensing and functioning of the women’s bodies; indeed, one of 
the major issues of a disease such as cancer may be the difficulties it poses for 
these foundations of our identities, which are less provocatively confronted in 
the routine of an ostensibly healthy life. I have therefore chosen to present the 
super-ordinate theme of Embodiment at the beginning of the Analysis, as the 
change and continuity in identities arises initially out of this embodied state.
The third point relates to the environment surrounding this body. Although this 
research focussed on the idiographic analysis of an individual psychological 
phenomenon, I have been very aware of evidence of how the social context 
has shaped these women’s experience.  All participants and all themes show 
conscious and subconscious use of social material, through social practices or 
employment of social discourses. This analysis has aimed to draw out some of 
these issues. For example, one major issue running throughout this chapter 
has been the ongoing stigmatisation of cancer, and the way this influences 
fulfilment of certain identities for younger women. Another example is the way 
in which emotions such as distress can be negatively associated with desired 
social attributes such as strength. By showing sadness or grief, participants 
appear to worry that they will be additionally devalued in social contexts. Both 
these issues may be seen to be linked within an over-arching discourse of 
bodily self-control. 
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Fourthly, I feel it is important to make some comment about the third super-
ordinate theme.  At the end of the research interviews, I asked each 
participant to rank those two or three identities which they felt were most 
salient or significant for them at that time. These choices are highlighted in 
Appendix 13. While a quantitative measure of salience is neither scientifically 
warranted not appropriate to the method of this study, I felt it was an 
important aspect of individuals’ experience that at least one of the salient 
identities for each woman came from within the final super-ordinate theme; 
moreover, this theme had substantially more salient identities that the other 
two themes. These choices suggest that the emotional-existential issues 
highlighted in this theme are at the core of women’s lived experience of breast 
cancer, and raise important questions for the nature of identity and therapy.
The final point relates to the structure of this analysis, and indeed the 
phenomenon of changing identities after breast cancer. Although I believe – 
after much thought – that the chosen conceptual groupings represent a 
legitimate, coherent and rigorous construction of the accounts presented to 
me, I was also aware of the intricate web of connections between subordinate 
and super-ordinate themes. An obvious example is the subordinate theme of 
“Facing my own mortality”. While I believed its existential content led the 
theme to fit best within the third super-ordinate theme, there were also clear 
connections to the first super-ordinate theme of “Challenges to embodiment”. 
There are other, more detailed linkages, and I have aimed to illustrate a few of 
these within the Analysis. However, I am aware that it is not possible to do 
justice to the complexity of this web, nor perhaps to the dialectical 
relationships between the various identities. 
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4 Discussion 
 You cannot take a life out of history [...] life-history and history, 
 psychology and politics, are deeply intertwined. (Gilligan, 1982: xi)
 
______________________________________________________
4.1 Overview
In this Discussion, I shall propose that the nature of change and continuity in 
identities after cancer can helpfully be understood as “biographical 
disruption” (Bury, 1982). As Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009: 113) describe, it 
is “in the nature of IPA that the interviews and analysis will have taken you 
into new and unanticipated territory.” In making sense of the shape and scale 
of this territory, I found myself looking for ‘maps’ of identity which could help 
explain the new landscape. I shall argue that the broad change in embodied, 
role and emotional-existential identities is usefully accounted for by the 
framework of biographical disruption. While concepts such as “identity 
projects” (Harre, 1983) are restricted to a particular area of activity, the wider 
range of biographical disruption provides a better fit with the phenomenon 
experienced by my participants. 
Furthermore, as the notion of biographical disruption was developed within the 
discipline of sociology, it is more explicitly oriented to issues of context and 
discourse. As a researcher, one of the unexpected aspects of the analysis was 
the extent to which discourses of bodily self-control and stigma occurred 
throughout participants’ accounts of identities. In their assessment of 
meaning-making and cancer, Collie and Long (2005) propose that dominant 
discourses can greatly constrain the meanings available to individuals, and 
advocate that research raises awareness of the way in which forms of speaking 
can impact experience. Mindful of the research criteria which Yardley (2000) 
outlined, I felt that proper sensitivity to context required greater attention to 
these questions of discourse. The framework of biographical disruption 
enhanced such an enquiry, as it enabled me to unpack participants’ use of 
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discursive material regarding the control of the body, and to do so more 
productively than within a cognitively-focussed concept, such as that of 
“threatened identities” (Breakwell, 1986). 
This chapter begins by explaining the concept of biographical disruption, and 
describing how it illuminates the overall findings of this study. Theory relating 
to discourses of control and the body is then introduced and related to general 
issues of biographical disruption. This leads to more detailed consideration of 
the ways in which disruption in embodied, role and emotional-existential 
identities is intertwined with particular manifestations of discourse concerning 
body control. Finally, I draw some general conclusions about this particular 
phenomenon of biographical disruption. The chapter then moves to an 
evaluation of the study and its implications for counselling psychology, before 
concluding with a final elaboration of reflexive issues.
4.2 Continuity and change as biographical disruption 
4.2.1 The relevance of biographical disruption
As Charmaz (1983; 1995) and Frank (1991) have argued, a diagnosis of 
cancer does not only affect a person’s physical being, but also their sense of 
self and their connections to their wider world. In developing the concept of 
biographical disruption, Bury (1982) sought to describe and explain these 
wide-scale and inter-linking changes which chronic illness can bring about. 
Such changes, Bury proposed, could be seen as centring in three main areas: 
disruptions in taken for granted assumptions about the body; disruptions in 
explanatory frameworks, such as questions of causality of disease and life 
meaning; and disruption of material and social resources available for the 
creation of the self. Wilson (2007) described how this biographical disruption 
can be manifested either through the development of new identities or through 
the re-formulation of previously-held identities.
The concept of biographical disruption is therefore of direct relevance to this 
research, in several ways. Firstly, the direct correspondence between the kinds 
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of change in identities reported in this study and those theorised in 
biographical disruption helps illuminate the nature of change which breast 
cancer can bring about. Change in identities following breast cancer is not 
restricted to a single role, not even to a particular aspect of identity, such as 
embodiment. Instead, a person experiences disruption across the arc of their 
life. As such, the notion of biography is helpful in two ways. Firstly, as 
Riessman (2003) describes, it suggests how the universal characteristics such 
as mortality and the physical body are inextricably bound up with cultural 
location and individual meaning-making. Indeed, though I believe the 
individual super-ordinate themes are a useful and meaningful explanatory 
device in this study, they also conceal the profound relationships between 
embodied, role and emotional-existential aspects of an individual’s biography. 
Secondly, the notion of biographical disruption directs attention to the extent of 
work required by individuals diagnosed with cancer. Research which focuses on 
explicating a single identity, or on overarching issues of meaning, may miss the 
scale of the detailed and often distressing work across a wide range of 
identities, which is required in the re-negotiation of life with cancer. Indeed, as 
Mathieson and Stam (1995: 284) suggest, identities can be seen as “the 
vehicle for making sense of, not just an illness, but a life”.
In dimensionalising the wide-scale nature of change in identities following 
cancer, this study reinforces recent research which suggested that cancer 
should be considered as a chronic illness. Early studies of biographical 
disruption focused on illnesses such as multiple sclerosis (Robinson, 2010), 
diabetes (Kelleher, 1988) and rheumatoid arthritis (Bury, 1982). However, 
Hubbard, Kidd and Kearney (2010) have argued that cancer should not be 
seen as an acute disease whose impact ends with completion of treatment, but 
rather as a disease which has an extensive and ongoing impact on individuals’ 
lives. This view is supported by issues of biographical disruption found in 
recent studies with persons with colorectal cancer (Manderson, 2005; 
Rozmovits & Ziebland, 2004). It is also reinforced by quantitative studies from 
outside the field, such as the survey by Ganz et al (1996) which described 
impact on personal and sexual identities which persists years after diagnosis. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the experience of biographical disruption 
in this study was reported by women with early stage (i.e. less advanced) 
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breast cancer, and therefore experience of change may not be 
straightforwardly connected to longevity of disease symptoms or disease 
staging. Instead, explanations of the biographical disruption experienced here 
may be more usefully linked to issues of context, as Carricaburu and Pierret 
(1995) have suggested. For the women in this study, disruption appeared 
deeply linked to the unusually young age at which breast cancer was 
diagnosed, and also to the particular significance of the disease of cancer 
itself: an issue which I will explore later. 
Developing the theory of biographical disruption, Bury (1991) suggested that 
there are two main ways in which persons seek to normalise their identities. 
The first style of management involved efforts to keep pre-illness identities 
intact, through strategies of minimising or denying change brought about by a 
disease. The second style involved the development of altered identities, 
through incorporation of changes drawn from illness. These two broad 
categories of response have been echoed in other literature focussing both on 
the lived experience and cognitive processing of trauma (Charmaz, 1995; 
Breakwell, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). While styles in the management of 
identities were not an explicit focus on this research, these broad patterns of 
responses may help explain the different levels of change reported by some 
participants. The lower level of overall change in identities reported by Ursula 
and Rachel may relate to a desire to preserve their pre-illness biography, while 
the wider changes described by other participants may indicate their 
motivation to make sense of the illness through altering their self image. 
However, there is an alternative explanation for these differing responses. 
Studies of chronic illness (Carricaburu & Pierret, 1995; Pound, Gompertz & 
Ebrahim, 1998) suggest that biographical disruption is not a universal 
experience, and that the impact of illness may be affected by personal factors, 
such as previous hardship in life. While Rachel and Ursula did describe changes 
in many areas of their identities, the nature of the events in their personal 
backgrounds (not explicitly covered in this research) may have reduced the 
scale of change they experienced compared with other participants.
Finally, as previously mentioned, the notion of biography suggests the 
impossibility of separating the meaning of an event from its context. Bury 
195
(1991) argues that there are two types of meaning to be drawn from chronic 
illness. The first are the practical consequences for the individual: how the 
symptoms and physical sequelae of disease are logistically to be managed in 
daily life. The second is what Bury terms the “significance” of disease. This 
relates to the particular connotations and imagery of a condition, and the way 
these connotations are reflected in the manner individuals perceive 
themselves, and understand others to be perceiving them. While there is 
inevitably some messiness between the boundaries of these two types of 
meaning, I believe that this idea of significance can be used to draw deeper 
understanding of the changes in identities described in this research. For these 
participants, the significance of cancer can be understood to relate to wider 
social discourses about control of the body. In his overview of research in the 
field of biographical disruption, Williams (2000) proposed that future studies 
should “pay greater attention to the timing, context and circumstances within 
which illnesses are ‘normalised’ or problematised’, and the manner in which 
identities are threatened or affirmed...” (2000: 62). In order to throw further 
light on the context of changes in identities in this study, I will therefore briefly 
review broader discourses about the control of the body. Discussion will then 
consider the nature of biographical disruption in each of the main super-
ordinate themes, with attention to the ways in which participants’ experience 
within each theme is shaped by the presence and use of these discourses.
4.2.2 Linking biographical disruption to the control of the body
In her extensive survey of the way the body is perceived in medicine, Lupton 
(2003) argues that, in Western societies, the body does not usually come into 
conscious being unless illness or pain is experienced. However, as I have 
discussed elsewhere (Nelson, Smith & Nicolson, 2010), such separation of 
mind and body inherent in our common practices become problematic when a 
person experiences illness. In such instances, it becomes clear that the body is 
the foundation of changes to identities; that it is “our general medium for 
having a world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/62:169). Recent scholarship has become 
increasingly interested in this social aspect of embodiment, and the ways in 
which a body is not merely a given reality, but a product of certain kinds of 
knowledge and discourses which are subject to change. 
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As Foucault (1980) proposes, the body can be seen as the site of political and 
ideological control. Through educational, legal and medical systems, a state 
can define the limits of behaviour and prescribe procedures for those bodies 
deemed to have violated established boundaries. In particular, Foucault (1979) 
challenged the status of medicine, arguing that it was not simply an objective 
set of scientific practices, but rather a major institution of power through which 
bodies are labelled as deviant or normal, as controlled or needful or control. 
The requirement for discipline of the body is notable in discourses of public 
health, where “the body is regarded as dangerous, problematic, ever 
threatening to run out of control, to attract disease, to pose an imminent 
danger to the rest of society” (Lupton, 2003: 33).  Whereas public health 
concerns previously focused on the containment of infectious disease, Lupton 
(95; Peterson & Lupton, 1997) argues that attention has now turned to 
exhorting individuals to take responsibility for their own bodily health. This 
“privatisation” of health has had a number of consequences. Firstly, there has 
been an increasingly emphasis on the link between “life-style” diseases and 
associated behaviours, where the responsibility for disease is, at least partly, 
turned back to the individual. Secondly, in promulgating the view that health is 
a universal right, public discourses demand changes in behaviour and an 
awareness of risk which mean that – as Lupton (2003) argues – self control of 
the body has become the new work ethic. 
This widespread discourse of self control of the body is taken up and used by 
all participants, in consideration of the changes they experience in their 
identities. In the following sections, I will explore particular manifestations of 
this wider discourse. When constructing and reconstructing embodied 
identities, a person works creatively with the social discourses which are 
available to her in her cultural and historical setting. As Gillies et al (2004) 
describe, in many instances these discourses can be seen as functional, 
enabling individuals to craft identities which are helpful in achieving a 
particular outcome. However, discourses may also be seen as restrictive, in 
that they constrain an individual’s potential identity. While I find the 
“functional/restrictive” nomenclature to have an uncomfortably judgemental 
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tone, the distinction has utility in clarifying the possible impact of particular 
uses of discourse.
4.2.3 Biographical disruption and challenges to embodiment
As previously discussed, illness – especially chronic illness – is an experience 
where the structures of everyday life, and the forms of knowledge 
underpinning them, are disrupted. In line with Bury (1982) and the wider 
literature, the experiences described in this research indicate that the physical 
state is the starting point for biographical disruption, through “the alteration of 
bodily states not usually brought into consciousness” (Bury, 1982: 169). In the 
first super-ordinate theme of “Challenges to embodiment”, it is apparent that 
for younger women with breast cancer, these altered states can include 
alienation and disconnection from their bodies, reappraisal of the relationship 
between body and mind, and a re-assessment of the way their physical 
appearance fits with their conception of the self. In this way, as Williams 
(2000) suggests, disruption may be seen as a transition from normal 
phenomenological modes of bodily “disappearance” – parallels are drawn to 
Sartre (1948), and a body which passes by in silence – to a state of corporeal 
“dys-appearance”, where the body’s presence becomes an issue through its 
problematic nature. 
To consider the problematic nature of the body in more detail, we need to turn 
to individual subordinate themes of embodiment raised by this study. Stacey 
(1997) proposes that, although other illnesses can be deadly and painful, few 
carry the connotations and dread of cancer. This sense seems to be captured in 
the identity changes described in the subordinate theme “Something alien in 
my body”. In managing their new physical state, participants make use of vivid 
imagery to portray cancer as something foreign and hostile to themselves: a 
dangerous and evil predator. To cope with this predator, a military struggle is 
required; in this struggle, participants personify both the cancer and also the 
body parts affected by the cancer (“it”, “the boob”). This experience of cancer 
as the enemy has been documented in other clinical studies (e.g. Charmaz, 
1995), and research into chronic illness has confirmed the frequent use of 
processes of disembodiment, where the disease is separated from the self 
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(Breaden, 1997; Bury, 1982; Finlay, 2003). Frank (1991) has suggested that 
we can make sense of this use of personification by seeing it as a human 
response in coping with something we don’t fully understand. The still-
uncertain origins of cancer leave it open to the mythic imagery of monsters 
and evil, because it cannot be biologically accounted for. Thus, as Sontag 
(1991) argues, the presence and use of such images can be seen as society’s 
need to organise a chaotic, frightening world. By personifying the evil cancer, 
we draw boundaries around ourselves and attempt to control an apparently 
random disease. To the same end, the use of military imagery is linked to this 
idea of control, suggesting that the individual is involved in direct action 
against the disease and refuses to give in. Such implied dualism of mind and 
body, and disaggregation of body parts, are also represented in medical 
discourses. In her review of patient literature, Davis (2008) describes how 
breast cancer is portrayed as a frightening, deadly being. In discussions about 
treatment, women are not represented as three-dimensional human beings, 
but rather presented as the physical setting for cancer, with their body broken 
down into component parts. 
Participants’ sense of disconnection from their bodies, and the attribution of 
evil personhood to cancer, can thus be seen to draw upon wider social 
discourses. In many ways, use of these discourses can be seen as functional. 
By constructing the cancer as a separate entity, Cassell (1976) argues that it is 
possible to see the disease as something separate from oneself, and therefore 
one can retain the previous integrity of personhood once the cancer has been 
removed. This is indicated in this research by the change of heart mentioned 
by participants such as Ursula following surgery. The disembodiment implied in 
the construction of hair or breasts as “it” may also help women adjust to the 
distress of losing parts of their previous selves. Sartre (cited in Glover, 1987) 
described how, in his own experience of illness, he was aware of re-drawing 
the boundaries of the self, and in this study women’s actions may enable them 
to lose the “Other” and consolidate their new embodied personhood. Finally, 
metaphors of mythical monsters and military campaigns may enable women to 
focus attention on gathering resources needed to achieve a particular goal.
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However, there are also important ways in which these discourses may be 
restrictive. Goffman (1963) has argued that stigma arises from the perception 
of a dangerous or discredited attribute, and despite participants’ work to 
distance themselves from this aspect, the use of such vivid imagery both by 
participants and the wider society may leave a sense of faulty personhood. In 
this way, I perceive that this initial imagery of cancer might be considered as 
the “primary stigma”, while the changes wrought by treatment for cancer 
might be conceived of as “secondary stigma”. As I shall discuss later, this sense 
of a tainted, stigmatised body, drawn from constructions of cancer as evil and 
alien, constrains the re-creation of other identities. The discourses may be 
restrictive in a further sense, in that they suggest a control which is not in fact 
possible. Cancer may be to some degree conceptually contained through 
personification, and the impact of bodily changes minimised through 
disembodying practices. However, medical and social discourses of the body as 
controllable come into conflict with existential and phenomenological realities. 
For example, the later acknowledgement of issues of mortality suggest that 
participants are aware of this limit to control, while Nina’s description of 
different sensation in her reconstructed breast indicates how medicine cannot 
return her body to what it was.
In the second subordinate theme “Just me in a body”, identity issues also 
appear to relate to control and dualism of body and mind. Participants 
described the way in which cancer treatment left them feeling exhausted, 
reduced to a body. This state was likened by some to being old, in contrast to 
their chronologically youthful age; however, while many perceived fragility, one 
woman talking of perceiving a greater strength in her body through its capacity 
to withstand cancer. In her account of medicine as culture, Lupton (2003) 
depicts the way in which Western concepts of mind-body dualism and 
individual autonomy are intimately bound up in the bio-medical practices and 
discourses, which propose the body as something which is separate from, and 
capable of control by, the mind. However, what participants appear to be 
wrestling with here is the limitation of these discourses of control and 
autonomy. As Saywell, Henderson and Beattie (2000) argue, the experience of 
cancer can violate the normal boundaries of existence, creating a haziness 
around the extent to which body is constitutive of mind, and the degree to 
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which the subjective self is in control of the objectified body. The limits of the 
body may be seen as particularly difficult to reconcile for younger women. 
Many participants in this study remarked on the apparent incongruence 
between their “health”, as signified through their previous practices in sports or 
at the gym, and the diagnosis of cancer. More positively, Lesley’s sense of self 
appeared to have been enhanced rather than reduced by her bodily experience 
of cancer, through her perception of increased physical resilience. Thus in 
many regards, the dualistic discourse of a separate mind and body might be 
seen here as restrictive, in that it fails to capture the women’s experience. 
Indeed, as Frank (1991) proposes, perhaps what illness teaches is the 
profound unity of mind and body. 
In the final bodily identity, participants dwelt upon changes relating to their 
appearance. Breast cancer had resulted in surgery to the breast for all women, 
while many experienced side effects of further treatment such as weight gain 
and hair loss. Many women seemed to interpret this change through a 
discourse which Lupton (2003) calls the “commodified body”. Here, good 
health is merged with sexual attractiveness, which may in turn be linked with a 
body that can be successfully “marketed” to prospective partners. Youth and 
specific forms of beauty (slenderness, number and shape of breasts) constitute 
socially accepted norms, while bodies which do not conform are seen as 
visually and conceptually out of place. Within this research, Gilly measures her 
satisfaction with her reconstructed breast through her continued ability to 
display herself in a bikini, while Nina’s comments about feeling more 
“presentable” after breast augmentation suggest that she feels an enhanced 
ability to meet these social norms. Therefore, on one level new reconstructive 
techniques appear to allow women to choose to change their body, to maintain 
fit with such discourses. 
However, on another level, such social discourses – and the reconstructive 
techniques which support them – may be seen as restrictive. Reconstruction 
aims to re-make the body so that it can “pass” as in keeping with socially 
prescribed norms, rather than challenging hegemonic conceptions of how the 
female body should be. This becomes a particular issue when changes to 
appearance cannot be concealed: issues of stigma which Goffman (1963) 
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describes as the discredited – as opposed to the potentially discreditable – 
body. Louise relates her sense of her discredited appearance, following her 
weight gain and loss of hair. Her phrase “you have to be” links with 
observations about the way a commodified body is associated with inner 
qualities. Bordo (1990) suggests that aspects of appearance such as 
slenderness and body tone are equated to moral qualities such as control, self-
discipline and caring about the self. Thus the restrictions inherent in discourses 
of the commodified body can be seen to rest ultimately on previously discussed 
issues of bodily control and the limits of individual autonomy. An alternative 
discourse suggests different possibilities. In choosing to see her body’s altered 
appearance as “natural”, Lesley appears to associate her body with what 
Coward (1989) has described as the powerful symbolic meanings of 
wholesome-ness, integrity and goodness. “Not messing with nature” involves 
constructing identity differently: viewing continuity not through the preserved 
or controlled shape of the body, but through the accommodation of change.
4.2.4 Biographical disruption and negotiation of social roles
Describing the ways in which biographical disruption can affect mobilisation of 
social resources, Bury (1982: 169) suggests that illness brings “individuals, 
families and social networks face to face with the character of relationships in 
stark form, disrupting the normal rules of reciprocity and mutual support”. This 
was evident in the wide-ranging nature of change in social roles which was 
reported by participants in this study. As studies of biographical disruption 
have indicated (Hubbard, Kidd & Kearney, 2010; Wilson, 2007), these changes 
are driven both by functional limitations – physical and psychological difficulties 
in fulfilling social roles – and also by something which Bury (1982) terms 
“embarrassment”, but which I shall here call “stigma”. In the following 
discussion, I shall address the research question by focussing on important 
overall conclusions concerning changes in role identities, before moving to 
consider discourses of stigma which run across experience in all identities. 
In reflecting upon altered identities following cancer, it is notable that 
participants spontaneously saw themselves in terms of roles which pre-existed 
cancer, rather than in the acquisition of new roles. In describing change, 
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participants described disruption to the content and values of existing or latent 
roles such as partner-mother-friend, but did not voluntarily cite illness 
identities such as patient-survivor-victim, which are often the focus of 
psychological research. This runs contrary to quantitative studies assessing 
cancer “survivorship”, such as the surveys of cancer survivors by Deimling, 
Bowman and Wagner (2007) cited earlier, which proposed that that 86% of the 
sample identified as a survivor, with 42% self-identifying as an ex-patient and 
13% as a victim. The different findings in my study may simply relate to issues 
of sample size, or to national differences in the American population of the 
aforementioned study. However, failure spontaneously to claim “survivorship” 
may also be seen as supporting the arguments of Kaiser (2008), confirming 
the sense of the survivor identity being driven by medical professionals rather 
than emerging from women’s experience, where issues of survival had complex 
meanings. From my findings in this research, I would support Kaiser’s proposal 
that, to be useful to people with cancer, ongoing promotion of the survivorship 
identity within health research needs to encompass more nuanced issues of 
fear, and to address stigma linked to an ongoing association with cancer. 
Within the changes observed in pre-existing identities, there appear to be a 
number of important patterns. Firstly is the importance ascribed to intimate 
relationships, such as partner-mother-friend. Many studies have documented 
how – in line with general findings in other areas of psychology – social 
support is both valued and associated with greater psychological wellbeing 
throughout the experience with cancer (Lethborg, Aranda & Kissane, 2008; 
Waxler-Morrison, Hislop, Mears & Kan, 1991). These changes can be explained 
in many ways. Following the arguments of Jordan (1991), it is possible to see 
the centrality of these identities as a sign of women’s more relational sense of 
self, where both the giving and receiving of support is valued. For example, in 
her study of biographical disruption of women with HIV, Wilson (2007) 
describes how motherhood provides an important source of continuity, purpose 
and self-worth when coping with chronic illness. Many of the women in this 
study describe attributing new value in such a way, while also wrestling with 
the practical difficulties of the role of wife or mother. A further explanation for 
these changes may lie in a greater awareness of their own mortality, which, as 
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May (1983) discusses, can lead to a greater appreciation of connections with 
others. 
However, the focus on younger women in this research indicates how cancer 
during this life-stage may cause particular issues regarding roles which may 
already be perceived within our society as ‘deficit identities’ (Reynolds & Taylor, 
2005). Disclosing the physical changes caused by cancer, and relating the 
practical consequences of breast cancer for fertility, puts a potentially higher 
strain on any new partnership, thus increasing the already difficult task of 
managing ‘singleness’ which Reynolds, Wetherell and Taylor (2007) describe. 
Moreover, this difficulty may be amplified by ongoing cancer treatment which 
denies the possibility of being a mother. Existing research (Steinberg; 1990; 
Strickler, 1992) has suggested that women perceive infertility as a loss of 
control over their bodies, and experience grief both for the child they never 
had and for their misalignment with social expectations of motherhood. Issues 
of infertility following cancer are often more problematic for women than for 
men, as procedures to harvest eggs are more invasive and time-consuming 
than the banking of sperm, and cancer treatment rarely allows time for such 
considerations. This research suggests that the individual and cumulative 
weight of such losses needs to be recognised and taken into account in the 
care of women with breast cancer. Similarly to Grinyer (2007), who explored 
the impact of cancer in the teenage years, my findings indicate that a person’s 
age and gender mediate the experience of illness and the forms of biographical 
disruption. 
Finally, this research has drawn attention to two other identities which have 
especial significance for younger women, but which have received surprisingly 
little attention in research: the roles of friend and work colleague. Given the 
existing literature concerning both on the impact of unemployment (Jahoda, 
1979; 1981; 1982) and on issues of employment related to other chronic 
illnesses (Bury, 1982; Rozmovits & Ziebland, 2004), the omission of more 
detailed research into work identities appears an important oversight. This 
study accords with research from Johnsson, Fornander, Rutqist and Olsson 
(2010) in highlighting the importance of managing issues of social support and 
co-workers’ attitudes in the return to work of women with breast cancer; 
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however, it also raises additional questions concerning employers’ 
discriminative practices reported in the maintenance of these work identities. 
Similarly, given the known importance of social support to psychological well-
being and cancer, it is surprising that there are not more detailed examinations 
of the interaction between friendship identities and cancer. This research has 
briefly outlined how breast cancer brought many changes to women’s 
experience of friendship, both in terms of the increased appreciation of the 
practical and emotional support of close friends, but also in terms of difficulties 
in communication and in the management of negative, discriminatory 
reactions. Research within the field of biographical disruption indicates that 
these changes are not unusual. In their study of biographical disruption 
following an HIV-diagnosis, Carricaburu and Pierret (1995) briefly mentioned 
that gay men perceived their relationships with friends to be of greater 
importance, and this was reflected in the frequency and intensity of meetings. 
In her consideration of the biographical disruption of teenage cancer, Grinyer 
(2007) also touches upon issues of friendship; she describes how participants 
feel isolated from their peers due to their unusual physical state, and suggests 
that within the expectance of sociality at this life-stage, ongoing and enforced 
isolation due to cancer can be particularly demoralising. However, detailed 
consideration of the lived experience of friendship and breast cancer is 
currently lacking. 
Within each role identity, and for each participant, the issue of the stigma has 
appeared in some form. The stigma of cancer is intimately related to 
discourses of self-control and the body; as previously discussed, the original 
“mark” of this stigma appears to be a body which is dangerous, uncontrolled 
and tainted, both through contact with an “evil” disease and through the bodily 
changes effected by cancer. Stigmatising discourses and practices are 
implicated in difficult movement in all role identities. As Charmaz (1991) 
describes, the shame and suffering in such changes derive both from the 
person’s own sense of failure in meeting internalised social standards, and also 
from the behaviour of others acting from those same standards: aspects of 
stigma captured by Scambler and Hopkins (1988) as “felt” and “enacted”. As a 
mother, Zoe described her guilt at potentially inflicting breast cancer upon her 
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daughters; in this instance, the felt stigma of an uncontrollable body appears 
also to relate to social standards in another discourse of “good 
mothering” (Elmberger, Bolund, Magnusson, Lutzen & Andershed, 2008). As a 
prospective partner, Rachel stated that she perceived she would be less 
desired, both inherently and because of potential difficulties with childbearing. 
Here, the felt stigma of a tainted body seems to connect up with the discourse 
of the commodified body, as mentioned earlier. In work, Louise and Lesley 
describe experiencing direct discrimination as a result of their breast cancer, 
while Gilly decides to keep her experience of cancer secret from her employers. 
This stigma, both enacted and felt, implies that the new – reduced - status of 
their bodies makes them less valuable as employees; in this instance, control 
of the body seems strongly linked with dominant discourses of productivity 
(Sennett, 1998). In social settings, Louise and Zoe describe the sense of 
shame at their altered appearance; in addition to this felt stigma, there were 
instances of enacted stigma, such as Becky’s sense of exposure when her 
disclosure of cancer was not comfortably received by another. 
Self-evidently, the stigmatising discourses of cancer were restrictive at some 
level for all women. Furthermore, it was my perception that a substantial 
proportion of the difficult changes in role identities experienced by these 
participants involved issues of stigma. Participants actively managed their 
positions, using many of the strategies which Goffman (1963) outlined. Life 
was rearranged to avoid awkward contact at work; body changes or the fact of 
cancer itself were concealed, with the aim of “passing as normal”; 
communication of cancer was restricted to a small group of intimates, while 
wider contacts were told nothing. There were other strategies which aimed 
actively to resist the sense of stigma, by challenging disclosure etiquette and 
sharing the experience of cancer. Both Lesley and Nina talked of seeking 
opportunities to present publicly their own experience, with the aim of 
normalising breast cancer. However, despite the active and productive 
strategies used by all participants, I was left at the end of this research with a 
deep sense of sadness that the stigma of cancer – the uncontrollable, tainted 
body – remains so prevalent and so powerful. I had considered that increased 
media discussion of breast cancer issues might have lessened this sense of 
stigma. Yet the accounts in this research suggested an alternative outcome: 
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that the heightened importance accorded to self-control of the body may have 
outweighed any benefits from greater public awareness. As Sontag (1991) and 
Frank (1991) have argued, we still appear to hold moralised notions of disease, 
where both the individual’s competence (Why me? Why her?) and value to 
society can be called into question. This links with changes in emotional-
existential identities.
4.2.5 Biographical disruption and emotional-existential identities
If challenges to embodiment disrupt understanding of the form of personhood, 
emotional-existential identities are the place where participants try to make 
sense of their disrupted relation to life itself. As Bury (1982: 169) proposes, 
chronic illness can result in “profound disruptions in explanatory systems 
normally used by people, such that a fundamental re-thinking of the person’s 
biography and self-concept is involved”.  Frank (1991) suggested that medical 
talk during cancer focuses on the part which is breaking down, while ignoring 
the frequent breaking down and re-making of the whole person: what has 
been described elsewhere as the modification of “being-in-the-world” (May, 
1983). In reviewing individual identities, this section will examine to what 
extent participants found coherence in their altered sense of mortality, in their 
emotions of fear, frustration and loss, and in the meaning of being ill. It will 
also consider how the discourse of self-control is implicated in these meanings.
In facing their own mortality, participants perceived a profound shift in their 
relationship to death. Bury (1982: 171) has described how a chronic illness 
such as arthritis can bring about a sense of premature ageing: a “biographical 
shift from a perceived normal trajectory through relatively predictable 
chronological steps, to one fundamentally abnormal and inwardly damaging.” 
This seemed to be reflected in several comments in this study, where women 
described feeling much older, or viewing their previous orientation to life as 
that of a child. In contemplating – at least briefly – the possibility of their own 
death, women’s sense of their position on the trajectory of life had changed, 
perhaps through an awareness that assumptions of a normal life-span might 
not apply to them. Such experiences link with aspects of biographical 
disruption described by Hubbard, Kidd and Kearney (2010), where a cancer 
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diagnosis also brought to the fore participants’ sense of their own mortality 
and death.
Prominent in participants’ consideration of their mortality are references to 
fate. Accounts dwell on the fragility of the life, and on the randomness of 
existence: the flipside of a coin; being lucky; being a cat with nine lives. These 
images can be read on a number of levels. One interpretation might be to see 
participants actively challenging discourses which propose that individuals can 
and should control their bodies. In arguing for the decisive role of fate, 
participants are resisting implications of personal failure and lack of attention 
to their health, by proposing that cancer and death are in many respects a 
matter of luck. This point is explicitly raised by Rachel, who questions the 
extent to which diet and exercise can affect cancer incidence. Recent research 
by Lupton (1995) and Prior (2000) discussed how public health discourses 
claim that taking prescribed measures will protect against early death. A 
corresponding response from individuals with cancer may be to resist ideas 
that death is preventable and within their control. This may be particularly 
significant for the younger women in this study, where the unusually early 
occurrence of cancer might add particular emphasis to the question “why me?”
However, participants’ invocation of fate can also be seen to challenge 
discourses of bodily control in another way. Frank (1991) has argued that we 
seek to promote beliefs in control, as they are a way of containing and 
constraining the inherent riskiness of life. Yet as writers such as Camus (2006) 
have suggested, the nature of our existence may be alternately seen as one 
where events are often random, and our control over our bodies is at very best 
partial. In crafting these new views on mortality, participants may therefore be 
seen as re-building their assumptions about the nature of the world. In her 
work on changes following trauma, Janoff-Bulman (1992) considers how those 
who experience “natural disasters” such as environmental catastrophe or 
illness may experience difficulty in reassessing their beliefs about the 
meaningfulness of the world and the nature of justice: the degree to which an 
individual person’s actions cause and merit a particular outcome. Participants’ 
changed identities in this area may thus be seen as a functional response to 
the existential reality of their lives, and also a resistance to discourses which 
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might be seen as promoting an unreasonably high expectation from bodily 
control.      
The changes which participants perceived in their autonomy were among the 
most moving for me as a researcher. I believe this was because I felt that 
participants were, in some measure, baring the vulnerability of their existence. 
In his discussion of existential ideas, May (1983) notes how Nietzsche employs 
terms like anxiety and fear not as clinical terms, but as signifiers of our wider 
ontological state. May argues that our particular existence – the ‘Dasein’ – is in 
a continuous and dialectical relationship with non-being. Seeing the emotions 
described by participants within this frame, awareness of individual strength 
(resilience in dealing with cancer) and vulnerability (fear of a recurrence of 
cancer, and losses experienced through cancer) can be seen as an appropriate 
recognition of the potentialities of a person’s existence. I think it is significant 
that research within cognitive paradigms has also affirmed the significance of 
acknowledging vulnerability. Specifically, in their examination of meaning-
making after trauma, studies by Tedeschi and Calhoun (1996) and Jim and 
Anderson (2007) found that awareness of vulnerability and meaning, rather 
than meaning alone, better predicts more benefit-finding after potentially 
traumatic life events such as a cancer diagnosis. 
For these reasons, it might be argued that discourses of self-control of the 
body can inhibit functional responses to breast cancer. Participants’ accounts in 
this study indicated two ways in which this might happen. Being positive – or 
what Lupton (2003:72) terms “the discourse of hope” – has been widely 
promoted as a significant factor in an individual’s successful recovery from 
cancer. Control of the body is thus seen as a direct function of proper control of 
the mind, which is related to success in the military battle against cancer 
(Erwin, 1987). The validity of these discourses has now been comprehensively 
challenged, by psychological research which – in all but extreme instances – 
denies the connection between emotional states and cancer survival (Coyne, 
Stefanek & Palmer, 2007; Coyne, Toombs, Stefanek & Palmer, 2009). However, 
for many participants in this study, the fears and losses they experienced were 
often kept private, and as well as interpreting such decisions as a further 
reflection of the personal management of the stigma of cancer, it is possible to 
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conceive of these acts as a way of dealing with restrictive social discourses 
which deny or criticise the expression of vulnerability. As Ehrenreich (2009: 
42) has argued, this “tyranny of positive thinking” acts to inhibit and privatise 
more “negative” reactions to cancer such as anger, fear and anxiety, construing 
them as implicitly shameful and “weak”.  
The final emotional-existential identity might be seen as a summation of all the 
changes in identities which each woman had perceived: an existential “bottom 
line”. As such it is more difficult to relate to specific discourses of bodily self-
control. However, in considering the theme ‘Following a different path to 
before’, it is possible to draw some overall conclusions about the nature of the 
biographical disruption experienced after breast cancer. For women such as 
Rachel and Ursula, individual changes in bodily and role identities were not 
linked to wide-scale change in direction of their life. Some researchers (Frank, 
2003; Shapiro, Angus & Davis, 1997) have styled such responses to cancer as 
“Bump in the Road” or “Back to Normal”, and in some respects it may be 
arguable as to whether these women have experienced biographical disruption. 
If, as Bury (1982) appears to suggest, biographical disruption is viewed as 
wholesale change in identities across the three domains of body, social roles 
and explanatory systems, then it seems as if this term is not applicable to the 
experience of Rachel and Ursula. However, in my consideration of biographical 
disruption, I wondered whether it is more useful to see such changes not as 
categorical but as a continuum: that biographical disruption is better seen as a 
question of degree, rather than all-or-nothing change. 
The accounts of remaining participants described extensive change, but of 
varying kinds. The work of Charmaz (1995) helps illuminate the nature of 
biographical disruption, and further refine ideas of the accommodative style of 
biographical management outlined by Radley (1989) and Bury (1991). Those 
women in this final identity who saw themselves as embracing life can be seen 
as adapting to cancer; their response to experience involves accommodating 
losses and reunifying the body and self through new, extensive projects. 
Women who observed a more ambivalent sense of change – lost dreams, a 
tainted appreciation of life – might be argued to be reconciling themselves to 
cancer. This response to experience involves working round changes arising 
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from their illness, but appears to place more emphasis on the restrictions 
which cancer has brought. However, in closing this consideration of styles of 
biographical disruption, I believe it is important not to be drawn into crude 
evaluations of relative utility. As Ehrenreich (2009) bluntly states, cancer is not 
a “makeover opportunity” (2009: 31). Instead, the diversity of styles might be 
seen as a sign of the creativity which individuals demonstrate in working with 
their different circumstances, personal histories and cognitive and other 
resources. This has implications for therapy, as I shall discuss below. 
4.2.6 Conclusions about biographical disruption
As I have articulated above, I believe that the wide-scale change in identities 
generally documented in this study can be usefully viewed through the 
framework of biographical disruption. Previous research on biographical 
disruption (Hubbard Kidd & Kearney, 2010; Williams, 2000) has observed that 
the phenomenon cannot be assumed to apply to everyone who experiences 
chronic illness. Within this study, I have reflected whether the more limited 
change described by two participants meets current definitions of biographical 
disruption; perhaps, as I have discussed, the concept needs to be extended to 
encompass a more continuous – rather than categorical – evaluation of 
change. However, the extensive changes voiced by most women convey the 
challenges of living with breast cancer. As Mathieson and Stam (1995) have 
argued, identities are transformed by cancer, and research limited to 
evaluation of psycho-social variables is not capable of doing justice to the 
nature of this change. I therefore believe that the concept of biographical 
disruption can be a valuable way of dimensionalising, and communicating, the 
impact of cancer. 
I have also sought to enhance interpretation of experience by considering how 
biographical disruption is informed by issues of context. As Radley (1989) 
noted, “what people adjust with is as important a matter as what they adjust 
to” (1989: 243). Guided by the material of participants’ accounts, I have 
chosen to consider how a particular aspect of context – social discourses 
relating to self-control of the body – is implicated in participants’ altered 
identities. Ashmore and Jussim (1997) propose that such public discourses 
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mediate between larger social arrangements and the creation of inner selves, 
in a dialectical process where individuals create and recreate the identities 
which form the basis for biography. In considering the interactions between 
discourse and the experience of younger women, my research adds to previous 
explorations of biographical disruption, which have paid greater attention to 
structural issues of class (Wilson, 1997) and age (Pound, Gompertz & Ebrahim, 
1998).  
In concluding this discussion of biographical disruption, I would like to take up 
an issue raised by Kelly and Field (1998). Following on from Giddens (1991), 
Kelly and Field suggest that chronic illness has become less disruptive in the 
modernist and post-modernist eras. Greater attention to deterministic social 
structures and the increased plurality in discourses is seen as enabling a more 
flexible adjustment to change. However, on the basis of this research, I would 
have concerns in taking such a benign view. Instead, as Williams (2000) has 
discussed, it is possible to argue that our society is creating alternative 
pathologies, through an excessive attention to the continual re-making and re-
modelling of the self. Discourses of bodily self-control can be seen as one such 
instance of re-modelling. Furthermore, as Ehrenreich (2009) asserts, 
treatment for breast cancer remains a punishing and life-disrupting experience. 
Despite advances in reconstructive surgery for breast cancer, treatments such 
as radiotherapy and chemotherapy have remained very similar for the past 
three decades. Thus the exploration of continuity and change in identities 
following breast cancer - or biographical disruption – appears to merit wider 
and more sustained investigation.
4.3 Limitations of this study and opportunities for further research
This study has proposed an important connection between the lived experience 
of breast cancer for younger women and ideas of biographical disruption. 
However, the small scale of this research has not permitted more general 
conclusions about the breadth and nature of biographical disruption in breast 
cancer, or indeed across different forms of cancer. Moreover, in creating 
therapeutic support programmes, it would be important to know whether 
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different aspects of disruption link to particular distress or clinical issues. 
Therefore, this research can be extended by triangulating the phenomenon of 
biographical disruption and cancer, using a variety of methodological 
approaches. Kvale and Brinkman (2009) and Tindall (1994) discuss how survey 
techniques can be productively linked to qualitative methods such as diaries or 
interviews. This more comprehensive research programme might allow a 
quantitative measure of the degree of change in identities perceived by a 
larger sample of participants (people with breast cancer across all age groups; 
younger people diagnosed with a variety of cancers), while also gaining 
explanatory understanding of the nature of these changes. Completion of 
clinical measures of distress would enable the phenomenon of biographical 
disruption to inform development of therapeutic support, as discussed below.
The focus of this particular research can be seen as both a strength and a 
limitation. Examining the range of identities has allowed understanding of the 
breadth of change which women experience, and the practical and discursive 
challenges of managing this change. This has enabled me to make useful 
connections with the literature of biographical disruption. However, there is 
now an opportunity to follow up some of these less-explored identity issues in 
greater detail. Identities concerning friendship and work were notable both for 
the importance accorded by participants and for the challenges such identities 
presented. Future research could consider a new project examining friendship 
issues, or could amplify this study’s research material through collaboration 
with the findings of researchers such as Hubbard, Kidd and Kearney (2010) or 
Rozmovits and Ziebland (2004).  
Another limitation to this study is its cross-sectional structure. The rationale for 
the choice of a single interview within eighteen months of diagnosis has been 
articulated earlier. However, as Riessman (2003) has suggested within her 
critique of narrative approaches, “constructing ‘who I am’ is an ongoing activity 
with a limited range, context-specific, a practical project of everyday 
life” (2003:8). Therefore this study does not enable the researcher to 
understand whether the phenomenon of biographical disruption is temporary 
or permanent, nor to examine the impact of cancer on identities across time. 
Flowers (2008) suggests that planned multiple contacts can offer the chance to 
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probe and develop material from an initial meeting, and also to build a trusting 
relationship where participants feel comfortable with increased disclosure. 
However, he also cautions that one danger of such multiple contacts is that the 
focus can turn away from an open examination of lived experience at that 
time, and instead be dominated by “follow up” on issues raised previously. 
Therefore important consideration would need to be given to the forms of 
contact in a longitudinal study. One option might be to supplement interviews 
with personal video diaries or blogs, which might allow more spontaneous 
records of experience to sit alongside semi-structured techniques. While 
obviously time-consuming, implementation of such a longitudinal study might 
enable the creation of a stage or process model of biographical disruption, 
similar to those found in bereavement work (Stroebe & Schut, 1999; Worden; 
1983). 
The nature of findings in this study may have been significantly affected by the 
characteristics of its participant group. As Rozmarits and Ziebland (2004) 
indicate, it is possible that volunteers may differ from a broader sample in their 
motivation to be involved. Volunteers may be drawn to take part because of a 
particularly positive experience, or conversely a particularly difficult one. While 
it is obviously impossible for the researcher to be sure of such issues, I find 
some reassurance in the nature of the findings. The differing accounts of 
change and overall meaning described by participants suggest that there was 
not one motivation driving participation. Furthermore, in my conversations with 
participants during the de-briefing, the women raised a variety of reasons for 
their involvement in the research, from a desire to help other women and a 
sense of gratitude to the charity through which I recruited, to a need to have 
more time to understand their experience.
However, there are other characteristics of the participant group which may 
have had greater effect on the study’s findings. Previous studies have 
suggested that social class can have an important effect on the experience of 
biographical disruption. Specifically, research to date indicates that people from 
the middle classes are more likely to experience disruption than those 
described as being working class (Bury, 1982; Radley, 1989). This traces 
potentially to heightened middle class expectations concerning the nature of 
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identities, and also to previous experiences of disruption to health, work and 
family among those with fewer resources. An assessment of the educational 
and occupational status of this study’s participants indicates that all 
participants might be viewed as middle class, and thus more likely to 
experience disruption. Similarly, concern might be raised over the participant 
group’s ethnicity, as all women were of Caucasian origin. While there is little 
existing research in biographical disruption – and in cancer and identity – 
concerning the interaction of ethnicity with experience of cancer, it seems 
probable that such cultural beliefs and support structures affect the perception 
and understanding of breast cancer. In any further research, issues of class 
and ethnicity among the participant group would therefore be an important 
consideration.   
Finally, this research has made me consider whether existing psychological 
research into cancer is avoiding “the elephant in the room”. Issues of stigma 
have been raised in many different studies of people with cancer, from 
research into biographical disruption to studies of identity (Mathieson & Stam, 
1995; Rozmovits & Ziebland, 2004). However, despite having the pioneering 
work of Goffman (1963) and Sontag (1991) to light the way, there does not 
appear to be any recent research which has directly addressed this issue. 
Perhaps this is because the nature of stigma is hard to grapple with, given its 
roots in the wider social issues of group identities which Tajfel (1969; 1981) 
described, and its multiple manifestations at the intrapersonal, interpersonal 
and societal levels. Yet this complexity of the subject offers many opportunities 
for further research. Action research could be conducted, to consider how the 
stigma of cancer can be raised and alleviated in the workplace. Discourse 
analysis could update the work of Saywell, Henderson & Beattie (2000), and 
consider whether media representations of breast cancer have altered within 
the past ten years. Discourse techniques could also be used to analyse the 
constructions within UK patient information for cancer, and consider whether 
these contribute to the sense of stigma. Finally, researchers across a range of 
chronic illness could combine resources to explore how issues of stigma are 
experienced, and to identify ways in which this stigma can begin to be 
addressed.
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4.4 Implications for counselling psychology
The thought-provoking discussion by Strawbridge and Woolfe (2003) of the 
nature of counselling psychology has helped me formulate two principal ways 
in which professional considerations intersect with this research. The first 
involves consideration as a scientist-practitioner of the ways in which issues of 
biographical disruption might be addressed in a therapeutic context. An 
important initial question might be a decision as to whether therapy is 
necessary for those experiencing cancer. While biographical disruption involves 
difficult and often distressing changes, perhaps it might be more useful to see 
it as a life experience similar to bereavement, where change is mostly 
accomplished without professional intervention (Parkes, 1996). A consensus 
between the two fields is suggested by recent research by Coyne, Stefanek 
and Palmer (2006) and Nezu, Nezu, Felgoise, McClure and Houts (2003), which 
indicates that therapeutic interventions in cancer have greatest impact among 
those assessed to be in greater distress. This parallels recent directions in 
bereavement research, where studies have indicated that therapy appears to 
effect greater change among those in more complex – and often more 
distressing – situations (Parkes, 2006; Stroebe, Schut & Stroebe, 2007). 
However, there may be an alternative way of viewing the provision of therapy 
after cancer. Woolfe (1990) reminds us that, in addition to working with 
psycho-pathology, counselling psychologists can play a wider role in the 
facilitation of mental and physical well-being. To this end, it is interesting to 
note that the majority of participants in this research expressed a sense of 
fulfilment from the opportunity to describe their changed sense of self. Louise 
said that she had “searched for things deep down, and said things I’ve 
probably almost tried to hide” (69:27), while Becky observed that “this has 
been cathartic in a way [...] drawing a line and saying, right, that’s it” (56:14). 
Nina commented that the interview had enabled her to “find things out about 
myself that I didn’t know by talking about them in such detail, so I got quite a 
lot out of it” (52,2). These benefits appear desirable in and of themselves, and 
suggest that provision of individual or group therapy beyond the narrow focus 
of clinical distress can be valuable. In the debriefing following my research, 
participants suggested that therapeutic support would be particularly helpful at 
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two stages. Following the diagnosis of cancer, many participants observed they 
would have benefited from greater information about the treatments they were 
to undergo, as well as from an opportunity to meet other women and to 
“normalise” the fears and emotions they were experiencing. At the end of 
treatment, several participants commented that a “cancer rehabilitation” would 
have helped them prepare for re-entry back into their working and social lives.
There is some interesting research which might support the wider provision of 
support, on the basis of broader health-related criteria. Evidence from 
Simpson, Carlson and Trew (2001) and Rosenberg, Rosenberg and Ernstoff 
(2002) indicates that group psychological interventions for cancer patients with 
lower levels of distress resulted in decreased use of health care services and 
improvements in the domains of physical symptoms, and was thus a viable 
financial proposition. Therefore as Carlson and Bultz (2004) argue, any review 
of the efficacy of psycho-social interventions may need to consider the whether 
evaluations of therapeutic support should be restricted to psychological 
measures, or should assess the wider impact of psychological care.   
Turning to specific therapeutic modalities, this research cannot add 
meaningfully to recent reviews of psychological interventions, such as those by 
Cunningham (1995; 2000), Meyer and Mark (1995) and Coyne, Stefanek and 
Palmer (2007). However, the predominant therapeutic approaches indicated by 
the evidence in these studies (supportive/person centred and cognitive-
behavioural therapy) would each appear to address issues at stake in 
biographical disruption, such as conditions of worth and rebuilding of 
assumptions and beliefs. Interestingly, recent developments in cognitive 
therapy have seen a move away from identification and modification of coping 
styles (Adjuvant Psychological Therapy: Moorey & Greer, 1989) to consider the 
socio-cognitive aspects of personal transition (Brennan, 2001). Within this 
approach, it is possible to consider how the “Who Am I?” research tool could be 
modified and evaluated as an additional screening device, with the aim of 
rapidly assessing wider aspects of biographical disruption. Thinking more 
widely, the nature of biographical disruption described in this study suggests 
that the value of narrative and existential therapies should be more rigorously 
explored. While narrative therapy has been used in many health care settings 
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to assist in rehabilitation from conditions such as heart disease, it is difficult to 
obtain robust studies of its use in cancer. Similarly, existential approaches to 
meaning-making have been documented for end of life care (Breitbart, Gibson, 
Poppito & Berg, 2004), but there has been little evaluation of its use at earlier 
stages of cancer.
Review of approaches to therapy is useful and has its place. However, 
Strawbridge and Woolfe (2003) challenge us to think more imaginatively about 
the role of counselling psychology. Quoting Pilgrim and Bentall (1999), they 
ask us to envisage a profession where “the study of psycho-pathology itself is 
replaced by a study of the ways in which psycho-pathology is represented or 
socially constructed” (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2003:18). This particular research 
suggests two possibilities for wider action by counselling psychologists. The 
first relates to the discursive construction of illness and disease. Frank (1991; 
2003) has been notable for his extensive work to challenge existing 
conceptions of illness. Decrying the excessive attention to bodily self-control in 
current discourses, he argues that we need to place a higher value on illness. 
Conceiving that health and illness are foreground and background in our life-
worlds, valuing illness restores a sense of proportion lost when life is taken for 
granted. Our creativity and our frailty are profoundly linked, and through 
illness we can better understand the nature of our existence in the world, and 
our connection with others.
While Frank – by training a sociologist – has worked actively to change 
conceptions of illness, there is a conspicuous absence of psychologists working 
on this wider level. Counselling psychologists could work towards change in a 
variety of ways – workshops, papers, seminars – but perhaps one of the most 
wide-reaching could be the use of popular media. The opportunities are 
apparent in the recent contrasting presentations of different medical 
conditions. At the time of writing, one woman’s experience of a mastectomy is 
being reviewed in a television programme entitled “Embarrassing 
Bodies” (Fraser, 2010). Although the programme purports to alleviate 
embarrassment over medical conditions, its title hints at “freak show” qualities, 
and indeed criticism of the programme has centred on whether it builds – 
rather than challenges – stigma. Alternatively, a national newspaper currently 
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runs a weekly column from a woman who has experienced extensive spinal 
injuries (Reid, 2010).This page documents her lived experience, and, in my 
judgement, allows readers to understand the nuanced emotional and practical 
issues involved in living with this condition. In the normalisation of illness, I 
believe there is space for more of the latter kind of account. Rather than 
seeing ourselves as limited to the consulting room, counselling psychologists 
could consider whether to work with media partners to create more sensitive – 
rather than sensational – accounts of illness.   
 
This links with my final comments, which concern ways of dealing with the 
stigma of cancer. While stigma can obviously be worked with at the individual 
therapeutic level, counselling psychologists may have greater leverage when 
working at the wider societal or organisational levels. This may involve 
becoming involved with institutions where there is an opportunity to influence 
models of care, patient literature, or employment and social practices: hospital 
boards; campaigning or charitable organisations such as (in this instance) 
Breast Cancer Care or Breast Cancer Haven; a co-operative workplace. As 
previously described, it may require us to pay direct attention to the issue of 
stigma in research. Perhaps it has been easier to turn away from the difficult 
issues raised by stigma in cancer, rather like some of the social contacts of 
participants in this study. However, consideration of the more vocal and high 
profile campaigning work among persons with HIV (Woodward, 2000) may 
point to the value of a different strategy.
4.5 Final questions of reflexivity
The close of this research brings an end to the “dialectical dance” (Finlay, 
2008: 3) of reflexivity, whose beginning was discussed within the Methodology 
chapter. As the research has moved towards completion, I have developed 
greater understanding of the processual nature of reflexivity, and the ways in 
which I have shaped, and been shaped by, the material in its final chapters. 
Following my earlier use of the ideas of Wilkinson (1988), I would like to 
extend my previous comments on reflexivity by further exploration of personal, 
functional and disciplinary issues.
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Turning first to functional issues, I have become increasingly aware of the ways 
in which my personal convictions as a researcher have influenced the nature of 
findings in this research. My decision to focus on the whole gamut of identities 
experienced by participants was driven by my personal experience of cancer, 
my work with clients, and by analysis of the research literature. However, in 
many ways, the scale of this work was a rookie’s mistake. This became clear as 
I struggled with page after page of detailed and thoughtful comments from my 
participants. My sense of being overwhelmed by data was exacerbated by the 
new interview approach I devised for this study. The “Who Am I?” tool proved 
extremely effective in gathering highly relevant information which directly 
conveyed participants’ own understanding of their experience, unmediated by 
my pre-conceptions. It also appeared to be well-received by participants, who 
suggested that “if you had just set questions...it’s not so deep coz you didn’t 
write them yourself” (Louise: 69,13). However, this resulted in descriptions of 
a phenomenon which was far wider than I had initially conceived. My first 
research interview guide (Appendix 2) shows how my early ideas of identity 
were largely limited to roles; however, participants’ own responses indicated 
that embodied identities and emotional-existential identities were vital parts of 
their experience. This wealth of material provided plenty of opportunity for 
individual research presentations (Nelson, 2010; Nelson, Smith & Nicolson, 
2010), but caused me to spend hours sequestered with tiny print-outs of 
quotes, as I attempted to build up a picture.
During the analysis and discussion, I spent many hours in the hermeneutic 
circle moving between the part and the whole, as Smith, Flowers and Larkin 
(2009) suggest. Within the analysis, one of the more difficult pieces of work 
was the composition of the emotional-existential super-ordinate theme. 
Originally envisioned as simply “emotional identities”, the subordinate theme 
“Following a different path” was originally a separate super-ordinate theme. 
However, with the use of abstraction I began to understand how these 
seemingly disparate parts might fit together as a larger whole. Within the 
discussion, consideration of the part and the whole involved an assessment of 
the way my findings fitted within broader frameworks of life change. My 
ultimate alignment of the phenomenon of changing identities with biographical 
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disruption was not something I had envisaged at the start of the study, 
although I now feel that the concept is very well suited to the accounts of 
participants. Thus, from a functional perspective, this experience has 
highlighted for me the importance of creativity with research tools to enhance 
the quality of data gathered. It has also highlighted the importance of being 
open to the data, and working outwards from the data to theory. I am aware 
that my personal background and interests have inevitably affected the 
possible interpretations I might have made of the data; for example, my 
professional and personal experience made psycho-dynamic analyses less 
accessible than constructionist approaches. I am also mindful that - as 
Riessman (2003) has highlighted – a researcher’s understanding of interview 
material can change across time, with her altered experience and insight.  
However, within this inevitable subjectivity, I have been conscious at each 
stage of trying to find ways in which any interpretations are rigorously 
grounded in the material of participants’ accounts.
On a personal level, I have found myself partly following the trajectory of Le 
Gallais (2008), in her move from insider to outsider. When I conceived of the 
study, my own experience with breast cancer was very much in the 
foreground, and as I described earlier, this influenced both my research aim 
and my choice of methodology. Yet as the work progressed to its conclusion, I 
felt an increasing responsibility to do justice to these women’s interviews: that 
it was their story, and not mine. This has led me to reflect on key aspects of 
the findings. I had not conceived of the totality of my own experience as 
biographical disruption, nor been aware of the impact of stigma or the 
relevance of discourses of bodily self-control. Therefore, as Moran (2000) 
suggests, I could feel confidence in my findings, in that I could perceive that 
the processes of bracketing and practices of reflexivity meant that the data had 
not been forcibly fitted to pre-existing patterns.
Yet, while perceiving myself now to be more firmly situated on the outside, the 
study’s findings have also given greater coherence to my personal experience. 
For example, I can understand the value of my yoga practice in providing me 
with alternative conceptualisations of mind and body from those provided in 
medicine. My location within the profession of counselling psychology not only 
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facilitated personal processes of meaning-making, but also provided colleagues 
and settings that accepted and worked with my cancer treatment. At times, 
the accounts from participants touched identity challenges in motherhood or 
friendship which I recognised from my own experience, and I am also aware 
that the theoretical reading for this study has often helped me understand my 
own life positions, in addition to those of participants. However, to a large 
degree, I believe this relates to the unavoidable intersection between the 
personal and professional in any work as a psychologist. At the close of this 
study, my sense is of a project which has been originated and framed by me, 
but where the strong, passionate, and often unexpected voices of the women 
participants predominate. The perception of my changed status in this work 
has led me to alter the research’s title. Instead of the oblique reference to my 
own experience in the earlier “Cancer and ‘Me’...”, I have now chosen the less 
personal “Cancer and biographical disruption...”.
Finally, completing this study has re-connected me with disciplinary concerns 
which had become somewhat obscured by my focus on clinical counselling 
psychology practice. In my early reflexive writings, I was clear that the 
personal was the political: my personal experience with breast cancer inspired 
me to conduct research which voiced other women’s experience of breast 
cancer. However, in my reassessment of possibilities as a counselling 
psychologist, I am now assessing how the personal can become political, in a 
wider sense: how I might build from my new understanding of illness and 
stigma derived from the personal experiences of women in this research, to 
influence political change within organisations, institutions or social settings. To 
this end, I have found inspiration from psychologists such as Higley and Milton 
(2008), who have engaged counselling psychology with broader environmental 
issues outside the traditional mental health contexts. While I continue to be 
drawn to therapeutic work, I am considering how I might draw new inspiration 
from community psychology, and work more directly for social change.
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Appendix 1: Glossary of cancer terms
Chemotherapy: Chemotherapy is the use of anti-cancer drugs to destroy 
   cancer cells around the entire body. It is given if it is 
   believed that cancer cells may have spread beyond their 
   original site. These drugs are given by injection into a vein 
   or as tablets. There are many different chemotherapy 
   drugs, with different side-effects. Chemotherapy is usually 
   given as an outpatient, and a complete course may take 
   4-6 months. Side-effects can include nausea and vomiting, 
   lower  resistance to infection, anaemia, sore mouth, and 
   poor appetite, as well as hair loss and fatigue. 
Lumpectomy: This surgical procedure involves removal of the breast 
   lump, together with some surrounding tissue. A 
   lumpectomy is usually followed by radiotherapy treatment 
   to the remaining breast tissue. It removes the least amount 
   of tissue, but leaves a small scar and sometimes a small 
   dent in the breast. 
Mastectomy: A mastectomy is a surgical procedure which involves 
   removal of the whole breast. It may be necessary if the 
   breast lump is large in proportion to the rest of the breast, 
   or there are several areas of cancer cells in different parts 
   of the breast. A new breast can be created at the time of 
   the mastectomy, and this is known as breast 
   reconstruction. There are several types of reconstruction, 
   including those which involve use of flaps from the tummy 
   and the back to provide shape to the new breast. 
   Augmented reconstruction involves an increase to the 
   original size of the breast, through the use of implants.
Radiotherapy: Radiotherapy treats cancer by using high-energy rays to 
   destroy the cancer cells. After a lumpectomy, radiotherapy 
   can reduce the risk of cancer arising in the remaining 
   breast tissue; after a mastectomy, radiotherapy to the 
   chest wall may remove any cancer cells left behind. 
   Treatment is usually given in short daily sessions, and a 
   course of radiotherapy may last 3-6 weeks.  Side-effects 
   may include  reddening of the skin, nausea and tiredness, 
   as well as nerve pain and numbness in the arm. 
Staging:  The staging of a cancer describes its size and whether it 
   has spread beyond its original site. There are five stagings 
   (0-4), with stage 4 being the most severe, and indicating 
   secondary cancer which has spread beyond the breast to 
   other parts of the body.
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Appendix 1: Glossary of cancer terms  (cont.)
Staging (cont.) The stagings referred to in this research relate to the 
   commonly used medical system, which is as follows: 
   - Stage 0: when cancer cells are confined to the 
     breast ducts or lobules within the breasts, and 
     have not spread into surrounding breast tissue
   - Stage 1: the cancer tumour measures less than 
     2cm; the lymph glands in the armpit are not 
     affected; there are no signs that the cancer 
     has spread elsewhere in the body
   - Stage 2: the tumour measures between 2-5cm, 
     or the lymph glands are affected, or both; 
     however, there are no signs that the cancer 
     has spread further. 
Tamoxifen:  Tamoxifen is one of the most widely used hormonal 
   therapies for breast cancer. It is given after surgery and/or 
   chemotherapy to reduce the chance of cancer coming back; 
   the drug prevents oestrogen in the body from attaching to 
   breast cancer cells and encouraging them to  grow. 
   Potential side effects are hot flushes and sweats, weight 
   gain, dryness of the vagina and sleep disturbance. 
   Treatment often involves taking medication for five years. 
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Appendix 2: Initial interview schedule
Thanks for working through all those details. Do you feel ready to start? 
As mentioned before, in this interview we are looking at how a diagnosis of 
breast cancer can affect a woman’s sense of who she is – her identity.
We will start with general questions and then look at some areas in more 
detail.
1. Can we begin by talking a little about life before breast cancer. How would 
you have described yourself then?
Back then, if someone who didn’t know you had asked “who are you?”, what 
would you have told them?
How do you think other people would have described you then?
Deep inside, how did you think of yourself at that time?
(In pilot, explore whether writing an openly visible, shared list of identities 
given in answer to questions 1-3 assists with developing answers to Q4-8).
2. Now, can you tell me a little bit about how you see yourself after your 
experience with cancer ?
If someone asked you to write down a list of things that described you now, 
what would be on that list?
How do you think other people see you now?
In your own private mind, how do you see yourself now?
3. I’d like to share with you some ways people have thought of themselves 
(show “Identities: some possible ways of describing who I am”, below). Do any 
of these trigger other identities which are relevant to you, that we haven’t 
already mentioned?
    * * * *
4. Let’s look at the ways you have described yourself in more detail.
(Go through each identity in turn, starting with pre-cancer identities, then 
moving to post-cancer identities).
What is involved in being a …………………..?
What does the word ……………. mean to you?
What things do you value about being a ……………..?
What do you find difficult about being a ……………..?
How do you feel about being a …………………? 
(For pre-post cancer identities) So is being…………now different from the way it 
was before cancer?(If yes, explore how)
    * * * *
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5. Do you think that any of the identities, or ways you have described yourself, 
are connected?
(If yes) What links have you experienced between different identities?
e.g. Friend-stigmatised one; stigmatised one-worker; worker-mother; patient-
worker; patient-mother; mother-survivor; worker-survivor; physical being-
sexual partner
6. If we look at how you describe yourself now, and how you described yourself 
before you were diagnosed with cancer, do you see any major differences? 
(if yes) What do you think those differences are?
    * * * *
7. Can we return to your description of yourself before your cancer diagnosis, 
which you created at the beginning. Which were the most important identities 
to you at that point?
Why was being …………….important?
8. Now, let’s look at the ways you described yourself after your experience with 
cancer. Which identities are the most important to you now?
 
What is important about being …………… ?
9. We’ve almost come to the end of our interview. Is there anything I have not 
asked about who you are – your identity – which you feel is important for me 
to know?
Are there any other parts of yourself – private or public – which you feel we 
haven’t touched on here?
    * * * *
10. How have you found taking part today?
Check if participant is showing signs of distress or discomfort. Consider if she 
looks as she did on arrival, and if not, probe (e.g. you are looking a little 
concerned/upset – has anything we have talked about left you feeling anxious/
upset?).
What did she feel, talking about these experiences?
Talk participant through resources sheet. Confirm that will get back in touch 
with participant in 6-9 months time, when research findings have been written 
up, but remind of option to contact me or supervisor in meantime if any issues. 
Thank participant for taking part.
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Identities – Possible Ways of Describing “Who I Am”
1. Social Roles
- Conventional
e.g. woman; mother; step-mother; wife/partner; office 
worker; lawyer; daughter; sister; colleague/employee/boss; 
sexual partner; friend…..  
- Non Conventional
e.g. alcoholic; drug addict; rebel; anarchist; protester……
2. Important Activities & Loyalties
e.g. swimmer; cook; dancer; gardener; reader; party-goer; 
Chelsea supporter…..
3. Organisational Memberships
e.g. anti-apartheid campaigner; church member; political 
party member……  
4. Cancer-Related Identities
e.g. patient; cancer survivor; victim; person with cancer…..
5. Socio-Demographic Characteristics
e.g. female; white; black; Asian; mixed race…….
6. Social Types of Person/Major Personality Traits
e.g. intellectual; leader; optimist; caring; angry…….. 
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Thank you for working through all those details. Do you feel ready to start?
As mentioned before, in this interview we are looking at how a diagnosis of 
breast cancer can affect how a woman sees herself  – her identity. I want to 
understand the world from your point of view, and try as far as I can to 
understand the meaning of your experience. So while I will be asking 
questions, it will be you who is helping me understand your experience as 
closely as I can.
The interview is in four parts. The longest section is the first part, where we 
will be talking about your sense of who you are now, following your experience 
of breast cancer. Then we will talk briefly about any connections between 
aspects of who you are, and those aspects of “you” which are most important 
to you. 
_______________________________________________________________
Part 1 – Who Am I?
1.  Can we begin by exploring your ideas and feelings about yourself, following 
your experience of breast cancer. 
[give participant “Who Am I?” sheet (below), and talk through instructions. 
Estimate c. 5 mins]
2. If you’re ok, what I’d like to do now is to understand a little bit more about 
the things which you have put down on this sheet, and in what ways they may 
have been affected by your experience with cancer.
General
Can you tell me more about ……………?/What is involved in being a …………………?
Change
How has being a ………….been affected – if at all – by your experience with 
cancer?
Evaluation
What things do you value about being a ………….now.?
What do you find difficult about being a ………….now?
Social
Where do you think your sense of being ………..has come from?
How have things outside yourself affected what you feel about being a …………?
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3. At this point, I wondered if we could explore whether there are any other 
aspects of “who you are”, which did not come to mind earlier?
[Prompt based on omissions from earlier “Who Am I?” list.]
Roles: (conventional) work; mother; woman; partner; sexual partner; friend.
 (non-conventional) rebel; protester; alcoholic.
      
Activities/Loyalties: interests (e.g. swimming, dancing); campaigner; church 
member.
Cancer-Related Identities:patient; cancer survivor; victim; person with cancer.
Personality: intellectual; optimist; angry; vulnerable; grateful.
[Explore meaning and any change pre/post cancer as earlier.]
_______________________________________________________________
Part 2 Connections
4. One of the things I would like to understand from you was whether it feels 
like there are connections between different aspects of who you are. Does it 
feel to you like there are any connections? 
[If necessary, prompt with example. E.g. woman – white hair – wisdom.]
5. How are these areas connected?
_______________________________________________________________
Part 3  Importance
6. If we look at the ways you described yourself now, which of these have the 
most significance for you? (significance= mean most, have greatest impact in 
your sense of who you are).
7. Has what is significant about who you are changed, from before your 
experience with breast cancer? (yes = in what ways?)
       
_______________________________________________________________
251
Appendix 3: Revised (final) interview guide (cont.)
Part 4  Other
8. We’ve almost come to the end of our interview. Is there anything I have not 
asked about who you are – your identity – which you feel is important for me 
to know?
Any parts of yourself – public or private – which you feel we haven’t touched 
on here?
_______________________________________________________________
Debrief
9. How have you found taking part today?
Check if participant is showing signs of distress or discomfort.
Consider if she looks if she did on arrival, and if not, gently explore (e.g. you 
are looking a little concerned/upset – has anything we have talked about left 
you feeling anxious/upset?)
What did you feel, talking about these experiences?
 Familiar/unfamiliar thoughts?
 Helpful/not helpful?
Do you have any feedback for me about the interview?
 Questions make sense? Any parts could have been more clearly 
 explained?
 Any questions you feel I should have asked?
 Any feedback on ways I handled things that was helpful/not helpful to 
 you?
Talk participant through resources sheet. Ask if happy with current support, 
and if would find helpful to be put in touch with BCH support.
Confirm that will get back with participant in 6-9 months time, when research 
findings have been written up.
Remind of option to contact me or supervisor in meantime if any issues.
Thank participant for taking part!
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Who Am I?
Please write up to 20 simple answers to the question “Who Am I” in the blanks 
below. Try to answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not to 
someone else. 
Please write the answers in the order they occur to you, with a different 
answer for each blank. Don’t worry about logic or ‘importance’!
I am __________________________________________________________
I am __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
I am  __________________________________________________________
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     questionnaire
This research aims to listen to the experiences of younger women with breast 
cancer. In order to help me explain the characteristics of participants as a 
group, I would be grateful if you would take a couple of minutes completing 
the following questionnaire. Your answers will be anonymous and all 
information will be confidential. Please feel free to leave blank any questions 
which you do not want to answer.
Age: ……………..
Qualifications (please tick any you have obtained):
None     □ GCSE/equivalent  □ 
Trade Apprenticeship  □ A/AS Levels/equivalent □ 
Diploma in Higher Education □ First Degree   □ 
Postgraduate Qualification □ Don’t Know   □ 
How would you describe your ethnic origin? (Please choose from the 
following):
Asian - Bangladeshi  □ Black  - African   □
 - Indian   □  - Caribbean   □
 - Pakistani   □  - Other Black background □
 - Other Asian background □ Chinese    □
Mixed Ethic background:    White    □
 - Asian & White  □ 
 - Black African & White □ Any other ethnic background □
- Black Caribbean & White□
- Other mixed ethnic □
   background
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Appendix 4:  Optional socio-demographic & treatment 
     questionnaire (cont.) 
Which location best describes where you live?
London area    □ Leeds area   □
In which month were you diagnosed with breast cancer?    ………………………….
What staging was given to your breast cancer at diagnosis?  
Stage 0/pre-cancer □ Stage I  □ Stage II □
What treatment have you received for your breast cancer?(please tick all that 
apply)
Surgery □ Chemotherapy □ Radiotherapy  □
If surgery, what kind of surgery did you experience?(please tick all that apply)
Lumpectomy □ Mastectomy □ Double mastectomy □ 
Other surgery □
If chemotherapy, how many individual sessions of chemotherapy did you 
experience?
1-2  □ 3-4  □ 5-6  □  6+ □
If radiotherapy, how many weeks of treatment did you experience?
1 or fewer □ 3 or fewer □ 5 or fewer □  5+ □
Thank you for completing this form.
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256
Appendix 6: Recruitment flyer advertising for participants
Were you diagnosed with breast 
cancer between 4 – 18 months 
ago?
Would you be willing to talk 
about the way this diagnosis 
has affected your life?
My name is Catherine Nelson. As part of a doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology at City University, I am carrying out 
research into the experiences of women with breast cancer, 
prompted by my own earlier experience of breast cancer. All 
my research is confidential and would involve an interview 
carried out on a one-to-one basis. The research findings will 
be used to identify ways women may be appropriately 
supported through their time with cancer.
If you think you might be interested, or would like to find out 
more, please contact me on 07919 557565 or email me at 
Catherine.Nelson.1@city.ac.uk. Thank you!
[This research is supervised by Susan van Scoyoc, Chartered Counselling 
Psychologist (telephone 01245 330003; email susanvanscoyoc@mac.com)].
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Appendix 7: Telephone interview with prospective participants
Thank you for calling.
As you saw on the flyer, as part of my doctoral research, I am interested in 
talking to women to explore how their identity, or sense of who they are, has 
changed since their diagnosis with breast cancer.
If you choose to take part, you would be helping in two ways:
- you would be helping to increase understanding about the psychological 
journey faced by people with cancer
- through this understanding, you would be helping those working with 
people with cancer to develop new programmes of support.
Would it be useful if I talked you through what taking part would involve?
There are 5 things which are important for you to know.
- The first is that research would involve one interview of between 90 
minutes and 2 hours. The interview would take place at Breast Cancer 
Haven. I would ask you some questions and you would have the 
opportunity to share your experiences about whether your diagnosis 
with breast cancer has affected your identity, or your sense of who you 
are. This may include ways in which cancer has negatively or positively 
changed your sense of self as a person.
- The second thing is that I would like to audio tape the interview, so I 
can make sure I have an accurate record of our conversation.
- Thirdly, everything which we talk about in our interview will be treated 
as confidential, and will be guided by professional standards laid down 
by my professional body, the British Psychological Society. This means 
that your identity and participation will be known only by me. When the 
research is written up and sent for publication, no names or identifying 
details will be included in any document. With your consent, I will delete 
your identifying details following completion of this research. 
- Fourthly, your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You can 
withdraw from the study at any time, including in the middle of the 
interview, should you wish. 
- Finally, your participation in this study will also have no impact on your 
connection to Breast Cancer Haven. Though Breast Cancer Haven has 
kindly enabled me to talk to potential participants, this research is being 
run separately through the psychology department at City University. 
Should you wish to confirm my details there, you can contact either 
Nikki Hann (Counselling Psychology Programme Administrator: 020 7040 
4564; nikki.hann.1@city.ac.uk) or my research supervisor, Susan van 
Scoyoc (01245 330003; susanvanscoyoc@mac.com).
Do you have any questions on this so 
far?            
    
258
Appendix 7: Telephone interview with prospective participants 
    (cont.)
Do you think you might be interested in taking part?
If no: That’s fine – I understand that ……………Thank you very much for getting 
in touch to talk about this. I’m really grateful to you for making the effort to 
talk through this with me. 
If yes: That’s great. Thank you. There are a few brief guidelines for this study 
which I need to check out with you before we arrange to meet. Can I run 
through these now?
Firstly, when were you diagnosed with breast cancer?
When you were diagnosed, what staging was your cancer?
Was this your first experience of cancer?
Have you had any treatment previously for serious longstanding health issues, 
such as heart problems, or had any experience of psychological illnesses such 
as schizophrenia or severe depression?
If don’t meet inclusion criteria:  I’m really sorry. I’m very grateful for your 
willingness to participate, but this particular study is focussing only on those 
(who were diagnosed within P18M/for whom this is the first experience of 
cancer/whose cancer is Stage 0-2). 
I’m sorry that we can’t talk further at this stage. 
If do meet criteria: Thank you! Can we arrange a time and place to meet? We 
can try to arrange a time to coincide with your visit to Breast Cancer Haven, if 
there are rooms available there.
OK, so that’s ……am/pm.at ……..on …………….
Can I take a contact telephone number in case of problems? 
If it’s alright with you, I’d also like to send an email or letter so you have the 
key details of our conversation. Is there an email or a land address which you 
would be happy for me to use?
OK, that’s great. 
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part. I look forward to meeting you 
on …………….
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Appendix 8: Pre-interview email/letter (following telephone 
    interview)
Dear ……………..
Thank you for agreeing to take part in my research project. As mentioned on 
the telephone, I wanted to set out the main points we discussed in writing, so 
you have time to reflect on your involvement before the interview.
What is the research looking at?
My research project seeks to give a voice to women who have been diagnosed 
with breast cancer. The interview will seek to explore your sense of who you 
are – your “identity” – both before and after your diagnosis. As part of this 
discussion, we may review whether parts of your identity have changed, and 
whether cancer has affected parts of your identity positively or negatively.
Why will this research be useful?
This research can be useful in two ways. It will increase understanding of the 
mental or psychological “work” involved in dealing with an experience of breast 
cancer, through communication and/or publication of the research. It will also 
be used to develop support programmes for those diagnosed with cancer in the 
future.  
What is involved in taking part?
- The research involves one interview of between 90 minutes and 2 hours. 
I will ask you some questions and you will have the opportunity to share 
your experiences about any things which have changed in your identity, 
and any ways in which you have stayed the same, since you were 
diagnosed with breast cancer.
- The interview will be audio-taped, so I have an accurate record of our 
conversation.
- Everything we talk about in our interview will be treated as confidential, 
and will be guided by professional standards laid down by my 
professional body, the British Psychological Society. This means that 
your identity and participation will be known only by me. When the 
research is written up and sent for publication, no names or identifying 
details will be included in any document. With your consent, I will delete 
your identifying details following completion of this research. 
- Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You can withdraw from 
the study at any time, including in the middle of the interview, should 
you wish. 
- It is possible that the areas we cover in the interview may cause you 
discomfort. However, past research has shown that many people 
appreciate sharing their experiences with another person, and take 
pleasure in knowing their experience can be used to benefit others.
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Appendix 8: Pre-interview email/letter (following telephone 
    interview)  (cont.)
- Your participation in this study will also have no impact on your 
connection to Breast Cancer Haven. Though Breast Cancer Haven has 
kindly enabled me to talk to potential participants, this research is being 
run separately through the psychology department at City 
University.    
Should you wish to confirm my details there, you can contact either 
Nikki Hann (Counselling Psychology Programme Administrator: 020 7040 
4564; nikki.hann.1@city.ac.uk) or my research supervisor, Susan van 
Scoyoc (01245 330003; susanvanscoyoc@mac.com).
I hope this helps confirm what we talked about on the telephone. If you have 
any additional questions after reading this, please do not hesitate to contact 
me.
I am grateful for your agreeing to participate in this research. I look forward to 
meeting you on …………….. at ……………….at ………………….
With best regards
Yours sincerely
Catherine Nelson
Email: Catherine.Nelson.1@city.ac.uk
Telephone: 07919 557565
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Appendix 9: Consent form
This research project is being carried out as part of my doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology at City University. It is guided by the research 
principles of the British Psychological Society, and the project is supervised by 
Susan van Scoyoc, Chartered Counselling Psychologist. I am interested in 
hearing about your sense of who you are – your identity - both before and 
after a diagnosis of breast cancer.
Thank you for taking part in this project. We will explore your experiences of 
identity and cancer in a one-to-one research interview which will take 
approximately 1 ½ hours. So that I have an accurate record for the research, 
the interview will be audio-taped. This audio-tape will then be transcribed. 
The tape and transcript will only be listened to and read by those directly 
involved in the research project.  Short passages from the interview may be 
used in the final write-up of the research. However, in all such instances – 
including tape, transcript and final write up – your confidentiality will be 
preserved. Names and identifying features will be removed from all relevant 
items.
There is a possibility that discussion of your experiences might lead to some 
discomfort or distress. However, many people with cancer have also found it 
beneficial to share their experiences, particularly if it can be used to help 
others. 
Finally, I would like to emphasise that your participation in this research is 
voluntary. It is in no way connected to your involvement with Breast Cancer 
Haven. You are free to refuse to answer any question, and can withdraw at any 
time.
I agree that the purpose of this research and the nature of my 
participation in this research have been clearly explained to me in a 
manner that I understand, and that I have had the opportunity to ask 
any questions that I might have. I therefore consent to take part in an 
interview about my experiences of identity following a diagnosis of 
breast cancer, and consent to this research being audio-taped, 
transcribed and used for the purpose of research.
Signed: ………………………………………………………….....
Printed: ……………………………………………………………..
Date:  ……………………………………………..................    
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Appendix 9: Consent form (cont.)  
On behalf of those involved in this research, I undertake that confidentiality 
will be ensured with regard to any material presented from this research. This 
material will be used for the purposes of research only and the anonymity of 
this interviewee will be protected.
Signed: ………………………………………………………….
  Catherine Nelson
As discussed, I would be happy to share the findings of this research with you, 
and would welcome your feedback on the findings.
Would you like a report of the results of the project?  Yes/No
How would you like to receive this report?    Email/Post
Would you be interested in discussing the report?  No/Yes – in group/
Yes – only with 
researcher
Postal or email address for those asking for a report:
……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………...
……………………………………………………………………
I would be grateful if you would sign both copies of this consent form. One 
copy will be for you to keep.
Contact Information:
Researcher:  Catherine Nelson
   07919 557565
   Catherine.Nelson.1@city.ac.uk
Supervisor:  Susan van Scoyoc
   01245 330003
   susanvanscoyoc@mac.com
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Appendix 11: Table of super-ordinate themes for Nina  
Appendix 11: Table of super-ordinate themes for Nina (cont.)
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Appendix 11: Table of super-ordinate themes for Nina (cont.)
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Appendix 12: Table of group super-ordinate themes 
Appendix 12: Table of group super-ordinate themes (cont.)
Appendix 12: Table of group super-ordinate themes (cont.)
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Appendix 13: Table of frequency of occurrence of super-ordinate 
    themes across participants
